Talks and tribulations

While the government-LTTE talks have been welcomed by and large in Sri Lanka, they have also led to fears of an agreement that might compromise the security of Sinhalese and Muslims, particularly in the eastern districts.

"Politics is war without bloodshed."

- Mao Tse Tung (1893-1976), in a 1938 lecture.

THERE is a saying used often by those in sticky situations: "It takes two to tango." In Sri Lanka, however, a coming together of just the two main players - the government of the day and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) - is not enough to script a fairytale ending to the island-nation's two-decades-old separatist conflict.

It requires, as a precondition, domestic political consensus, particularly among the southern mainstream political parties. Equally important is the nod of important regional players, given the geo-strategic position of the island - at the crossroads between South Asia and South-East Asia. And, above all, given the present structure of the Sri Lankan state, the assent of the President, who is empowered with unparalleled constitutional powers.

A reality check on the progress of the Sri Lankan peace process reveals a picture that is not as rosy as the recently concluded second round of talks in Thailand. After the breakthroughs made at the Rose Garden talks in October - with the government and the Tigers agreeing to look at political, military and development issues through joint committees - the main actors in the conflict are headed towards the more difficult part of the journey.

To begin with, the agreements will have to be adhered to, in letter and spirit, by the two sides. A glimpse at the island's handling of the conflict shows a long list of broken promises. The shreds of the agreements signed in Sri Lanka's bloodstained past are grim reminders of the mistakes that should not be repeated if the latest peace efforts are to be meaningful.

Translating the words of the peace deals into action requires a demonstrated move away from the status quo by both the government and the Tigers. Apprehensions in the south, particularly among the opponents of the peace process, that the government is "giving away too much without getting anything in return" can be countered only if the government and the LTTE stick to what they have agreed upon.

While there is a general welcome from the Opposition that the sensitive issue of an interim administration for the North-East has been "dropped", there is continued scepticism on other counts. The earlier demand was that the negotiators should move on to the core issues. Now, after the formation of the sub-committee on political matters, the demand is likely to be for greater inclusiveness in the conflict-resolution process.

The first sign of this was already out with an appeal by a pro-peace group, the National Peace Council. An "area of concern", it said, "is the growing feeling of being left out that is being experienced by a large section of the people". On the face of it, the feeling may seem bizarre, when a government, which was popularly elected barely a year ago, is engaging the LTTE in negotiations. But it could be attributed to the deep political divide. There is a feeling among the Opposition People's Alliance (P.A.), which commenced the peace process with Norwegian involvement, that its efforts are not being recognised. Oft-repeated observations about President Chandrika Kumaratunga's contribution, by Colombo's chief negotiator G.L. Peiris, have apparently not had the desired effect. Recently, Kumaratunga expressed her satisfaction at the LTTE dropping its demand for an interim administration; the P.A. claimed credit for it as it had opposed giving such powers unless a negotiated settlement was reached.

Another, perhaps more realistic, apprehension of those who feel "left out" relates to the three eastern districts - Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai - which have a near-equal distribution of Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims. After decades of conflict, the fear now is about any agreement that would compromise the security of Sinhalese and Muslims. This concern has to be addressed effectively as any shoddy resolution of this complication is bound to derail the entire peace train. Given the bitter experiences of Muslims and Sinhalese in the East, the apprehensions have some merit in them. The onus is therefore on the LTTE and the government, more so the Tigers, to prove that the post-conflict situation will not be discriminatory. An institutional guarantee, in whatever form, is likely to satisfy the dissidents on this count.

Moreover, the more the sense of insecurity among the Muslim community, the more possible the radicalisation of its youth. In addition, the void in the Sinhalese political leadership in the region makes it a possible fertile ground for hardline opponents to stoke sentiments that could lead to the situation turning volatile.

The second round of talks laid a basis for dispelling Muslim fears when the leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), Rauf Hakeem, and the LTTE's military commander for Batticaloa and Amparai, Karuna, agreed to hold regular meetings to resolve this issue. The time has now come to start delivering on the promises made and the agreements reached.

Apart from the practical result of forming joint committees, the second round of talks put forward a few conceptual points that Sri Lanka will have to take cognisance of. While attention has been focussed on the future of Muslims and Sinhalese in the North-East, the non-LTTE Tamil political player has been ignored. Two Tamil parties - the Eelam People's Democratic Party and the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam - and a faction of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front, led by former Chief Minister of the North-East Varadaraja Perumal, have remained outside the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance.

To implement meaningfully the LTTE's announcement of its ultimate desire to join the democratic mainstream would necessitate the free participation of its political opponents. The LTTE's position that it would "accept and assimilate" dissidents is seen as a not-too-encouraging sign by some political commentators, who feel that the Tigers would prefer "assimilation" to dissent.

The most important domestic factor that continues to create a sense of uneasiness in relation to the conflict-resolution process is the Presidency. The Constitution vests executive power in the President. A recent judicial verdict - on the aborted 19th amendment - made it clear that the President's powers are inalienable.

Abraham Lincoln said: "As President, I have no eyes but constitutional eyes."

The root of the Sri Lankan problem, however, is in the Constitution, which President Kumaratunga has wanted to abolish since she first came to power in 1994. However, she has linked the abolition of the executive presidency to the resolution of the conflict. That Kumaratunga is the head of the main Opposition party, the P.A., makes the situation even more uncertain.

If the issue were to be looked at only through the constitutional eye, any resolution requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament, which is not possible for any single party under the present electoral system based on proportional representation. The Ranil Wickremasinghe administration has taken a massive political gamble in embarking on the peace process. To take it to a successful end requires the support of not just the Tigers but the other minorities and, most importantly, the P.A. and the President. While there has been a coming together between the Tigers and the government, and to a certain extent the Muslim minorities, support from the Opposition remains elusive.

With the P.A.'s position that its backing of the peace process would not amount to a "blank cheque", and the President's desire that the conflict should be resolved on the basis of the draft proposals put forward by her, the much-required coming together of political forces remains distant. To that extent, the island-nation can very well be described as going through a phase of a war without bloodshed.