Uncertain gain

The Rajapaksa government is delighted over the capture of Sampur but it must prepare for more battles.

B. MURALIDHAR REDDY in Colombo

"OUR armed forces have captured Sampur [in the North-Eastern Province] for the welfare and benefit of the people living there," a beaming Mahinda Rajapaksa, Sri Lankan President, announced to the delight of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) delegates in Colombo on September 4. The ruling party could not have asked for a better birthday gift. The victory of Sampur was a hard-earned reward for the security forces engaged in an undeclared war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for over four months.

However, conscious of the tougher times that are possibly in store and the growing concerns of the international community over the deteriorating security situation in the island-nation, Rajapaksa was quick to add a footnote to his triumphant tone. "The capture of Sampur does not signal the commencement of war. The government launched an offensive to take control of Sampur as a defensive mechanism and to protect vital national interests," he told his colleagues on the 55th anniversary of the party.

While declaring the determination of his government to respond to the Tamil Tigers' threat, he acknowledged the challenge of having to remove the "germs of mistrust" among the Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim people who lived in friendship over several centuries, and pledged to build a new Sri Lanka based on mutual trust, love and understanding.

The rounded and nuanced speech of Rajapaksa reflected the trials and tribulations of his government. The country has seen so many vicissitudes in the two and a half decades of ethnic conflict that it is simply not in a position to `celebrate' what on the face of it appears to be a straight military gain after a long gap.

Although the significance of the fall of Sampur cannot be underestimated in the immediate context, there are reservations about the cost of the victory, the difficulties the government could face to hold on to the town and the surprises that the LTTE could spring. Political observers are intrigued by the low profile maintained by the Tamil Tigers post-Sampur.

One view is that the recent fighting has demonstrated the growing chinks in the armour of the LTTE and that the consolidation of the ground situation could pave the way for the steady deterioration of the military might of the rebels. The other is that the LTTE has staged a `strategic or tactical' retreat from Sampur and would bide its time to turn the heat on the Sri Lankan military. If past experience is any guide, bloodier battles are ahead.

The uncertainties of the future apart, the capture of Sampur could not have come at a more opportune time for the Rajapaksa government. In the run-up to Sampur, the government had lost several battles with important actors in the international community. These include the Co-chairs (the United States, the European Union, Japan and Norway), the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) over a number of crucial issues related to the peace process.

Sri Lanka's closest neighbour, India, which has the highest stakes in the peace process, has been concerned about the handling of the situation by the Rajapaksa regime. There is an element of unease over the slow pace of the political dialogue to resolve the ethnic conflict and the seemingly excessive emphasis on the military dimension.

On August 30, General Ulf Henricsson, the outgoing chief of the SLMM, gave a ruling on three major issues that have dominated the discourse in the country since the escalation of the current phase of hostilities in April. These are: the execution of 17 national aid workers of a French NGO at Muttur in the first week of August, the killing of 68 bus passengers in a claymore attack in June, and the reported claymore attacks by the Sri Lankan security forces since April in LTTE-controlled areas.

All the three rulings show the government in a poor light. No wonder then that Henricsson has been at loggerheads with it. Making allowances for the prejudices of the general, the international community will still be guided by his report and rulings. This does not augur well for the SLFP government.

The ruling that is going to embarrass the government the most is the one pertaining to the execution of the aid workers. It said there were "very strong indications" of the involvement of the security forces in the execution.

On the June 15 Kebitigollewa bus attack, the SLMM has said:

"Based on SLMM inquiries and the well-known modus operandi for the LTTE, the SLMM considers highly probable that there can be no other armed element than the LTTE and LTTE-affiliated forces that have had the motive to carry out the attack, in particular in GOSL [Government of Sri Lanka]-controlled areas.

"Taking specifically into account the prevailing circumstances and obtained findings there are strong indications that the attack on Sinhalese civilians had been a deliberate retaliation for the recent killings of civilians and LTTE cadres in LTTE-controlled areas in the North and the East."

