Musharraf's mandate

In the April 30 referendum, Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf manages to win a 'landslide'.

GENERAL PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, like the other three Generals who were at the helm of affairs in Pakistan, is convinced that he is out to make history. But each of the Generals has seemed to repeat rather than create history. Consolidation of their rule through referendums by three of them best illustrates the point.

They all have trodden the same path: they have had contempt for politicians and the Constitution of the day and had an unshakeable belief in the capabilities of the Army. Military rulers have believed that the people are dying to be delivered from the "slavery of the wretched political class" and that the armed forces can offer the panacea for all the ills of society.

October 1958: Self-styled Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan takes over the reins in the first military coup in Pakistan and becomes Chief Martial Law Administrator. In February 1961, he opts for the referendum route to become the country's President, and thus sets a precedent. The question then posed was: "Do you have confidence in the leadership of President Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, Hilal-I-Jurat?"

1969: General Yahya Khan captures power on the strength of a martial law.

1977: General Zia-ul-Haq overthrows Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. After being in the saddle for seven years he holds a referendum in December 1984 with a loaded question: "Whether the people of Pakistan endorse the process initiated by General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan, for bringing the laws of Pakistan in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) and for the preservation of the ideology of Pakistan, for the continuation and consolidation of that process and for the smooth and orderly transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people."

October 1999: General Pervez Musharraf takes over the country in a bloodless coup. Six months before the end of the three years stipulated by the Supreme Court for the transfer of power, he falls back on the referendum option in order to stay on in power for another five years with effect from the date on which the new Assembly meets after the promised general elections in October.

The question asked in the April 30 referendum left nothing to imagination. "Do you favour continuation of local government system, restoration of democracy; sustainability and continuity of reforms, elimination of sectarianism and completion of Quaid-I-Azam's (Mohammad Ali Jinnah, founder of Pakistan) concept. Do you want to elect President General Pervez Musharraf for the next five years as President of Pakistan?"

Three rhetorical questions. And Pakistanis were thrice faced with Hobson's choice. Three military dictators who came to power "to end the misrule of corrupt politicians", chose this mode to legitimise themselves in the eyes of the world and to procure for them easy extensions of tenure. The tenure of Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq lasted for almost a decade each. They left distinct legacies, of which the country's Constitution was the worst victim. Ayub Khan came to power in 1958, two years after Pakistan adopted its Constitution and the federal parliamentary structure. He abrogated the Constitution and within two years went in for a referendum through an 80,000 strong electoral college consisting of representatives to grassroots bodies created by his own regime. The fallout: the country had a new Constitution based on the presidential form of government. It was a 95.6 per cent 'aye' vote. The fact that 3,000 of the handpicked 'basic democrats' had still voted 'against' was ignored.

Politicians were given the choice of giving up politics for six years or facing disqualification tribunals. The military ruled the roost, and Cabinet members were made to take the oath of "allegiance to both - the country and the President".

Yahya Khan, the next military leader, is known to have commented that he did not want to be as powerless as "the queen of England". His reign was terminated in 1971 following the Bangladesh debacle.

The period between 1971 and 1977 was perhaps the best years for democracy in Pakistan. But the high was followed by a bitter low. Bhutto, the elected Prime Minister, was sent to the gallows and Zia-ul-Haq played havoc with the country and its constitution for 11 years as he kept reneging on his "election in 90 days" promise. Comfortably in his fourth year at the helm, he felt the need to confirm his leadership. He revived the local bodies but only to use them as cadre and supporters. He was the first to go directly to the masses to seek endorsement for himself on the plank of Islamisation. This time the turnout officially was 64 per cent and the 'yes' portion 97.7 per cent. According to commentators, Zia's referendum was an open fraud. The turnout was very low. Polling booths were deserted. The Army top brass knew the referendum was a scam. This perhaps triggered Zia's denouement.

The Army - his main constituency - realised that the man who claimed to be a champion of Islam had indulged in a dubious lie. Zia was killed in a plane crash in August 1988. Brigadier (Retd.) A.R. Siddiqui wrote in the Defence Journal soon after the crash: "It was an inside job".

By then the Constitution had been tampered with. Thanks to the proxy war in Afghanistan between the United States and the Soviet Union, Zia had emerged as a frontline ally of the West. The consequences of this for Pakistan society were disastrous. Kalashnikovs and drugs became the order of the day, and jehad gained international legitimacy.

Zia introduced the new Hadid, or Islamic injunctions, and took the country back to the presidential form, though this time with Parliament being kept alive. Partyless elections were held and Prime Ministers came in with meagre majorities, which were managed by the Army from behind the scenes. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) bloomed.

After the demise of Zia, four successive elected governments were first brought in with doctored mandates and then sent packing, and the unanimously adopted 1973 Constitution was altered once again. With generous support from a section of the military, Nawaz Sharif came to power in 1997 with a 'heavy mandate' enough to amend the Constitution. The brute majority in the Assemblies he commanded was used to the full to "fix opponents". He had even thought of putting the Army top brass in its place, but it proved to be a total miscalculation. He found himself mired in newer controversies - the executive-judiciary spat, corruption charges, the Kargil intrusion and so on - and these paved the way for yet another military takeover.

Allegedly threatened (the incident concerned involved the plane aboard which he was returning from abroad), Chief of the Army Staff Pervez Musharraf, the reluctant coup-maker and the 'architect' of the Kargil war, undid Nawaz Sharif in October 1999. Unlike his predecessors, Musharraf did not impose martial law. Aware of the new sensitivities of the international community on 'democracy and democratic values' he donned the hat of Chief Executive. He had as his main card his open-faced sincerity to put the country on the path to progress and rescue the 'hapless' people from the clutches of 'evil politicians'. He dubbed the mainstream parties' leaders looters and plunderers and vowed never to allow them back into politics. He was welcomed by the vast majority of the people.

