Fall of Vaharai

With the loss of the town, the LTTE also loses its claim as the sole representative of Tamils in the north and the east.

B. MURALIDHAR REDDY in Colombo

THE last significant military base of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the east, Vaharai, fell on January 19. The Sri Lankan security forces moved into the town, which has been a battleground since October 29, without much resistance from the Tiger cadre. Virtually encircled by a superior force, the LTTE cadre deemed it prudent to retreat. There is little doubt that the loss of the coastal belt of Vaharai is the biggest loss suffered by the LTTE since it lost control over Jaffna in 1995.

Vaharai is significant not only militarily but also politically. It is through Vaharai - the Trincomalee-Vaharai road - that the Tigers nurtured their bases and cadre in the districts of Batticaloa and Amparai. The capture of Vaharai and the surrounding areas by the military would put an effective check on forays by the Tigers into two of the three districts in the east. With the Karuna faction (an armed militia based in the east that broke away from the LTTE in 2004) already baying for the blood of Tiger cadre in Batticaloa, and with the military in command of the Vaharai region, the LTTE would face a logistical nightmare catering to the needs of its cadre in its remaining pockets of influence in the two districts.

With the fall of Vaharai, the LTTE also loses its claim to be the sole representative of Tamils in the north and the east. The claim had already suffered a blow with the emergence of V. Muralitharan, also known as `Col.' Karuna, in March 2004. Now, with the prospect of being chased out of the districts of Batticaloa and Amparai, the LTTE loses its `sole representative' status militarily too. It would indeed be an uphill task for the LTTE leadership to regain its base in the east.

Of course, there is another way of looking at the situation. Having been `freed' from the burden of guarding territory, the LTTE cadres could return to their old and time-tested guerilla tactics in the east. Holding on to the territory gained from the Tigers would prove to be a much more difficult task than conquering it. Thousands of soldiers are likely to be stuck in the task.

The difficulties ahead for the Sri Lankan military were evident in the process of `Operation Liberation Vaharai'. According to Army estimates, there were an estimated 700 to 800 Tiger regulars engaged in the Vaharai battle. The strength of the Sri Lankan military was 10 times more and that is not counting the aerial support it received. Yet, it took nearly 11 weeks for the military to oust the Tigers.

Two factors complicated the operations for the government. When the battle started there were an estimated 41,000 displaced civilians in the territory held by the LTTE. Throughout the operation, the military kept accusing the Tigers of using civilians as a human shield against its fire power. Independent observers have corroborated the charge. With such a large number of civilians caught in the cross-fire, the military had to proceed with extreme caution. Indiscriminate firing a couple of times triggered an international furore. Besides, the monsoon also played a role in prolonging the operation.

By all accounts, the Tigers were reconciled to the prospect of losing Vaharai and were holding onto the territory for as long as possible. So when the military moved in on the town in the early hours, most of the Tigers had fled, presumably to the thick jungles in the vicinity. Notwithstanding the claims made by the military about recovery of heavy weapons and substantial ammunition, it appears the Tigers had not only dismantled the entire significant military infrastructure but also managed to carry it with them.

The `liberation of Vaharai', as the government chooses to refer to the capture of the town, is part of a well-orchestrated campaign by the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime to weaken the Tigers in the east in the hope that it could subsequently turn the heat on them in the north. Though pursuit of a `military strategy' is frowned upon by the international community and is in violation of the Norwegian-brokered 2002 Cease Fire Agreement (CFA), Rajapaksa has got away with it. In a way, the Tigers invited it upon themselves when they kicked up a row by blocking an irrigation canal in Maavil Aru in July last year. It came in handy for the Rajapaksa government to oust the Tigers militarily from Sampur town, yet another major base of the Tigers, in Trincomalee district.

The Sampur base, facing the strategic and sensitive Trincomalee naval base, was vital for the LTTE in checkmating the military. Rajapaksa convinced the world that the base posed a threat to vital interests of the government, and ensured the LTTE's ouster from there. It marked the first instance of territorial transfer after the 2002 CFA, but there were hardly any objections from any quarter.

The project `Liberation Vaharai' was launched on October 29 with the avowed objective of rescuing harassed civilians. The operation acquired legitimacy after the 2006 `Heroes day' speech of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakaran on November 27 to the effect that `Sinhala duplicity of war and talks' had left Tamils with no option but to pursue the path of an independent Eelam. It was a virtual declaration of war and nullification of the ceasefire pact, which strengthened the government's strategy to take on the Tigers militarily, even if this went against the CFA.

Therefore, it is no surprise that the capture of Vaharai, though in violation of the CFA, did not attract criticism at home or abroad. Enthused and emboldened by its recent gains, the government is expected to continue with its military strategy to clear the Tigers from the east. This was evident from Rajapaksa's speech at a public function on January 25. "Our security forces have the ability, will and strength to defeat terrorism. Trust in them, for they have proved it in the east. Apart from trust, the main secret about that success is that we did not give political targets or goals to the armed forces. We did not sell or market the war for our benefit," he declared triumphantly.

No one expects it to be an easy job as the Tigers continue to control vast territory in Trincomalee towards Mullaithivu and Vavuniya, though Rajapaksa has claimed that 95 per cent of the people in the east have been `liberated'. It would be a long-drawn affair and the Tigers could return to their guerilla tactics.

Respected Sri Lanka defence analyst and Sunday Times correspondent Iqbal Athas sounded a note of caution in his column after the fall of Vaharai. He warned against "overt euphoria or jubilance", noting that the LTTE's forces had withdrawn largely intact. Athas recalled the government's triumphal reaction to the recapture of the Jaffna peninsula in 1995 and pointed out that barely seven months later the armed forces suffered one of their worst-ever defeats when the LTTE launched a major attack on the Mullaithivu military base.

Athas also noted that the military was relying on the support of the Karuna group. In return for supporting the war against the LTTE, `Col.' Karuna was permitted to build up his armed forces and extend the influence of his political wing - the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulihal (TVMP).

In its pursuit of a military strategy to tame the Tigers, the government would have to be extra sensitive to the humanitarian situation. With food and other supply lines disrupted, an estimated 2.13 lakh newly displaced people require help. The government would have to attend to their needs with a sense of urgency if it has to keep the people and the international community on its side.

It is high time the Rajapaksa regime came forward with the promised and much-delayed political package for power sharing to the satisfaction of all communities. The de-merger of the north and the east, and the government's reluctance to explore a legislative route for a re-enactment of the merger has only heightened apprehensions about its motives.

Whatever his reasons are, Rajapaksa is giving an impression of putting too much emphasis on the military option. The unprecedented memorandum of understanding between the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the principal opposition, the United National Party (UNP), is on the verge of collapse thanks to overzealousness on the part of the ruling combine to encourage defections from the Opposition ranks. Besides, the President is at loggerheads with the Foreign Minister, Mangala Samaraweera. These do not augur well for the peace process. Since there is no military solution to the conflict, the only way forward is a credible political package acceptable to all. Otherwise, the military gains will prove short-lived.