The SLMM ruling is bound to widen the gulf between the government and the peace monitor. The only positive aspect is that Henricsson has packed his bags and left the country after handing over charge to his Norwegian successor. Henricsson hails from Sweden, which along with Finland and Denmark quit the SLMM on September 1, ahead of the LTTE's demand for the exclusion of E.U. members from the mission.

On the execution of the aid workers, which triggered world-wide outrage, the mission ruling said: "Noting the facts outlined in the SLMM findings, there are very strong indications of the involvement of the security forces in the act despite their denial. Firstly, the SLMM cannot find the reasons for the restrictions of movements into the said areas especially in the above mentioned circumstances acceptable, thereby strongly indicating the GOSL's eagerness to conceal the matter from the SLMM."

Muslim-dominated Muttur emerged as the theatre of war between the security forces and the LTTE after the latter succeeded in overrunning the Army camps and taking over the town in the last week of July. In the battles that went on for four days, at least 50,000 people were rendered homeless.

"Taking into consideration the fact that the security forces had been present in Muttur at the time of the incident, it appears highly unlikely to blame other groups for the killing. Provided that was the case it would in particular be illogical for the security forces to prevent the SLMM from entering the area and making proper inquiries in order to find the perpetrator(s)," the SLMM said.

The ruling claimed that the head of the mission had confidential conversations with highly reliable sources regarding the party, which most likely was responsible for the act.

The views had not proved contradictory and the security forces were widely deemed to be responsible for the incident, it observed.

The mission concluded that with supporting information obtained from the persons interviewed and from conversations with representatives of the international community, it was clear that no armed group other than the Sri Lankan security forces could have been behind the act.

On the claymore mine attacks in LTTE-controlled areas between April 1 and June 15, it said the SLMM findings and internal analysis of both individual claymore mine attacks and the pattern arising from the same showed that deliberate, planned and coordinated offensive military operations had been conducted.

"Moreover, it is clear that the units/groups executed these attacks with the possibility to escape into GOSL-controlled areas where safe exit/entry points, logistic and other assistance must have been provided by the Security Forces and/or GOSL/police units deployed along the Forward Defence Line (FLD). Based on the verified activities of the SLA [Sri Lanka Army] Special unit soldiers in LTTE-controlled areas there are firm indications of the involvement of the SLA in such attacks," it said.

On the June 15 attack, the SLMM findings have shown that the attack was carried out using military expertisein planning, coordination and execution. Such an attack required good knowledge of the area and intelligence skills along with the capability to deploy and handle such weapons professionally, it said.

"The LTTE has condemned the Kebitigollewa attack and denied its involvement in the incident, expressing that another armed element, the Karuna group, has had a motive to execute the attack in order to discredit the LTTE. The SLMM does not find that plausible based on various grounds," the ruling said.

The mission has indirectly sought to blame the government for the current state of hostilities. The un-stated part of its rulings is that there are elements within the Rajapaksa government that are advancing the military option in preference to the political one as a solution to the current situation.

Predictably, the government was angered by the rulings of Henricsson, particularly the one on the execution of aid workers. Surprisingly, the ruling on the supposed military campaign by the government in LTTE-controlled areas has not received the attention it deserved. It is important considering that there was an attempt on the life of the Sri Lanka Army chief on April 25 and the number three in the Army was assassinated in the fourth week of June.

The government has a point when it accuses the SLMM chief of being prejudiced. The period covered by the mission is from April to August, which is selective. Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar was assassinated by the LTTE in August 2005 in the heart of Colombo and the SLMM is yet to make a determination on the forces behind the murder.

The battles of Sri Lanka are expected to take place in the next few weeks on more than one front. Rajapaksa returned a happy man from an unscheduled visit to London and a meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair. But it is not clear if this visit would be helpful when the E.U. Foreign Ministers meet in the coming days to take stock of the situation in the island-nation.