Revealing conversation

General J.N. Chaudhuri,who retired as Chief of the Army Staff on June 8, 1966, bidding farewell to Gen. P.P. Kumaramangalam (right), his successor, at Palam Airport in Delhi.-THE HINDU ARCHIVES General J.N. Chaudhuri,who retired as Chief of the Army Staff on June 8, 1966, bidding farewell to Gen. P.P. Kumaramangalam (right), his successor, at Palam Airport in Delhi.

D.A. SCOTT of the British High Commission enclosed a note of the conversation between High Commissioner John Freeman and Gen. J.N. Chaudhuri. An excerpt, taken from The British Papers: Secret and Confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents 1958-1969 (Roedad Khan (Ed.); Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002; pages 480, 481 and 496): In a recent conversation with General Chaudhuri, COAS revealed to me [Freeman] that Mr. [Y.B.] Chavan had consulted him during March on the possibility that circumstances might arise in which the Army would seize power from the civil authority. COAS told me that they had discussed this matter at some length and that he had expressed the categorical view that such a possibility did not exist. He based his belief on

(a) His view that there was a deep-seated respect for constitutional government at all levels in the country.

(b) The size of India and the degree of decentralisation of its government machine. From this he argued that it would be administratively and operationally impracticable for the Army to seize power from both the Union and the state governments in a single operation.

(c) If the Army were to attempt a coup against the Union government without seizing power in the states simultaneously, the Congress machine would remain operational and the coup would almost certainly be ineffectual.

(d) If the coup were directed against one or more of the states without the acquiescence of the statements [sic], it would present the same weakness as above in even greater measure. Moreover, in case the Army commander who directed such a coup would place a critical strain on the loyalty of Army, since state loyalties and rivalries are a real factor in the Army. COAS is of the opinion that in these circumstances the organiser of coup would probably find himself with his hands and that a civil war situation conceivably develop. [Words missing in original.]

2. COAS agreed that there would probably be no great difficulty if the Union government directed the Army to take over a particular state or region though even then he himself would require reasonable time to redeploy troops and assemble a select force whose loyalty would be strained as little as possible.

3. COAS had considered the possibility that, in a situation of political and administrative chaos, the President of India might, independently of the Union government or even against its wishes, order the Army to take over from the civil authority. If this ever happened he would interest his duty as requiring him to do his best to execute the order. He believed that presidential authority would be adequate cover and that the operation could probably be carried out successfully. But he was thankful that there was no prospect of such an order being given before his retirement.

4. I do not personally find all COAS' arguments fully convincing in theory but I daresay they might prove so in practice. In any case, I have little doubt that they do represent General Chaudhuri's considered views [signed] John Freeman (The High Commissioner) 5 April, 1966.

The President then was S. Radhakrishnan, who toyed with the idea of taking over the government, with the help of the Army and the civil service, after Jawaharlal Nehru's death. Significantly, the intention was bared to United States Ambassador Chester Bowles, which he recorded in his memoirs ( Promises to keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969; 1972; page 496).

On April 23, 1966, Scott wrote again to London: As promised in paragraph 3 of my letter of 7 April, I enclose three copies of the more detailed study on this subject which has been agreed by the High Commissioner.

2. I must make it quite clear that what this study seeks to do is:

(a) to confirm General Chaudhuri's view that as things stand at present we do not envisage an attempted coup by the Army; and

(b) to indicate what circumstances would need to occur to prompt a coup.

3. The circumstances we have outlined are not necessarily those that we expect by the end of 1966; but they are ones that could occur if India's fortunes take a downward plunge and should not be dismissed as mere flights of fancy. (There are many variations of this theme that we have not felt necessary to spell out).

4. Having uttered this caveat, I hope you will treat our study as a speculation only. It is not intended as a warning of a situation that we believe will inescapably take place this autumn.

Unfortunately, the editor of the compilation did not care to publish the valuable enclosure.