`We must give the Tamils of North and East a future'

Interview with Lakshman Kadirgamar.

As Sri Lanka starts another attempt at reviving the peace talks with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), its Foreign Affairs Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar outlines Colombo's broad approach to a range of related issues in an hour-long. interview to V.S. Sambandan on April 30. The interview took place just before the arrival of a Norwegian team of facilitators to hold preliminary talks on resuming the stalled peace process. Kadirgamar (72) said this was the opportune moment to fine-tune the role of the facilitator and move towards inclusiveness. Excerpts:

President Chandrika Kumaratunga invited Norwegian Prime Minster Kjell Magne Bondevik on April 22 to resume negotiations with the LTTE. What is the background to the invitation and what are the prospects?

We were saying right through the campaign that the moment we came to office, we would certainly make every effort to start the dialogue again. The President spoke to the Norwegian Ambassador twice. In those discussions it was decided that there should be a certain degree of formality in re-inviting the Norwegian government.

You are on record as saying that there would be no preconditions whatsoever. Do you see the LTTE coming up with any?

We have not detected any such thing. We have received messages from the LTTE, which do not talk of preconditions at all. Now the theory is that the LTTE is saying that this is a take-it-or-leave it situation, "either you accept the ISGA [Interim Self-Governing Authority] in toto before the talks start or we won't come to talks at all". I don't think this is factually correct at all. A certain degree of caution has to be exercised in determining from where these messages are coming.

How would you see the past experiences in holding negotiations? What lies ahead now?

Times have changed. A lot has happened. A lot of water has flowed under many bridges since the first round of talks [between Kumaratunga's government and the LTTE] towards the end of 1994, which broke down in April 1995. There has been fighting, there has been the recapture of the northern peninsula. Elections have come and gone, the Norwegians have come on the scene. Further battles were fought by the LTTE, which did not succeed. The status quo on the ground has prevailed in terms of territory for quite a while now. The ceasefire has been on for more than two years; the donor community has come on to the scene in a big way.

Has the negotiations dynamics changed? In 1994, there was a problem, with the LTTE taking up existential issues and the government, core issues. Do you see a move towards the middle ground by both sides?

I think so. In respect of reconstruction and rehabilitation, I think there is an acknowledgement across the board that it is high time everybody with the slightest interest in the welfare of the people of Sri Lanka, of the North and the East in particular, buckled down urgently to the task of rebuilding that terribly war-ravaged part of our country.

Certainly on the part of this government, there is a very, very clear understanding of this. We have good reason to believe that the LTTE is very acutely concerned with the lack of serious effort to reconstruct and rehabilitate. I also believe that one of the reasons why the talks that the previous government started fizzled out is the LTTE's perception that there is far too much talking going on and far too little being done on the ground.

We take that very much to heart. Certainly we will be very well disposed to doing something concrete as quickly as possible for the benefit of the ordinary people of the North and East.

Would it mean that you would take what the LTTE terms existential issues (andraada prachanai) upfront? Will that be the starting point?

I think in principle, in an attitudinal sense, that would certainly be a starting point - the day-to-day living problem of the people, and rebuilding and reconstruction. There is the question of basics. Things like some schools, some hospitals, some wells, roads and bridges, infrastructure building. There simply has to be some activity of that kind launched even on a modest scale, quickly.

I think the LTTE is perfectly correct when it complains that over the last two years there was far too little activity on the ground. They charge the government, any government, with being bureaucratic, inefficient, corrupt. All that is true. I think on one hand the LTTE tends to oversimplify the problems that governments have, but the basic thrust of their argument is valid.

There has to be a change in respect of political will that one brings to bear on this problem now. I think we would be very receptive to that approach, where we sit down at the table in a hardheaded way and say what kind of things we can start doing.

There is money available, which cannot be spent unless you have a mechanism for spending it and controlling expenditure. They have put certain proposals on the table in the form of the ISGA which at the moment, we think, are far too far-reaching in many respects. But I do not think it would be impossible to devise an institutional mechanism which is capable of handling international resources for disbursement, acceptable both to the LTTE, the government and the outside parties - the donor communities and the lending agencies. We have to work on that. In other words, I think there would well be possible alternative models to the existing ISGA proposals.

Would the alternative models be proposed by the government?

By the government.

The President has often talked about inclusiveness. At what stage would you start that inclusiveness?

Very quickly. At the moment, people are at the drawing board, working out revisions of the existing structures that have been deployed hitherto for this purpose, such as the peace secretariat. Now, in order to implement our inclusive approach on which we are very, very keen indeed, we have to devise structures which enable inputs to be made from all those concerned parties in our country who we consider have a legitimate interest and a stake in the developments that will hopefully culminate in a final solution. The President will play a very important role - of guiding, decision-making - but in consultation with many others. So I do not envisage this phase of talks being a process conducted by a few people, who keep it all to themselves.