The General began to show his true colours sometime in the middle of 2001. Even as he was judicially mandated to return the country to democracy by October 2002 and to carry on his reform agenda, he preferred to confer on himself the title of President General in June 2001. And the twist in the tale came six months before the scheduled elections to the National Assembly. Naturally, a referendum in search of legitimacy followed.

Like Ayub Khan (basic democracies) and Zia (the religious lobby), Musharraf assiduously built up his own constituency. A result of this effort was the system of nazims (administrators) and representatives of the local bodies created by his government through partyless elections a year ago. In the name of "genuine and true democracy", Musharraf created a new power-centre that is loyal to none other than himself.

Unprecedented powers were conferred on the grassroots representatives. The system of commissioners was abolished and the police have been made accountable to the new rulers. One wonders how the members of the Provincial Assemblies would cohabitate with the new set-up. As things stand, there is little doubt that a major confrontation is on the cards.

It was no coincidence then that Musharraf banked on the representatives of the local bodies for his campaign and the landslide victory. All the 23 rallies addressed by him were shows put up with generous help from the state administrations and the all-powerful Army Core Commanders. Funds meant for development schemes were diverted for the rallies.

No one has a clue as to how much money was spent on the campaign. The state-run PTV was milked to televise his campaign full time. One saw a 'son of the soil', symbolic of the identity crisis Pakistan has perhaps come to suffer. The General campaigned across the nation. Dressed in his Army fatigues, he would sport colourful local headgear like any seasoned politician. The Army was politicised like never before. At a rally in Faisalabad (in Punjab province), the Governor went to the extent of instigating the crowd to shout 'shame, shame' against the press for underplaying the turnout at the rallies.

What transpired on April 30 took the cake. Local and foreign media ran stories of tainted polls and deserted booths. Voter identity cards were made non-essential and the whole country was turned into one constituency, though for many first-time voters the whole exercise was often beyond comprehension. The press, independent organisations such as the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), and political parties opposed to the referendum were unanimous in their view that the turnout was the lowest ever in the history of Pakistan. There were reports galore of rigging and misuse of official machinery.

Political parties estimated the turnout anywhere between 5 and 10 per cent. Granted they could be biased, even the most optimistic estimate put out by the managers of Musharraf ranged between 40 and 50 per cent. Just three hours before the official declaration of the result (when 80 per cent of the votes were yet to be counted) the country's Information Minister, at a news conference in Islamabad, put the voter turnout at 50 per cent.

And then came the astonishing news from the Pakistan Election Commission at 9.30 p.m. (Pakistan Standard Time) on May 1. The voter turnout was a record 71 per cent, with nearly 98 per cent saying 'aye'.

Musharraf is least impressed with the arguments of "cynics" on the outcome of the referendum. This was more than evident in his thanksgiving address to the nation on May 2. He profusely thanked the Election Commission for ensuring a "clean and transparent" referendum.

A section of the intelligentsia in Pakistan is convinced that the U.S. cannot escape responsibility for encouraging military regimes. In fact, after the September 11 terror attack, the U.S. has not missed any opportunity to praise the bold stand taken by Musharraf in the fight against international terrorism. The irony is that in the 1980s the U.S. needed Zia to whip up the frenzy of Islam and jehad for the war in Afghanistan. Today it needs Musharraf to 'de-Islamise' Pakistan and wage a war on the culture of jehad.

LOVE him or hate him, Musharraf, is perhaps the most powerful President Pakistan has seen.

The run-up to the April 30 vote has left the country polarised, with 30-odd political, religious and human rights organisations meeting under one banner to condemn the referendum and another motley group supporting the Musharraf reform plan. Musharraf made it clear that there was no place in Pakistan's politics for the two former Prime Ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Political observers believe that minus Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), which they head respectively, cannot survive as mainstream parties.

In the run-up to the voting, the President had also made it clear that he expected the Assemblies and the new Prime Minister to function in complete 'harmony' with the President. "A clear line is drawn through this referendum - those who are opposed to the reforms of my regime and those who favoured them. Logic dictates that my victory should ensure the emergence of pro-reform parties in the forefront in the October general elections."

Indications from Musharraf's managers are that the regime would go all out in support of the parties that backed him. How else could the 'harmony' be realised?

Commentators have noted that the poor voter turnout should be reason enough for Musharraf to reach out to the larger parties. Lack of voter interest showed the failure of what are known as 'king's parties' and the newly created partyless local bodies system to mobilise the masses.

Even though this polarisation does not augur well for the polity, Musharraf is all set to define the rules. The game plan he has in mind would in effect reduce the National and Provincial Assemblies to 'rubber-stamp' legislatures, with the President and the National Security Council (NSC) overseeing their functioning.

The new Assemblies would have no jurisdiction over his economic and political reforms. 'Supreme national interest' shall be the guiding principle of the new political set-up and the NSC, headed by Musharraf and essentially seen as the institutionalisation of the role of the Army in Pakistan politics, shall define this national interest.

The reform package also includes constitutional amendments for power-sharing between the President, the Prime Minister and the Army Chief; changing the electoral college for the President (Article 41) from Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies to a direct vote by the people of Pakistan; changes to Clause 7 of Article 41 which, apart from providing constitutional cover to Musharraf's referendum, will now say that after a referendum he need not go before the Assemblies for endorsement.

For India the outcome of the referendum presents a dilemma. If bilateral relations were to move forward, the Vajpayee government will have to rethink its current strategy of coercive diplomacy which, in any case, has hardly worked.