`There is some hope'

SRIYANTHA WALPOLA

Interview with Chandrika Kumaratunga, the President of Sri Lanka.

Ten years after proposing to change Sri Lanka's unitary state to a union of regions, President Chandrika Kumaratunga believes that the island-nation is now "quite definitely" ready for federalism.

In an exclusive interview to V.S. Sambandan on November 10, Chandrika Kumaratunga said she saw changes in the world-view of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and in the political view of her left-nationalist ally, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).

The President said that despite an 18-month-long stalemate in peace talks, "there is some hope" of breaking the deadlock. The LTTE, she said, "has opened up" and had realised that "there is another world outside of its dark, dingy den". Chandrika Kumaratunga added that the LTTE had "become sensitive to its people's needs, to some extent".

According to her, the facilitators of the peace process, Norway, had "played its role quite well". She said this a few hours before meeting a team led by Norwegian Foreign Affairs Minister Jan Petersen. The team met LTTE leader V. Prabakaran on November 11.

Excerpts from the interview:

Ten years ago, your election victory brought the question of devolution of power to the centre stage of Sri Lankan politics. How much has the political discourse changed with regard to the question over the decade?

I think devolution was not only brought to centre stage, but it was the first time a Sri Lankan government, of its own free will, proposed devolution and the granting of full rights to all the minority communities. The only other time it was proposed was when the Indian government compelled the Sri Lankan government; so it was not of its own free will.

As far as devolution goes, at that time - a few months after we came into government in 1994 - we had a survey done. Less than 23.5 per cent of the Sinhala people agreed that the ongoing war should be resolved outside of a military conflict. They all thought it should be through military means. We came in, as you quite rightly mentioned, talking, persuading and doing all sorts of programmes to convince the Sinhala majority that devolution is the solution. After all the work we did, two years later - end of 1996 - we did another serious survey. The number of people who said `yes' to devolution and a negotiated settlement had gone up to over 65 per cent. I would say it was entirely and exclusively owing to the fact that it was for the first time that a political leader and a party and a government came out suggesting what the government could offer as a solution to the Tamil people's problem. Until then nothing was offered. It was just being forced.

When the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement came, one part of the government was about to move out and revolted against the other part of the government and that half of the government got together with the JVP and started killing those of us who were for devolution. It was a big mess.

Here, very clearly, that message came from the head of state. My party followed. It wasn't easy. I had to get my party to change its views... .

That must have been a serious challenge for you...

Not too difficult actually. At that time the party did not have a very clear leadership. My mother [the late Srimavo Bandaranaike] was ageing then and they were more keen on getting into power, so they were willing to accept whatever the leader said. There was a group of young people who were thinking otherwise and they took the leadership with me and the others fell in line. You know how parties are: they are more keen on coming into power. In any case, the SLFP [Sri Lanka Freedom Party] is not a hawkish party. It is the only party in this country that has consistently stuck to democratic politics in the face of every challenge to the lives of its own cadre and leaders.

One last word about devolution. Now the acceptance of devolution is absolutely total because, for the first time, the UNP [United National Party] also - rather than going against what we say when they are out of power and then saying it when they are in power - is consistently talking about it, which is a good thing. So, as both the major parties are talking about it, it is very clear that over 90 per cent of the Sinhala people are for devolution.

This has been a decade of huge intentions. Translating them into constitutional reforms has been another challenge. Where does Sri Lanka go from here if it does not happen? Some political analysts see Sri Lanka as a failing or failed state. Do you see that scenario?

(Reflects) I hope not. (Long pause) I don't think it is even necessary to adhere to that concept because the state of Sri Lanka and the state structure are too strongly embedded in the socio-cultural, emotive and psychological make-up of the people for it to crumble like that.

And don't forget that we have had a unitary state in this country, a unitary state like you have had in India at certain times. That began to disintegrate after 53 invasions from south Indian kingdoms and broke up into three to four kingdoms. But that was only in the last seven-and-a-half centuries of Sri Lankan history, which dates back to about 40 centuries - at least the known history.

