Hopes and hard facts

The nature of the post-conflict state that will be created in the Tamil-majority areas will determine the measure of success of the Oslo agreement between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE.

It is irreversible. It is a commitment to peace. There is not going to be war.

G.L. Peiris, Colombo's chief negotiator, at the end of the Oslo talks.

I totally agree with what Professor Peiris said.

Anton S. Balasingham, chief negotiator of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, at the same press conference.

CHRONICLERS of Sri Lankan history will do well to note the date December 5, 2002. Down the years, historians will have either to mark it as one that saw the start of the process of building a new Sri Lanka or to dismiss it to the footnote as the day of another false start.

Crucial to the shape of things to follow will be the character of the post-conflict state to be created in the Tamil-majority areas of the North and the East. Equally important will be the manner in which the sharply divided southern polity responds to the latest position. As long as these two issues remain unclear, the measure of success of the Oslo process will remain unclear.

On December 5, the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) agreed "to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka''.

A statement to this effect from Oslo took the peace euphoria on the Island to new heights. At the end of four days of talks, the arch-rivals continued to shake hands. They told the world, through the Norwegians, the facilitators, that they had agreed to initiate discussions on "substantive political issues'' that were crucial to conflict resolution. These included power-sharing, geographical regions, human rights, political and administrative mechanisms, public finance, and law and order.

In addition, the two sides "recognised'' that progress on political issues would have to be "supported by the continued consolidation of the Ceasefire Agreement''. They decided on steps required to achieve further de-escalation and normalcy. The government forces would vacate a hotel in Jaffna, which it had occupierd. The LTTE said that it would ensure that "all future transportation of area commanders will take place under the supervision of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission''. This was particularly because there were tense moments in the preceding month, when military commanders took the eastern sea-route unescorted.

Promises were also made that the two sides would "facilitate restoration and rehabilitation of places of worship in the North and the East belonging to all religious communities''. In addition, the LTTE said that it would "accept the right of political groups to carry out political work, including in the Jaffna peninsula and the islands, provided that they are unarmed, as stipulated by the Ceasefire Agreement''.

Taking the process further, the two sides agreed to "establish a permanent advisory committee'' on issues relating to "women's interests''. The committee would consist of four representatives each of the government and the LTTE. The issue of welfare of children was also given importance, with the two sides emphasising the "need to improve the situation for children affected by armed conflict''.

Four days of talks in Oslo ended on a positive note. To make it picture perfect, the Oslo agreement also said that the government would, "in order to arrive at the broadest possible consensus, establish an appropriate mechanism for consultation with all segments of opinion as part of the ongoing peace process''. This addresses the sensitive issue of a divisive southern polity, at least on paper.

For the peacemakers, it was a fortnight that was well spent. Earlier, on November 25, an international line-up was made at a donors' conference, pledging financial support for the peace process. The clear message from that meeting was that the Tigers should renounce separatism and the use of violence and terror as means to achieve their political end.

The negotiators have built an impressive castle in snow-clad Oslo, but the question is whether it will endure the tropical Sri Lankan climate.

There are several tests before the hurrahs can ring. The first relates to federalism, the very concept that the two sides have accepted for a political solution. The word evoked images of separation in the past. If there is a much-subdued reaction to it now, the credit goes in significant measure to President Chandrika Kumaratunga, who put the achievement of peace through negotiations high on the agenda, before fighting a "war for peace'', which dragged the island into a military confrontation.

The Kumaratunga constitutional proposals, which envisaged wide-ranging political power-sharing, can still form the starting point for a meaningful conflict-resolution process.

Although there could be cause for some cheer that the Tigers and the government have moved in favour of federalism, the nature of the federal unit to be created remains unclear. The Tigers made it clear in the first round that they would seek a "lion's share'' in the administration of the "homeland'' of "Tamils and Muslims''. In a way, this is the raison d'etre for the LTTE to talk.

A singular advantage for the LTTE is its already existing adjuncts of state. Its military machine apart, the manner in which its structures of state the police, courts and revenue collection, to name a few are formalised is a key factor that will determine the shape of the state to follow.

The ground-level consolidation that preceded the LTTE's acceptance of a federal option is bound to cause concern in an already divided southern polity. The Opposition spans a broad spectrum ranging from the extreme nationalist groupings that do not see federalism as the panacea for the island's ills, to those who might be open to a federal solution, as long as it is on acceptable terms.

The danger in the present situation is that it makes it easy for the extreme fringe elements to whip up emotions against any further progress.

This apart, political parties such as the left-radical Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) have gone on record as saying that a military offensive is the only way to solve the problem and that the Tigers should be fought to the finish. This opinion is unlikely to gather much support as long as the process holds, but if and when it fails the call for a return to war will be too shrill for any government to resist.

Therein lies the challenge for the other political forces, who are opposed to the manner in which the peace process is progressing. Clearly, there are two issues that are of concern to the main Opposition party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). To begin with, sections within it see the peace process as being hijacked from its initiators. It was President Kumaratunga and Foreign Affairs Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar who decided to call the Norwegians in as facilitators, they point out. Calls for a greater inclusiveness in the peace process found a formal reflection in the statement.

The other cause for concern, the more serious one, is the shape of the state to come. Clearly, no political grouping is likely to accept an all-for-nothing deal. The role of non-LTTE Tamil political parties is bound to be another serious issue.

Twenty years ago, all these parties were comrades-in-arms, but they trained their guns on one another to such a devastating effect that forgetting the wounds of war is bound to be a difficult task. It is in this context that the calls to ensure political values such as democracy, pluralism and human rights assume greater importance.

Rhetorical opposition to the peace process will not find much support. However, the mere absence of war may not translate itself into peace unless the sensitive issues are addressed meaningfully and a clear commitment is made that the state to emerge will ensure the working of a multi-party democracy. Until these signals emerge clearly and irreversibly, the Oslo deal will remain a snowman, waiting for the test of the summer of politics.