India signs an agreement for the acquisition of U.S.-made weapon-locating radar systems for the Army, in preference to an Ukrainian system that would have cost only half the sum.
INDIA'S new military relationship with the United States is not coming cheap. On April 19, Indian officials signed a $140-million deal to acquire eight Raytheon-made Firefinder weapon locating radar (WLR) systems. The Indian Army has long felt the need for a WLR system, which enables the detection of enemy artillery, missile and mortar positions. But the cost of the deal and the terms under which it has been made have raised more than a few eyebrows within the Army. The Firefinder is more than twice as expensive as the similar Ukrainian 1 L220-U WLR, which India had late last year committed itself to purchasing. And unlike any other defence acquisition, the contract has been signed in the U.S., and will be governed by U.S. laws - not those of India.
Raytheon's Firefinder ANT/PQ-37 is an improved version of the ANT/PQ-36, which is in service in 37 countries including Pakistan. The radar systems can detect artillery positions from a distance of 28 to 32 km, and tactical missiles from up to 50 km. According to Raytheon publicity material, it can detect up to 10 weapon locations in a matter of seconds. On paper, there is little to choose between this system and the 1 L220-U. Ukrspets Export, which sells the systems, says that it can detect artillery fire positions at up to 25 km, multiple rocket launch systems at between 40 and 50 km, and tactical missiles at up to 80 km. The Ukrainian system can acquire 50 enemy targets in less than a minute.
Late last year, the Indian Army had finalised the purchase of eight pieces of 1 L220-U for about $8 million each, four of them in partly built condition. Accessories would have cost approximately another $6 million for the entire set. Negotiations for the Ukrainian system started in August 1999, just after the Kargil war, during which the need for such a system was felt acutely. Discussions were initiated with the joint German-French venture that manufactures the rival Cobra WLR. Shortly afterwards, rumours began to circulate about the involvement of arms agents in the deal. Shortly after price negotiations started in July 2000, Defence Minister George Fernandes sent the matter to the Central Vigilance Commission, which referred the issue to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).
CBI investigators, in a report submitted to the CVC on January 16, 2001, said that while no specific indications of malpractices were available, there were "reasons to believe that there are certain retired Army officers using their status of ex-servicemen, who have been meeting the serving Army officers and also hobnobbing with the representatives of prospective foreign suppliers". In retrospect, the finding was of obvious relevance: the Tehelka arms scandal was yet to break. But all that Defence Minister George Fernandes did was to refer the matter back to the CVC. Meanwhile, Ukrspets Export extended the validity of its offer until June 2001, presumably awaiting the outcome of the CVC investigation. Parliament's Standing Committee on Defence was told that "action for procurement of WLR will be initiated as soon as the advice of the CVC is received".
Developments relating to the deal now became increasingly opaque. On October 10, 2001, the Standing Committee on Defence was told of the Ministry of Defence's (MoD) course of action. Although Ukrspets Export's offer had expired by then, no mention was made of whether it had offered any further extension. Nor did the Ministry see it fit to state what the CVC had found, and what it intended to do in order to speed up the deal. The 15th Report of the Standing Committee of Defence, tabled in the Lok Sabha on March 20, 2002, came down hard on Fernandes' fiefdom for its attitude. The committee was "surprised over the lack of seriousness of the Ministry of Defence and desire to know the latest position in this regard," page 7 notes. The committee also recorded "its serious concern that purchases of all equipment of critical importance for the Army are unnecessarily delayed".
What the committee did not know about, or was not told about, were events off-stage. By last year, the new U.S. Ambassador to New Delhi, Robert Blackwill, had indicated that the embargo on the supply of U.S. arms to India imposed in the wake of the 1998 Pokhran-II nuclear tests was to be lifted. Blackwill energetically pitched for major U.S. arms sales to India, echoing concerns among manufacturers in that country about the fact that European firms were moving in to capitalise on the opportunity. U.S. arms manufacturers were also incensed that Israel, which rapidly emerged as the second largest seller of arms to India after the National Democratic Alliance took power, was offering India equipment based essentially on their technology.