We have had very strong state structures and I think we can face up to it. If you take examples from all over the world, states have not crumbled because one separatist group challenged it in the most ruthless and horrendous fashion.

Politically, there are strains of discord within your alliance. Militarily, there is talk about the LTTE hardening its stance further. What is your current assessment?

That the [ruling] alliance is having problems may be true. But these problems are nowhere near breaking up the alliance. We are resolving them. In fact, I would have expected more problems. If you look at the differences of opinion, policy, style, tactics and even the lifestyle and the rest of the P.A. [People's Alliance], we should have had more problems. But when one works on policy - our entire alliance is based on that - it holds even if there are personality problems.

I don't know how you can say that the LTTE is hardening [its stance] when for the first time in its history it has split into three. Mr. Prabakaran has lost his army commander and now he is having serious problems with his navy commander [Soosai]. So I don't know how anybody could say they are militarily getting stronger.

Do you think there is a serious problem within the LTTE?

I think there should be, because they told us that he [Soosai] is very, very serious and had to be rushed out. He went to Singapore and came back in three days and he did not see any doctor or go to any hospital. That much we are sure of.

So there is a problem?

Yes. I fear that some senior LTTE leaders came from other parts of the world and persuaded him to go back. Whether it is true or not, I don't know, but there seems to be very serious problem.

How do you see the past international role, and its current and future status?

(Smiles) What do you mean by past international role? India?

Earlier, India was actively involved. Going beyond countries, how does Norway's role differ from that of India?

Well, India did not come as the facilitator for negotiations. India came in, unfortunately, with the Army, of course at the invitation of the then Sri Lankan government. And that was for a different purpose - to help the Sri Lankan government to fight a war. Norway was invited by my government to end the war and facilitate the peace process.

Why Norway?

At that time I was already talking with Prabakaran. They kicked the peace process in the teeth and went to war for some unknown reason in April 1995. So we had to respond. Jaffna was taken very fast, in less than eight months. Very soon after, I started sending messages to Mr. Prabakaran, saying `come and talk', `if you are willing to talk, then we can sign a ceasefire or whatever'. But he said: `No, you have taken my heartland, I have to take it back before I can talk to you.'

Finally, at one point, after about two-and-a-half years of these messages going up and down, they finally said OK. I was suggesting a foreign facilitator because I realised that could facilitate matters. We were thinking of the head of a particular international organisation; they did not like it. They suggested some countries - five or six countries - and Norway was one of them. That's how we selected Norway because it is supposed to be an independent, small nation, which, we thought, will not have imperial designs on Sri Lanka... [a presidential aide: `nor colonial baggage'] ... or the colonial or neo-colonial background.

Since then what has been your view of the Norwegian facilitation? The JVP was very vocal about it. Would you like to see a recalibration of Norway's role?

Well, on the whole, I must say Norway has played its role quite well. There are some weak points, but on the whole it has played its role quite well. There are certain things I have been very concerned about, not directly related to the peace process, but to the internal politics of Sri Lanka, which I cannot say now. When I write my life story someday that will be known.

Have you started working on it?

Little bits and pieces. That will be when I retire, if Prabakaran still has not got me. He is still thinking of getting me, while holding talks with us. But we have to go on with the process because one has to be knocking at the door. Even if you know that what is beyond the door could be not very pleasant, that is the only solution.

You see, Norway has got banged a lot by Norwegians themselves - Norwegian intellectuals and organisations - about their failures in other peace processes. Perhaps they are very sensitive about it and then it could become dangerous.

The advantages of a small country, as you know, are evident. But the disadvantage is if it goes into a thing like this, then it becomes very important for them. For the sake of the success of a peace process, they may tend to do something that may become detrimental to our national interest. One may, I am not saying they have.

Would you like to summarise the achievements of your recent visit to India? What has it meant and how do you see bilateral ties?

I think it was an excellent visit. We got a lot of work done on the economic front, the defence front and, of course, even on person-to-person contacts. It was very good.

During your talks with India, did you explain the current state of the conflict-resolution process?