Would this inclusiveness be represented in the negotiating team?

That I cannot say at the moment. This concept of a team is also something we are rethinking. We are not disposed to making a great deal about this team. I think if you have too high-profile a team, with chief negotiators, second negotiators and third negotiators and all that, you are making something structurally rather rigid, and I don't think that is desirable. Our approach will be more collegiate.

The ultimate direction will come from the President. Let us be sensible about this. This negotiating team is not going to be calling the shots. Life doesn't work like that. They will go and sit at the table and discuss and so on, but decision-making takes place elsewhere. Therefore, I would not set too much store by this team business.

So are we looking at a totally different kind of negotiations... ?

... Not totally different, structure is basically the same. There have to be groups of people on both sides talking around the table with sub-groups, and so on and advisers and experts. I don't think that is so fundamentally different from what has gone on in the past. That is why I would rather downplay this concept of who is the team and who is the leader as though that was the biggest issue of the day. I don't think it is. We won't allow it to become the biggest issue of the day, because that way you tend to personalise things too much. That could be a curse rather than help.

Would the talks be held within Sri Lanka or in different venues across the world?

We haven't worked out the details yet, but I can say that our approach would be not to allow the negotiating exercise to become a kind of television extravaganza where the emphasis becomes more on the public performance and the PR aspect of it. That has great dangers and I think the last two years have shown those dangers. One thing, you raise expectations needlessly.

The statement Tamilchelvan [the LTTE's political wing leader] made sometime in early 2003, if indeed he said it - that six rounds of talks have been a waste of time - if that is their true view, is very revealing. It may well be correct, and if it is correct, I think it is because there was too much focus on appearances instead of substance. Substance is a very difficult matter to grapple with. Substance is dull, demanding, hard. Appearances are easy to go for - the hype. But you get to a point where the hype wears off and you are left with no substance.

About substance, there are two issues put on the table by the LTTE - the High Security Zones (HSZ) and the ISGA proposals. Would you like to comment on the HSZ?

I don't know at the moment at what shape or form their proposal is going to be made. It has been around for some time. That issue tends to appear and disappear from time to time. Sometimes it takes a very high profile, at other times it seems to disappear from the scene. I have not detected in the last few months any particular emphasis on this as though that were a make-or-break kind of issue. So we have to wait and see.

The United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA), had always talked about going on to the core issues. Now that you are in government, what is your plan on the core issues?

We have to examine this very closely. I am sitting down to work the details out. We will never be able to abandon the importance of the core issues because we are firmly convinced and remain convinced that unless the core issues are addressed, time and priority being another question, we will never get the final, lasting solution. That goes without saying, it is axiomatic.

What has happened in the last two years is that - all of us should have learnt this lesson - elaborate strategies, designs, goals, objectives, all that is one thing. But the lives of people, and their living conditions are another matter entirely. You must not allow the latter to suffer while you are trying to rather grandly sketch out scenarios for the former.

I would say that even if we started 10 years ago with this concept of core issues first, at least core issues parallelly with existential issues, now 10 years have gone and I agree fully with the LTTE and the Tamil people that on the ground in the North and the East very little has been done to improve their lives. Then surely you must rethink the priorities. I repeat this constantly: we can't forget the core issues. If you want a permanent solution you can't. But I think it might well be not merely wise, but dictated to by sheer necessity, that you must discuss upfront, right upfront, the issues that affect the lives of our people.

That would be your starting point?That will be our starting point.

Is the government also thinking in terms of a broad time-frame, a time sequence in which the talks should go on?

I think at this point of time, since there has been a break of one year in the process of the talks we take a fresh look at all that. I don't think we can be didactic or obstinate about a time-frame, when we have to pick up the pieces again, put the threads together again and see how we are going to take it from now on. It is virtually a cold start now. So one has to gear up all over again. I don't think it is correct, wise, prudent, to start by concentrating on a time frame now. Particularly since I have already made the point that we should address ourselves collectively to the needs of the people. If you want a time-frame for that, I would say that is very urgent. Not for completion, obviously, but for starting meaningfully. In other words I am beginning to think, as I reflect more and more on the problem, that this time around we should take a large number of small bites at the problem.

If we are able to say to ourselves collectively - when I say collectively I mean quite definitely the LTTE and all other concerned parties - the LTTE is very much a concerned party. Everything I say in regard to doing something for the North and the East means with the LTTE; can't be without.

