Palestinian anger

Published : Aug 29, 1998 00:00 IST

The resignation of two Ministers from Yasser Arafat's Cabinet points to growing frustration over the Palestinian Authority's way of functioning and the lack of progress in the negotiations with Israel.

IF anyone has any doubts about whether the Palestinians make up a separate nation, it would be useful for that person to make a trip to the Arab neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem, say, a residential area in Sheikh Jarrah. It is not just that these areas are less obviously prosperous than and the ambience far less frenetic than it is in the western parts of the city. Obtainable here is a sense of a society with a centre and an apex, elements that give meaning to the whole. Driven as they are by the aspiration for independence, the Palestinians surely make a nation; but as they struggle to form a state, they have begun to ask questions about themselves - questions that are only slightly less important than the demands they have of others.

There is, of course, at least one aspect of the Palestinian aspiration which takes in both the internal and external dimensions. When Palestinians seek the restoration of land, they are not only making a demand of the Israelis, but also, consequentially, putting themselves in a situation where they will at some stage have to ask and answer some fundamental questions about the nature of the state they want to create. If they want their state to cover the entire West Bank territory up to the 1967 border (some still dream of a state spread over the entire Mandate Palestine), they will have to decide what status they will accord to the Jews who will surely remain in these territories. Are they (the Jews) to be made full-fledged citizens and, if so, will the state be secular and multi-ethnic? Such a question is not entirely theoretical since Palestinian society is segmented into Muslim and Christian, the settled communities and Bedouin, as it is.

While this question would be of fundamental importance at some stage, it is not in the forefront right now since the Palestinians are currently struggling to obtain a further slice of the West Bank. But questions of this nature have already begun parading before the Palestinian mind and will continue to do so with increasing rapidity. As it is, the administrative machinery of the state-to-be has been functioning, and the ordinary Palestinian already has reasons to ponder and criticise its styles and methods. At the root of the Palestinian aspiration to create a state is a belief that it will be a democratic one and at the root of that belief is a pride that they will make a better job of governing themselves than other Arab nations have done. However, the administrative machinery that is in place is less than democratic in its approach and basic outlook, and the ordinary Palestinian is certainly dissatisfied, although not rebellious as yet.

A primary problem, both Palestinian and Israeli observers say, is the mismatch between those who run the administrative machinery and those who are the subjects. Most of the administrative personnel, especially those in key positions, have spent their formative years in places such as Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and the Gulf countries. Their experience and conditioning are quite different from those of the people, who have all along lived on Palestinian territory. That is not all. The countries where most of the officials lived are not known for their democratic culture. According to observers, what these officials have brought with them is a mindset in which back-door connections carry more weight than direct, democratic dealings.

A resident of the West Bank said: "Under the Israelis, we were discriminated against. But at least we were all discriminated against in an equal manner. What we have now is something which we cannot fully comprehend or appreciate." According to him, the Palestinian officials brought with them the institution of "wasta" (which roughly means influence). Connections and/or money have a greater impact on decision-making than the merits of a case. Added to that is the machinery's penchant for strong-arm methods, and this is justified internally and excused by those outside on the grounds that those leading the Palestinian struggle for independence should not be distracted by "mundane" considerations.

Significantly, democratic aspirations have not been abandoned in the course of the struggle. However, it would be a grave mistake to be overly optimistic on this account because there are not many people who are actively fighting for democracy and most of those who do so exercise caution. Palestinian analyst Ghassan Khatib said: "The basic problem here is that you have to define the frame of reference. If your frame of reference is the Gulf sheikhdoms, or even Egypt or Jordan, then we are democratic. If your frame of reference is the West or even Israel, then we are not democratic." This dichotomy is reflected in the operative methodology employed by Palestinians who are involved in the struggle for democracy.

THIS duality in approach was clearly brought out during the recent debate in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) on the Cabinet reshuffle effected by President Yasser Arafat. Councillor Hassan Khuder, disgusted at what he perceived as the Council's pusillanimity towards the Authority (the administrative wing), said that it was perhaps about time that Arafat was declared "the God of Palestinians for all time to come." Two Ministers, Hanan Ashrawi and Abed Sallah, resigned from the Cabinet in protest against the denial of reform that was inherent in the reshuffle decision. While the two Councillors were relatively restrained in their criticism of Arafat and his Cabinet, those who were critical during the debate did not feel constrained to accept Cabinet appointments.