Well, not in that way. India does not participate in our conflict-resolution [process] except that it wants to be kept briefed and it wants to know what is going on since it is very closely related to us and also because of its geographic, strategic concerns. Beyond that, [emphatically] no.

You have been in politics for long. On a personal note, how do you see political culture changing from the time of your early brush with politics? Your father was a Prime Minister...

In a few sentences, Sri Lanka was an extremely decent place before 1977. Even though my father was assassinated, that was an absolutely one-off act of violence in which some UNP leaders were also involved. He had, you know, in the social evolution, actually made the country stand on its head, but in an advantageous way for the people of the country. Not for the privileged few. But apart from that, even after he was assassinated, the country went on in a very decent way. [The year] 1977 [when the late J.R. Jayewardene was elected to power] was the high watermark of all the changes for the worst in this country.

It was horrendous. I could not actually bear to see it. I was interested in what was happening from the age of eight. I used to listen to my father talking. I used to read the papers starting from the front page until the end of the sports page. Being someone who valued justice and all that, the way we were brought up, justice, fair play, decency, honesty and all that... it was horrible... . There were times when Vijaya [Kumaratunga, the President's late husband and popular film icon] and I discussed and even decided to leave the country at one point, somewhere in the early 1980s.

Then in 1994, came my major call, which actually came from the heart. And that was the call to which people responded to by the millions. I had just two lines. The main line was to render back to Sri Lanka and its people a decent society, where humaneness reigns. And the people reacted.

What I am proudest of, out of all our achievements, is the fact that we were able to bring that back very fast. Violence used at the level of the state was stopped. Not only by practice, but also through laws and by strengthening democracy and democratic practice. And, of course, preaching all the time. I think I have preached, more than a lot of religious preachers in this country, to change society. And I used popularity to get messages across to the people. My enemies hate that because the leader of their side is incapable of preaching in any way, so they keep abusing me. When you have an Opposition like that, how can I change the country?

So you will keep trying?

Well, I suppose yes. Until I break. This time I have much more support from Opposition forces, even though their leader may not be supporting me. There is a lot of goodwill from everybody. Unfortunately, it is at the tail end of my incumbency as President and sometimes you have lost a lot of the fire that you had earlier.

You talked about the tail-end of your incumbency. There has been a lot of talk about your term of office. Is it 2005, or 2006? To be specific, would you seek a judicial interpretation?

I don't think I need to. If somebody has a problem they can seek a judicial interpretation. But all the legal opinion, at the topmost level, and I have studied the Constitution myself. It is 2006.

That is categorical?

Quite categorical. But whether I will stay till then, it is my own problem. I am talking about the constitutional situation.

In the build-up to the 1999 presidential election, you said that you were giving up a year by advancing elections by one year. You think you are being weighed down by that?

When did I say that?In 1999.In 1999 I said that. I did not say it now.

Do you think that will have an impact on your term of office?

Not constitutionally. Definitely not.

How do you view the current 18-month stalemate in talks with the LTTE compared to 1995? Any sense of deja vu?

Oh yes. Many. The LTTE has a habit. This is the seventh round of talks they are having. I don't know what [former Prime Minister] Ranil Wickremasinghe told them, because he did not tell me the whole thing. I don't know what [the late President] Premadasa talked with them. So out of the five times I know, the LTTE has baulked at the point when the government negotiators wanted to sit down and talk about the final settlement. Each time it has been like that. That's when they baulk. Our very first talks in 1994, that was the time they did it.

Its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority is on the table and it has said that it should be the basis...

That's the best way to halt a discussion on the final settlement.

So you don't see the deadlock being broken? Do you think the stalemate...

Nothing moves along unilateral lines. The LTTE also has changed a lot, as you know. They have opened up. LTTE cadre go out into the world and see that there is another world outside of their dark dingy den, where they are only thinking of who they are going to murder next. They have opened up to the world. For the first time, they have gone on with a ceasefire agreement, with violations. But at least it is adhered to, I would say 70 per cent, for a long period of time - nearly three years. They have at least said - whether they mean it or not, up till now they didn't even say it - that they are willing to explore some solution other than Eelam. So there are a lot of changes. A few years ago one could not have heard of a Karuna or a Soosai objecting to Prabakaran and still living. They would have been bumped off very early.