I think we must look at time-frames of this kind - what can we do in two months, six months. Can we start building something? Can we complete some small projects, may be healthcare, mobile clinics; there is a desperate need for drugs in the Wanni. People have to walk miles to get basic things like aspirins. It really is an absolutely pathetic situation, so now surely at the governmental and intergovernmental level, we should be able to address those problems and cease to allow them to remain problems when they are in fact so easily capable of resolution, given will and direction.

A lot has changed between 2001 and 2004, when the United National Party (UNP) was in power - such as the lifting of the ban on the LTTE; the economic restrictions do not exist. How do you see the UNP's period in the continuum of the peace process?

Well, we carry on from there. Obviously we won't be going back on things like that. That is a movement forward and now we go on from there. Good things have been done. That must be accepted and improved upon if possible.

The government and the LTTE agreed in Oslo to explore federal models. Would you go on with that?

As far as the old Opposition, the present government, is concerned. We had no problem with the Oslo formula, except for the meaning of self-determination, which expression occurs in that formula. We did not have, and do not have today, any substantive difficulty with the federal structure. But there could be problems of elucidation about the meaning of self-determination and the question of the areas of geographical habitation, which is another way of saying homeland, whether this means exclusivity or not. These are matters that require explanation.

I would say as a composite whole, insofar as this formula to my mind means a devolved form of government within a united Sri Lanka, is the most desirable solution to our problem, then we go along with it.

Do you think there has been a change in the opposition to federalism that was there earlier? Would you be able to convince the nation?

There again, I think there are some pre-election polls that had some revealing results. There is still a large body of opinion, but I think it is short of 50 per cent, which seems to think that some kind of devolved system is the best answer. There is a large body of undecided opinion, which means that further education, debate and discussion is necessary. Much work would have to be done.

There is also the apathy factor. There are some issues, which people fight very strongly against something. A separate state is something where there will be near total unanimity against. I do not detect that there would be very strong organised opposition to a form of devolved government. That's the apathy factor.

After your visit to New Delhi, the Indian government indicated that the solution should be homegrown...

... We go along with that completely. That is our view on the way a final solution should be reached. We would be totally against an imposed solution from outside. We would not be in favour also of international meddling in the evolution of our solution. Advice is one thing. Solicited advice is very good. Unsolicited advice suffers from certain deficiencies. But decision-making must be ours. I believe all the responsible actors who are involved in this process take that view. At least they say so; so what the Indian government has explicitly said is what our government go on with completely.

On the eve of the Norwegian team's visit to Sri Lanka, do you think there would be some kind of fine-tuning of what to do, what not to do?

Yes. There will be. This is an opportune moment to embark on that task of redefinition. It is the start of a process, which is old in terms of evolution, but new in terms of the new approaches that might have to be adopted to suit the circumstances of the time. So I think it is opportune to discuss deeply and seriously with the Norwegians and fully convince that they see it the same way themselves, what their role is going to be.

What are the areas you will touch upon, broadly?

Format, for instance. What are we going to expect the Norwegians to be doing? Certainly we will be expecting them to conduct their shuttle diplomacy for which we engaged them in the first place as classical facilitators.

In the last two years we began to see what we thought was an enlarging of that role and if we are correct in thinking that the Norwegians had a big hand in drafting documents and so on, we would be hesitant to confer that role on them...

... Any specific document...

... The ceasefire agreement itself ... we would encourage the Norwegians to perhaps reduce their profile somewhat. I think they themselves suffered the ill-effects of a high profile possibly conferred on them by the previous government, rather than sought by them. I think they attracted certain degree of fire from the general body of the country because of this.

I think we will be discussing with them ways and means of protecting themselves from over-exposure because true facilitators ought not to draw fire. Firing comes from those who perceive the role to have become more than facilitation. That then arouses suspicion in the minds of the ordinary people.

In the early days of your third term as Foreign Minister, how optimistic are you of a final solution?

My optimism tends to ebb and flow. At times I feel it is very distant, but then experience shows that you never know what configuration of forces lies ahead, therefore what I am saying to myself is: let us get on with what we can get on with.

I am now a firm believer in approaching this whole problem in a very practical way. We must definitely start as quickly as possible doing everything possible to raise the quality of life for the poor battered people of the North and the East. After all it is the Tamil-speaking people of those areas who have borne the brunt of war. Armies have come and gone, they have suffered in so many ways. Their lives have been pretty hopeless.

Should we be asking anybody what their view of their future, surely it is those poor people. We must surely get down and tell to ourselves, we must give them a future. And if the LTTE is willing to be a serious partner in that, then we must accept them and work with them. And the reality on the ground is that we have to work with the LTTE. That is not to say that we accept everything that the LTTE wants or does or its philosophy of life. This is the conclusion I have come to after a long time.