Perpetuating a peace process

A convergence of interests of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE has fuelled the determination to keep the peace process on track under adverse conditions, and contributed to an amazing quantum of mutual flexibility.

THE euphoric mood surrounding the ongoing peace process in Sri Lanka continues. The four-day conclave at the Rose Garden resort in Nakorn Pathom in Thailand has concluded on an optimistic note. Given the circumstances under which the second round of talks was conducted, it is indeed heartening that the peace parley achieved progress, particularly on certain prickly issues.

What is most striking about the talks is the transparent resolve and determination of both parties to maintain the eight-month-old ceasefire, continue the talks and preserve the peace process.

Apart from the stated objective of establishing permanent peace, both the United National Front (UNF) government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have particular reasons that are somewhat congruent. It is this convergence, if not identity, of interests that has fuelled the determination to keep the peace process on track under adverse conditions. This desire has contributed to an amazing quantum of mutual flexibility, which in turn perpetuates the peace process.

The first round of talks at the Thai naval base in Sattahip resulted in agreement on two crucial matters. One was to set up a joint task force (JTF) to coordinate matters relating to the resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced persons in the North-Eastern province along with the reconstruction and development of war-affected areas. The second was to set up a committee to expedite de-militarisation of the northeastern region and to quicken the pace of achieving normalcy. While the latter was only a logical extension of the Ceasefire Agreement of February 22, the former was a novel and radical concept. Although the decision was positive and unanimous, there were difficulties and differences of opinion about its actual implementation.

The draft legislation formulated by Norway, the facilitator, after consulting both sides envisaged the setting up of the JTF under the Prime Minister's Secretariat and being responsible to it. With the executive President adopting a confrontational posture towards the peace process the only way to ensure the smooth functioning of the JTF was to keep it under the Prime Minister. The LTTE, however, was not amenable. The Tigers perceive the current conflict as a national question between two "nations" and not as a simple "minority" problem. The LTTE was reluctant to accept the "superiority" of the Prime Minister's office at this juncture on the JTF issue.

Another problem arose from the Muslim Congress ranks. Muslim Parliamentarians of the Eastern Province, rebelling against the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) "Thalaiver" Rauff Hakeem, wanted two joint task forces, one for the North and one for the East. If that was not possible, they wanted a separate JTF for all Muslim majority divisions in the North-East. Interestingly, Hakeem, too, concurred with the proposal to set up separate JTFs for the North and the East. He was silent on the demand for a separate JTF for Muslims in the North-East. Hakeem, however, raised valid objections about "duplication". Most of the proposed functions and powers of the JTF were already with different ministries. The Finance, Planning, Plan Implementation, Eastern Development, Wanni Development, Rehabilitation and Development Ministries were already carrying out these functions. Hakeem questioned the need to set up a parallel structure and the division or equation of powers envisaged. He pointed out possible areas of friction.

Apart from the procedural problems, there were also legal issues. There was ambiguity about the JTF's validity in functioning under the Prime Minister when executive power, under the Constitution, is vested solely in the executive president. It was highly unlikely that the LTTE would accept President Chandrika Kumaratunga's authority over the JTF.

There was also the possibility of some concerned "citizen" challenging the JTF's validity and authority in court. In the aftermath of the unanimous Supreme Court determination on the proposed 18th and 19th constitutional amendments there was much anxiety and concern about such a development.

The Supreme Court ruling had made the UNF government nervous about another judicial fiasco. The best way to ensure undisputed authority and validity for the proposed JTF would have been to pass a constitutional amendment. That was not possible because the UNF did not have a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Furthermore, even simple legislation on this was a question mark on account of the Muslim Congress factor. With nine SLMC members boycotting Parliament, the government was not sure even of a simple majority. Of course, there was the Tamil National Alliance with 15 MPs, but if for some reason the LTTE decided to send out a contrary signal the TNA would not support it. Besides, with the SLMC wanting two JTFs and the Tamils one there was no chance of both sides voting together.

Another spectre looming large over the UNF government was the "political" ascendancy of President Kumaratunga as a result of the Supreme Court ruling. Come December 5, Kumaratunga will be empowered to dissolve Parliament. Complicating matters further was the SLMC crisis and the extremist demands of the rebelling faction. Appeasing that faction would alienate the Tamil parties and possibly the LTTE.

In such a fluid situation the UNF government was unsure of what the LTTE would do. A key element in the LTTE's strategy was its demand for a North-Eastern Interim Administrative Council. Without a two-thirds majority in Parliament there was no chance of the government delivering on it. For the same reason there was little chance of implementing any worthwhile decision on constitutional reform taken at the peace talks. Thus there seemed very little incentive for the LTTE to continue participating in a process that seemed unable to deliver constructively. And with Ranil Wickremasinghe's position becoming shaky, vis--vis the SLMC dissidence, it was questionable whether the LTTE saw any tangible benefit in continuing to palaver. After all, when the People's Alliance (P.A.) government was floundering last year, the LTTE announced that it "was not willing to board a sinking ship"

Other tensions, too, were impacting on the peace process. President Kumaratunga was exerting strong pressure on the government to take up core issues for discussion at the talks. Both the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, in association with Norway, had agreed upon a structured approach, carefully sequencing issues and proceeding on a step-by-step basis. There was also concern about the human rights situation in the North-East.

GIVEN this gloomy scenario, the ostensible results were made possible by the pragmatic flexibility displayed by all sides. It was advantageous to the UNF government, the LTTE, SLMC leader Hakeem and the Norwegians to keep the process alive instead of letting it collapse through rigidly contradictory stances. This brought about a conciliatory atmosphere and a spirit of give and take at the Rose Garden resort.