The LTTE has also become sensitive to its people's needs to some extent, though they were not up to now. The LTTE kept refusing all my offers for development of the northeast all the time, but now they don't. They are permitting development work to go on, they are happy about it. Why? They have become sensitive to their people's needs, because the people became very critical of them. `Look here, the governments of Sri Lanka want to develop us and you say until you have Eelam you won't allow it?' Then they realised that they can't keep their people with them, so they have had to agree to that. Things are changing. It is not because, I think, the personality of Mr. Prabakaran has changed. Being a political scientist, I have studied the personalities of such individuals in the world and I do not expect much change from this particular leader. But movements change, other people change, circumstances and political conjectures change. Therefore I think there is some hope.

Can you give us any insight into the present stage of talks?

Up to now they have not said anything else. What I can say is that the LTTE has become absolutely adept and masters at playing off the UNP against the SLFP. From what they have been telling me through their back channels, from what they have been telling Ranil through their back channels, I know they try to use one against the other. And this is what I have been telling Mr. Ranil Wickremasinghe to please understand, but he doesn't, for whatever purpose.

Is that not the LTTE's major strength?Of course it is. It has been, all this while.Do you see the two parties getting together?

I can't see Mr. Ranil Wickremasinghe ever agreeing to such a thing. He doesn't have the confidence, nor the ability to handle such a situation.

Do you think Sri Lanka is ready for federalism?

(Emphatically) Yes. Quite definitely, yes. One of our partners may not agree, but they are also looking at it seriously.

Would you like to elaborate?

You can ask me about the JVP. Don't forget that the JVP has also come a long way. When they started talking with us, they were not even talking of a negotiated settlement. Now they are fully in agreement that a negotiated settlement should be the solution. They are in agreement that there should be some form of power sharing, but what level of power sharing is what has to be discussed. And they also agree that once we start talking to the LTTE and we see the responses of the LTTE, then they also start talking within their organisation and see what they can agree to. So the LTTE trying to use the fact that the JVP is not for federalism, not to come to talks is all rubbish. In fact, I have told the Norwegians to tell the LTTE - and they have told that, that I know - not to worry about the JVP matter. I will handle the matter. Believe my word for it. JVP is fully for going to talks with them. So they have to only come to talks to see what they are willing to give.

Japan's special representative Yasushi Akashi had gone to the LTTE's political headquarters at Kilinochchi earlier this month with a message from you. Would you like to share the message?

`Come to talks.' That is what I told them. I didn't tell them anything else.

There is talk about a possible constituent assembly, a non-binding referendum and the possibility of your coming back as Executive Prime Minister. Your comments.

If the people want the Constitution changed, and if it is to be changed, we will explore every possible legal possibility. It could be a quasi-constitutional possibility of changing Constitution. Don't forget that I went to university in France, which is the homeland of constitutional revolutions.

Could Sri Lanka expect something in the coming months?

If it is necessary, we will consider it very seriously.

By all indications, it appears necessary, President, so...

We should ask if a referendum is necessary.... I would like to say one thing here. The UNP's spokesman on constitutional matters, Mr. G.L. Peiris, is going around saying all over the place that a constituent assembly is not possible, it is all illegal. Do you know that [he] gave me in writing the whole procedure for the constituent assembly, the referendum, how to do it, and how it is possible?

I had an inner group of the Cabinet talking about the ethnic matter only and related constitutional matters in my P.A. government. There were nine people in it. Three of them are dead today. Two of them are in the UNP. The other four are still there. With me it is 10. There he categorically came and read out the procedure. He got me to spend some millions of rupees and went and consulted [the constitutional expert] Professor Wade of England. He then consulted another Professor in Quebec. We invited a French professor to come to Colombo.

So if we have not bothered to even reply to G.L. Peiris, it is because actually I have stopped taking him seriously. After working with him for one year, I decided that he was not to be taken seriously, and this is the reason why he left. He has gone around India telling people that he left my government because he was against this constituent assembly thing. Absolutely false. He worked it out.