A nuclear gamble and some fears

Published : Aug 15, 2003 00:00 IST

A rally on June 25 in Pyongyang's Kim Il Sung Square to condemn U.S. policy. The banner reads, "Get out (from the Korean peninsula), U.S. murderers." - GONG YIDONG/AP/XINHUA

A rally on June 25 in Pyongyang's Kim Il Sung Square to condemn U.S. policy. The banner reads, "Get out (from the Korean peninsula), U.S. murderers." - GONG YIDONG/AP/XINHUA

Tensions grow in the Korean peninsula after Pyongyang announces that it has nuclear weapons, and there are fears that the Bush administration may use the opportunity to attack North Korea.

THE dramatic claim by Pyongyang, in the second week of July, that it possessed a couple of nuclear weapons has once again brought the Korean peninsula back into the international spotlight. The North Korean government claimed that it had processed plutonium from the 8,000 fuel rods that had been stored, until recently, at its Yongbyon nuclear reactor. Pyongyang had said in October last that it had a programme to build nuclear weapons with an explosive core made of uranium.

President George W. Bush has been insisting that he "will not tolerate" a nuclear North Korea. Pyongyang, on the other hand, has been consistent in its stance that it had the right to seek "nuclear deterrence" against "hostile" American policies. Pyongyang has been demanding a high-level diplomatic engagement with the United States for the last many years; it had declared that it would choose the option of going formally nuclear if Washington continued with its policy of diplomatically and economically isolating it.

North Korea formally withdrew from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) in January this year.

That tensions were again rising became even more evident when North and South Korean forces exchanged fire in the demilitarised zone in the third week of July - for the first time in three years. American intelligence agencies now claim that they have evidence that North Korea has built a secret plant to produce weapons-grade plutonium. However, after Iraq, the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) assessments have become suspect.

North Korea's diplomatic flexibility was once again evident when the crisis flared up. An article that appeared in the official North Korean news agency KCNA in the fourth week of July said that if the U.S. "dropped its hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and legally committed itself to non-aggression, the latter would be ready to dispel the American concerns".

Even as the Bush administration prepared for the invasion of Iraq, Pyongyang announced its intention to process plutonium. Former U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry, who had been the point man for the Clinton administration in the negotiations with North Korea, said in the third week of July that the Bush administration was "losing control of the situation". Perry has, ominously, predicted war by the end of the year, if the situation is not resolved diplomatically. When Perry was in charge of American diplomacy with regard to North Korea, Pyongyang negotiated a missile test moratorium, in September 1998, in exchange for the partial lifting of economic sanctions.

At the fag end of the Clinton presidency, Pyongyang had also tacitly agreed to end all missile-related exports and stop missile production. In return, the North Korean negotiators were willing to accept non-monetary compensation, such as satellite launches and food aid. However, the "neo-conservatives" dominating the Bush administration were in no mood for a compromise with Pyongyang. Spurgeon Keeney, the editor of the reputed journal Arms Control Today, suggested that the Bush administration gave the impression that it wanted to preserve the North Korean ballistic threat in order to give legitimacy to its controversial National Missile Defence (NMD) policy.

In April this year, when U.S. and North Korean diplomats once again established contact through the good offices of the Chinese government, Pyongyang once again offered to give up its nuclear option. All that North Korea wanted from the U.S. was the resumption of dialogue, which would lead to guarantees that its sovereignty would be respected and the U.S. would not resort to military force to resolve the political impasse in the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang also wanted an undertaking from Washington that it would not try to hinder its economic growth by continuing with the economic blockade. North Korea also wanted an assurance from the Bush administration that it would not undermine the diplomatic links between the two Koreas, which were assiduously cultivated by Pyongyang and Seoul in the last five years.

One of the first things that George Bush did as President was to express his disapproval of the growing closeness between the two Koreas. Years of painstaking diplomacy by the Clinton administration, which culminated in the visit of his Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang, was nullified when Bush sanctimoniously included North Korea in the "axis of evil" and reversed the Clinton administration's policy of engaging Pyongyang diplomatically.

The Bush administration has also refused to honour explicitly agreements arrived at with North Korea by the Clinton administration. Pyongyang had agreed to "shut-down" the Yongbyon reactor under the 1994 Framework Agreement. In exchange, Washington, along with South Korea and Japan, had promised the speedy completion of two civilian nuclear reactors that would provide North Korea electricity. The work on the reactors started in 1999. Only the foundation has been laid so far, while North Korea remains energy-starved.

The Bush administration, busy trying to extricate itself from the quagmire in Iraq, paid little attention to the escalating crisis in the Korean peninsula, despite the concerns expressed in Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing and Moscow. North Korea's suspicions have also been aroused by the proposed redeployment of U.S. forces in South Korea. U.S. Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, during his visit to South Korea in early June, confirmed that the bulk of the U.S. troops would be moved south of Seoul, away from the front lines, far from the range of North Korea's artillery. Wolfowitz had said in July last year that U.S. troops in South Korea were targets of North Korean short-range missiles and that the U.S. mainland was the target of Pyongyang's long-range missile programme.

While some South Koreans have criticised the American action as amounting to leaving them in the lurch in case of an attack from North Korea, others believe that the U.S. redeployment is part of a concerted move to attack the country. In the unlikely event of a war, South Korea and Japan could face the brunt of a North Korean military attack. Pyongyang's missile expertise has been internationally acknowledged; its missiles can hit targets all over Japan. Seoul is within the range of North Korean guns.

Beijing is once again trying to revive the dialogue process on Korea. This would initially involve the U.S., North Korea and China, and would be expanded later to include South Korea and Japan. Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo has formally proposed the resumption of dialogue during a recent trip to Pyongyang. The senior Chinese official handed over a letter from President Hu Jintao to the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. The letter urged North Korea to participate in talks aimed at resolving the nine-month-old crisis. China has said that the security concerns of North Korea were "rational" and should be taken into account.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said in the third week of July that the diplomatic track on North Korea was not closed and that he was hopeful about new diplomatic developments. Indications are that talks involving North Korea, the U.S. and China are likely to be held in the Chinese capital in the first week of September. South Korea, Japan and Russia expect to be invited to the second round of talks, which are likely to follow soon afterward. Pyongyang had previously insisted that it would consider five-party talks only if North Korean and U.S. officials met first. Washington, on the other hand, was against bilateral talks, and had until recently insisted on multilateral talks.

Analysts feel that if North Korea becomes a de jure nuclear power, there will be a domino effect in the region. They feel that it will be only a matter of time before Japan and South Korea follow suit. China fears that Taiwan will use the North Korean case as a pretext to go nuclear. American commentators fear that a nuclear-capable North Korea will begin proliferating nuclear technology to non-state actors. For a long time now, Washington has been accusing Pyongyang of causing missile proliferation. Western intelligence sources claim that North Korea has supplied Pakistan with its Nodong missiles in exchange for uranium enrichment technology.

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