It just was not possible, however, to rule out the Ukrainian offer. Even if arms agents were involved, it was on the face of it ridiculous to respond by buying similar equipment at twice the price. At this stage, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) lent a helping hand to the U.S. MEA bureaucrats refused to allow the MoD to renew negotiations with Ukrspets Export, arguing that Ukraine had supplied over 320 T-80 UD tanks to Pakistan. This argument should also have been shot down out of hand. After all, the U.S., not Ukraine, was the largest supplier of arms to Pakistan, and it had even made available the 36-series Firefinder against which India's new purchase would be pitted. Reason, evidently, was not the main force behind the MEA's objections. Then, more pressure was brought to bear on India, through rumours suggesting that Ukrspets Export was involved in covert arms sales to Iraq - allegations that it hotly denies.
By February 2002, acting behind the Standing Committee's back, representatives from the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command were in New Delhi working on the details of the Firefinder deal. Just how far the Indian defence establishment was willing to go to secure the deal soon became evident. Those who expressed doubts about the U.S.' willingness to back its sales during times of crisis, as a result of its long-standing relationship with Pakistan, were told to shut up. Blackwill himself was honest, making clear at a press conference in late 2001 that U.S. sales to India were bound by its laws, and that no guarantees of continued technological support in the event of future differences could be provided. Nonetheless, breaking precedent, India agreed to sign the deal with Raytheon in the U.S., and for the contract consequently to be bound by that country's laws.
TWICE the price might still have been acceptable if the 37-series Firefinder was indeed clearly superior to the Ukrainian system. The evidence, however, is far from clear. While it is possible to argue endlessly about the minor differences in range for different categories of weapons between the two systems, most publicly available technical literature rates both as being broadly similar. Some experts say that Ukraine has a poor record in meeting needs for spares, but this does not seem to have troubled Pakistan's T-80 UD tanks. Raytheon itself is in the process of developing the ANT/PQ-47, a new-generation system that can be lifted to combat locations on a C-130 transport aircraft flight. When the ANT/PQ-47 series is finally in place, it would be clearly superior to competing systems. There is no sign, however, that the U.S. would offer such technologies to India, since it is committed to blocking weapons sales that would alter the balance of power in South Asia.
Sadly, the corruption issues that emerged during the WLR deal after 1999 have yet to go away. The corridors of the MoD are abuzz with rumours that Raytheon insisted it would pay an India-based representative a commission on the deal, in violation of official guidelines. No one is certain how the issue has been addressed in the contract, but the fact that it has been signed outside India has fuelled rumours of paybacks to an arms dealer based in a suburb of New Delhi. Major sales of other U.S.-manufactured military hardware, notably helicopters, are on the anvil. The mystery surrounding key aspects of the Firefinder deal could yet cloud future acquisitions. "The worst thing," says an Army official, "is that the U.S. acts as if it's doing us a favour, and we behave the same way. The truth is that we're paying cash, and should insist on our rights as buyers."
Worst of all, the WLR episode has shown how little concern there is for the real needs of the Army in the matter of arms procurements. Few people are aware that the search for a WLR system began as early as 1980, when a team of senior officers led by Lieutenant-General Surinder Singh, the then Director-General of Artillery, and Lieutenant-General K.K. Hazari, visited the U.S. Surinder Singh and Hazari checked out systems, including the Series-36 Firefinder that was later purchased by Pakistan, but were unable to close a deal. No one seems certain why this was the case, but priorities changed in subsequent years and the search for a WLR came to a halt. Two decades later, Hazari was appointed a member of the Kargil Review Committee, which discovered that the absence of WLRs had seriously impacted India's ability to engage Pakistani artillery during the 1999 war.
In the larger sense, the issue is not that of an arms system, or even arms procurements at large. It is whether multi-million-dollar acquisitions should be made on merit or to suit some larger, and politically contentious, geostrategic objective. For all of the gushing within the MEA about the transfiguration of the U.S.-India relationship after September 11, there is little sign yet of that country severing its abiding strategic relationship with Pakistan. The U.S. has obvious interests in using two horses to pull its chariot in South Asia rather than one, but it is less clear what India's interest in this arrangement might be. There might be no such thing as a free lunch. In this case, however, there seems to be no question of the bill being shared.
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