The security aspect was given urgent priority because of the fragile and vulnerable situation. There were three broad conflictually contradictory areas creating tensions. First, there was the armed forces-civilian contradiction; secondly the armed forces-LTTE contradiction; thirdly the Tamil-Muslim contradiction in the East. The conflict between the forces and civilians had led to several incidents of friction, notably the Kanchirankudah shooting. This led to a Tamil demand that the Special Task Force camps at Thirukkovil, Thandiady and Kanchirankudah be removed. There were similar demands over other camps located in civilian areas and housed in schools, places of worship and public buildings. There was also the question of downsizing areas declared as high-security and security zones. Another point was de-mining.

These problems prevented the resettlement of civilians and the return of normalcy. The process of de-escalation envisaged in the Ceasefire Agreement was undermined and delayed by these shortcomings. Moreover, several sporadic incidents threatened to disrupt the ceasefire. One way of containing and possibly eliminating this was by strengthening the Ceasefire Agreement and enlarging the scope of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. These decisions were taken and measures agreed upon.

A significant decision was the appointment of a sub-committee on de-escalation and normalisation. This sub-committee would be a mechanism to maintain a structured dialogue among the parties to the conflict. While accommodating the security concerns of the other side, this panel will examine ways and means of resettlement, return of property and resumption of economic activity.

The sub-committee will be co-chaired by Defence Secretary Austin Fernando and Eastern Special Commander Vinayagamoorthy Muraleetharan alias Col. Karuna of the LTTE. It will comprise high-level civilian and military personnel from both sides. This panel is, in a sense, a logical corollary of the ceasefire agreement. It will follow up and expedite de-escalation of the conflict process. Moreover, the decision to appoint the sub-committee was taken at the Sattahip round. Apart from Karuna, the LTTE political commissars of Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Wanni and Jaffna-Kilinochchi, namely Kaushalyan, Tilak, Elilan and Ilamparithi respectively, will be in the panel. So will be their military commander counterparts Paduman, Jeyam and Theepan.

Enhancing the security angle further was the seven-point agreement reached in relation to the Eastern Province. This agreement, if implemented, will lay the groundwork for an improved security situation in the East for all three parties the forces, the LTTE and Muslims. Karuna, Gen. Kottegoda and Rauff Hakeem were involved greatly in the tripartite exercise that led to the agreement. Under it, Karuna is scheduled to meet the commandant of the STF, DIG Nimal Gunetilleke, to iron out the differences. Karuna and Hakeem also met privately away from the conference table. Apparently much understanding was achieved. The Hakeem-Karuna "concord" was an extension of the accord reached between the SLMC leader and the LTTE chief V. Prabakaran on April 13. Had that agreement been implemented, much of the Tamil-Muslim problems could have been avoided.

Another noteworthy achievement at Rose Garden resort was the jettisoning of the proposed JTF. Since this proposal was ridden with problems and vulnerable in several directions the decision to establish a "low profile" sub-committee in its place was arrived at. It will be called the sub-committee on immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation needs in the North-East. Its role will be to identify humanitarian and rehabilitation needs, prioritise implementation activities catering to those needs, decide on financial resources for those activities and determine implementation agencies for each activity. Its headquarters will be in the Kilinochchi GA office with branches in Colombo, Batticaloa and Kalmunai. It will be co-headed by Peace Secretariat Director Bernard Gunetilleke and LTTE political wing chief S.P. Thamilchelvan. There will be eight representatives, four each from both sides; two of the government members will be Muslims. The original figure of six on the JTF was increased to eight on this panel to give more weightage to Muslims.

The most immediate objective of this panel will be to assist Norway in holding the aid-pledging conference in Oslo on November 25, to which India too has been invited. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe and Anton Balasingham will address the conference and also interact personally for the first time. The high-level conference will be attended by persons like U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, British Overseas Development Minister Claire Short and Canada's International Cooperation Minister Susan Whelan.

A concerted appeal will be made for aid to address urgent humanitarian and rehabilitation needs in the war-ravaged areas. Three prioritised purposes are resettling and rehabilitating internally displaced persons, rehabilitating war-affected women and children, providing livelihood for war-affected people in the North-East. It is expected that around $775 million will be mobilised for these needs in Oslo.

A third sub-committee to be set up will be on political matters. It will be co-chaired by the chief negotiators of the Sri Lankan and LTTE delegations, Prof. G.L. Peiris and Anton Balasingham. Other government representatives, including Hakeem and LTTE nominees, will be included on this panel. The parties will jointly and separately address in depth, at the current stage of the peace process, relevant subjects such as other peace processes, political solutions to ethnic conflicts, models and systems of government, issues of post-conflict transition, coordination of international assistance, and reconciliation processes. The parties will interact with relevant experts and practitioners in these fields as a basis for the formulation of approaches to the critical political issues for consideration in the future sessions of the peace talks. In short, this panel will help prepare the stage for addressing what are described as core issues or principles. Thus the panel has helped deflate criticism about core issues not being addressed.

It could be seen, therefore, that the setting up of three sub-committees under the auspices of the peace conference has helped cover a wide range of issues in the security, economic and political spheres. The pragmatic and conciliatory approaches adopted have facilitated the smooth progress of the peace process and avoided breakdown pitfalls. The process was reinforced by the continuing incremental strategy of moving forward step by step while dealing with the current realities on the ground.

Despite the euphoria about the progress achieved, the reality is that both sides are scrupulously avoiding meaningful discussion on contentious issues. The mutual focus seems to be on harnessing as much financial aid as possible for rehabilitation and development. While this "humanitarian" approach cannot be faulted, the future will depend on the crucial question of a constitutional settlement. Will there be agreement and will there be a Southern Consensus for it?