This apparently swift surrender by those fighting for democracy and clean government does not tell the entire story. First, the PLC investigated, exposed and published a report on the widespread corruption in and the faulty running of the administrative wing of the Authority. According to the report, about half of the $800-million annual budget was being lost on account of corruption and wastage. Other than the Kuwaiti legislature, it is difficult to think of any other Parliament in the Arab world that has gone into these issues in such detail. The PLC also named three Ministers in its report. Secondly, the matter was vigorously debated.

Despite the disappointing outcome, some Palestinians still believe that the debate did produce an advancement of sorts. A precedent has been set, and this should put the Cabinet on alert in the future. Besides, some of the Councillors apparently believe that this was the most that could be achieved for the moment. Too much pressure could weaken the Authority, especially when it is involved in a more existential struggle with Israel, or, as is more likely, the administration might have moved to crush such democratic institutions as have sprouted. Although it is too early to predict how the struggle for Palestinian democracy will proceed, those who are fighting for it do appear to be showing signs of resilience and realism.

While carrying out the reshuffle, Arafat did not axe the Ministers who came in for negative assessment in the PLC report. In fact, he demoted Ashrawi and Sallah, who had voiced their displeasure at the mismanagement. He also co-opted some of his critics into the Cabinet along with a large number of members from his Fatah faction. In the process, more than a quarter of the PLC members appear to have found Cabinet berths. Overall, it was merely an exercise in the operating style that Arafat has perfected over 30 years at the helm of Palestinian affairs - co-opting some, demoting others and thereby maintaining a balance between different factions and interests.

These manoeuvres, and the ever-increasing size of the Palestinian security forces, can ensure Arafat's control over the levers of power for some time to come. However, adding to the disenchantment over the lack of progress in the negotiations with Israel is the growing frustration over the performance of the Palestinian Authority. So far Palestinian officials, from Arafat downwards, have contented themselves with warning that a prolonged deadlock in the negotiations will lead to a violent explosion. They presumably do not mean that Israel and Israelis alone will be the victims of any violence caused by the frustration. However, if they presume - contrary to the impression gained from the streets where the criticism of the Authority is often vocal and vehement - that they will remain unaffected, it could be a dangerous delusion.

A breakthrough in the negotiations will undoubtedly provide Arafat and his officials with a much-needed reprieve. In terms of technicalities, the breakthrough appears to have actually occurred with several key Israeli officials admitting in private that Israel has decided to pull its troops out of a further 13 per cent of the West Bank after having dropped its earlier objections to parting with anything more than 9 per cent. Israel would do this on one condition, that 3 of the 13 per cent must constitute land on which the Palestinians cannot build or create any infrastructure, a condition which the Palestinians are as yet not prepared to comply with. However, the main reason for the absence of a breakthrough is the political considerations of the two sides.

THERE are several political considerations, most of them purely partisan or even personal, that are weighing on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. However, one of them is of direct relevance to the Palestinians. Israel insists that the Palestinians should manifest a change in their basic attitudes towards them (the Israelis). This demand is usually couched in the message that the Palestinians must erase those clauses of their Covenant that articulate a denial of Israel's right to exist. According to Israeli officials, what they actually mean is that they want to see a termination of the propaganda, the educational material in textbooks and the themes of teledrama where young Palestinians are taught to hate Israel and its people.

It is possible that Israel has raised this demand, believing that it is a demand which the Palestinian Authority will not be able to fulfil easily. If Arafat cannot deliver on this demand, Israel will have a more justifiable reason for failing to fulfil its part in the negotiation process. It is also possible to treat this demand as a chimera if the Palestinian claims that they have already amended the Covenant are taken as valid. And there are reasons for doing so. But even if the Palestinians were to dismiss Israel's stand on the subject as being of little importance to them (something they surely cannot do when Israel holds most of the cards), they still have to grapple with the questions of existence and co-existence.

Khatib said that implicit in the Oslo processes was the notion of a two-state settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and that the solution probably had a large measure of public support when the processes were initiated. According to the analyst, support for a two-state settlement has begun to erode among the intelligentsia. Israel has, of course, not officially come on board the two-state platform as yet and if the Palestinians too were to turn away from it, the best chance for a settlement would end.

A flourishing democratic creed can perhaps alleviate some of the frustration in Palestinian life; an abatement of the Palestinians' angst can perhaps give rise to a willingness to co-exist with Israel. On the other hand, a breakthrough in the negotiations would surely cause a lowering of the levels of frustration, which could perhaps rekindle Palestinians' faith in the Palestinian Authority and thus provide Arafat with a situation in which he could loosen his control. One way or the other, the external dimensions of the questions regarding Palestine's existence seem to be inevitably tied to the internal dimensions.

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