How the ruling junta has dodged the basic questions about its own legitimacy on the international stage perhaps accounts for pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi's continuing incarceration and the lack of progress towards real democracy in Myanmar.
P.S. SURYANARAYANA in SingaporeTHE courage and fortitude of Aung San Suu Kyi, the 60-year-old icon of the struggle for democracy in Myanmar, are comparable to those of Nelson Mandela. However, the international community has not been able to persuade or pressure Myanmar's military rulers to set her free.
There is, as yet, no groundswell of political will from major governments to move against the authorities in Myanmar. Nor is there any credible hint of "political opinion" expressed by these governments on the scale that they did when the apartheid regime in South Africa ended and that country's destiny went into Mandela's hands. In fact, Myanmar's military junta had no hesitation in extending Suu Kyi's detention, house arrest in legal parlance, in the face of the international community's perceived helplessness.
Deploring the latest extension of her detention, the United States State Department said, in a routine tenor, that the action "is yet another step in the wrong direction by Burma's [Myanmar's] military leaders". In order to move Myanmar towards democracy and national reconciliation, the military regime should release Suu Kyi and all her political associates and other political prisoners, the U.S. said. The Myanmar authorities were also counselled to initiate "meaningful dialogue" with the "democratic opposition [Suu Kyi and others] and ethnic political groups".
Scoffing at the "incredible assertion" by the junta that Suu Kyi was being held for her own protection, the U.S. spokesman merely commented that her latest imprisonment and subsequent house arrest followed a brutal attack on her convoy in May 2003. He also noted matter-of-factly that the regime had failed to charge her with any criminal offence.
Such a reaction, by no means a testament of Washington's political will for pro-democracy action against the Myanmar junta, is especially important for a negative reason. Despite being a self-proclaimed messiah of democracy worldwide, the U.S. has not crafted a road map for the triumph of the people's will in Myanmar. To point out this failure is not to advocate any muscular intervention by the George W. Bush administration in Myanmar. The U.S. occupation of Iraq, ostensibly for "democratising" that country, is the best bad example, given that American actions have outraged the Iraqi people beyond all words.
If the junta has been able to suppress the voice of democracy in Myanmar, it is because the international community has remained a passive observer. As a result, the global community is in danger of shifting its focus from the peaceful struggle of an indomitable Gandhian, as Suu Kyi has come to be regarded during her long years under various forms of incarceration. The ultimatum that Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) had served on the military rulers in 1990 was indeed known as the "Gandhi Declaration".
The Myanmar junta has increasingly come under international scrutiny, especially within South-East Asia, for the manner in which Suu Kyi and her followers are being held at bay. Well-informed observers of the situation, such as Kyaw Yin Hlaing, emphasise that "bold initiatives are needed" from the NLD if it is to "reform and rearm itself with a clearer [political] strategy" to meet the challenges. Central to any such move by the NLD will be a better political appreciation of "why military rule continues" in Myanmar.
There is no dearth of expert opinion about the junta's survival strategies and the NLD's perceived inadequacies. One view, as articulated by Morten B. Pederson, is that Myanmar presents a picture of "a strong regime, weak state". There are other views, too, but the political issues in Myanmar, which often cloud (if not totally conceal) the economic and social hardships of the people, are best seen as a story of how the junta has dodged the basic questions about its own legitimacy on the international stage. It is this aspect that largely accounts for Suu Kyi's continuing incarceration and the lack of progress towards real democracy.
Within Myanmar, the junta, which feels emboldened by the American embrace of Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan, has constantly tried to de-legitimise Suu Kyi and her NLD. A factor that suits the Myanmar regime is the co-existence of intellectuals and writers such as Suu Kyi herself and a democracy friendly band of former military commanders within the NLD. Long-time observers point out that the divide between the pure idealism of the intellectual camp and the realism of the old guard has suited the junta for a long time. The bamboo curtain, which isolates the incarcerated NLD leadership from its followers, is another hurdle to deciphering whether the divide between the idealists and the realists (not necessarily of a military background) is being overcome.
As for the junta, its latest defiance of the pro-Suu Kyi international opinion is illustrative of a certain "success" in holding the democracy waves at bay. It was in April that the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) felt the political heat from some of its dialogue partners, especially the U.S., the European Union and Australia, over the Myanmar issue. As a full-fledged ASEAN member, Myanmar was awaiting its turn to chair the 10-nation grouping in 2006. The Western dialogue partners would have none of that given the fact that the group's chairmanship in 2006 would entitle Myanmar to preside over the Association's meetings with them too in that year.
Foreign Ministers of other ASEAN members consulted Myanmar and the forum collectively left it to the Myanmar regime to decide whether or not to press its claim to the chair in 2006 in the context of the objections from the dialogue-partners. The reasoning was that the group's founding principles could not be transgressed. These included the rule of non-interference by ASEAN in the internal affairs of its members. It was felt that ASEAN would violate its founding spirit if Myanmar were to be asked to release Suu Kyi and earn the right to chair the group in 2006. So the chairmanship issue was "de-coupled" from the internal affairs of a member-state. The ball was tossed on to Myanmar's court. In July, when the ASEAN Foreign Ministers held their annual meeting, the issue was resolved, with Myanmar giving up its claim to chair the group in 2006.
There was good cheer within the forum, on the grounds that it had been saved an embarrassment as a result of Myanmar's "commitment to the well-being" of the group. Myanmar was patted for advancing the interest of all the 10 members. "Sincere appreciation" was conveyed to the military regime.
Myanmar's rulers said they would forgo their turn because of their preoccupation with the "ongoing process of national reconciliation and democratisation" at home. The process, which is now boycotted by the NLD, would enter a "critical" phase in 2006.
The "ASEAN way" of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states prevailed, with the Myanmar junta exploiting this principle to dodge the issue of genuine democratisation at home. The Western dialogue partners failed in their game plan of using the forum as a proxy to pressure Myanmar's rulers. For the junta, the price of losing the 2006 chairmanship was nothing compared to the huge gain of not giving in on the Suu Kyi issue and the principle of genuine democracy at home. Myanmar faces no sanctions at the level of ASEAN for refusing to democratise. Instead, the regime has earned the goodwill of the other members for saving them the embarrassment of a potential boycott by their dialogue partners.
For the present, the junta's ability to play ball in its immediate regional theatre of inter-state politics and the NLD's challenge of rejuvenating itself under an interminably incarcerated leader roughly define the Suu Kyi story.
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