Devious diplomacy

IN its April 22 issue, the journal Nature carried an article titled Copenhagen Accord pledges are paltry, written by nine prominent climate scientists led by Joeri Rogelj and Malte Meinshausen. Presenting sound technical arguments, their analysis is one of the many critiques that have appeared recently of the pledge and review approach, the highly controversial outcome of the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Copenhagen in December 2009. Arguing that the current emission targets will not limit global warming to 2 Celsius (above which catastrophic and irreversible climate change effects are predicted to occur), the paper warned that they might even lock the world into exceeding 3C warming. That is, the laissez-faire premise of the accord, which developed countries hailed, cannot lead to a liveable planet.

To recall, this agreement was surreptitiously evolved behind closed doors by the Danish Chair of the summit in consultation with two dozen countries, the so-called Friends of the Chair, and hustled through by President Barack Obama on the last day (see Battle half-won, Frontline, January 29). Since the accord was not a consensus document many parties had strong reservations about it it was only taken note of by the conference and not adopted.

But it seriously undermined the UNFCCC negotiations process, which was working towards legally binding commitments for carbon emission reductions by developed countries, or Annex I parties to the convention, under the Kyoto Protocol for the period beyond 2012, when the first phase of commitment under the Protocol ends. The Protocol requires only the Annex I countries, which are responsible for the carbon accumulation in the atmosphere since industrialisation began, to take legally binding emission reduction commitments, while non-Annex I (developing) countries do not have to.

A twin-track approach was adopted by the parties: one to arrive at the targets for the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and the other to implement the UNFCCC by the cooperative action of the parties. The discussions on these were held under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA). While the former is only among the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol, the latter includes all the parties to the convention (which significantly includes the United States, a Kyoto Protocol non-signatory). By renewing the mandates of the AWGs, the Bali Action Plan and the Bali Road Map, which were adopted at COP13 in Bali in 2007, reinforced the foundations of the current global climate regime, which the Copenhagen Accord seeks to dismantle.

Pledge and review'

The pledge and review scheme was the handiwork of the U.S., which was against accepting any legally binding commitment on emission reductions. Acting behind the scenes since mid-2009 and with active help from other developed countries which did not want to commit to a second commitment period such as Australia, Canada, Japan and Russia, the U.S. succeeded in having the scheme formalised as a political agreement at Copenhagen.

A legally binding agreement was rejected and an attempt was made to merge the twin tracks so that not only was the Kyoto Protocol killed but the entire Kyoto process was destroyed. What was feared before Copenhagen became a reality at Copenhagen, and post-Copenhagen apprehensions are now turning out to be true as well, with the demolition of the Kyoto process happening slowly but systematically.

The Copenhagen Accord required countries associating with it to submit their national pledges (of voluntary emission reductions) by February 1. As of date, 82 countries, together accounting for over 80 per cent of global emissions, have submitted their pledges. (At the time the Nature paper was published, 76 countries had submitted their pledges.) It is amazing how unambitious these pledges are, the paper remarked.

The submissions of all Annex I countries (under the Kyoto Protocol) were more or less the same as what they had submitted to the AWG-KP, the notable exception being Canada. By aligning itself with the U.S. (which gave a 2020 target of 17 per cent below 2005 levels), Canada has weakened its commitments by committing itself to an increase in its 2020 emission target above its current Kyoto Protocol target, that is, 3 per cent above instead of 6 per cent below 1990 levels.

According to various recent estimates, the probability of staying under the 2C guard rail is 50 per cent or more, if:

Global emissions peak sometime between 2015 and 2021;

Global emissions in 2020 are approximately 40.0 to 48.3 gigatonnes (Gt) of CO2-equivalent/year;

By 2050 global emissions decrease by 48 to 72 per cent relative to 2000.

An analysis was carried out in February end by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and presented at a meeting of the UNEP Governing Council. According to it, pledges under the Copenhagen Accord mean that global emissions in 2020 are expected to range between 48.8 and 51.2 Gt CO2-eq/yr. These figures are basically arithmetic averages of three different estimates (see table). Hence, if high pledges are fulfilled, the gap is between 0.5 and 8.8 Gt CO2-eq/yr, with an intermediate value of 4.7 Gt CO2-eq/yr; if low pledges are met, the gap is between 2.9 and 11.2 Gt CO2-eq/yr, with an intermediate value of 7.1 Gt CO2-eq/yr (Graph 1). This gives only a less than 20 per cent chance that the 2C limit will be met with the current commitments under the accord.

Rogelj and his colleagues carried the analysis further by taking into account some of the loopholes that exist in the current climate regime that allow increased emissions by developed countries. These loopholes include surplus emission allowances that have been accrued by some countries such as Russia and weak land use and forestry accounting rules. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the targets for some countries were so weak that they could emit less than their targets and thereby accumulate large amounts of surplus allowances for the first commitment period, 2008-2012. This surplus can, in principle, be banked upon and used later or sold to other countries as credits. As for land use and forestry, the rules for accounting, for example, in baseline fixation, have not been clearly defined and this too allows Annex I countries to increase their emissions. The Nature paper also allows for emission allowances for the aviation and maritime sector.

On the basis of the Copenhagen Accord pledges and allowing for the above loopholes, the authors estimate that emissions from developed countries in 2020 will be 19.9 Gt CO2-eq/yr, which is 6.5 per cent above 1990 levels. This level, points out the paper, substantially exceeds projections of what would happen in developed countries if no additional mitigation action was taken by 2020. That is, in the worst-case scenario of low Copenhagen Accord pledges, developed countries' emissions would exceed business-as-usual (BAU) projections from 1990 levels. In the more optimistic scenario of the Annex I countries meeting their ambitious high-end pledges, this comes down to 15.7 Gt CO2-eq/yr in 2020, which is 15.6 per cent lower than 1990 levels. But this is still woefully short of the 25-40 per cent reduction by Annex I countries required by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and demanded by countries of the G77+China group (Graph 2).

Adding the developing countries' emissions of 28.6-29.4 Gt CO2-eq/yr and the effects of deforestation, international aviation and shipping, the authors arrive at the global emission figures of 47.9 to 53.6 Gt CO2-eq/yr by 2020, which is 10-20 per cent higher than today's levels.

The range reflects the difference between the high and low ends of the pledges. Even if the emissions gap is closed in 2020, further emission reductions after 2020 are necessary to avoid overshooting 2C. (Most studies indicate that the reduction rate after the peak should be at least 3-3.5 per cent a year.)

It is therefore important to set aggregate emission targets not only for 2020 but also for 2050. Even if emissions halve by mid-century, warn the researchers, this will still leave the planet with, at best, a flip-of-the-coin chance of meeting the 2C goal. To have a higher probability of not breaching the 2C limit, emission targets must be still lower.

The only way to achieve the 2C limit, say the authors, is to increase the cuts before and by 2020, specifically in line with the IPCC findings, with at least a 30 per cent reduction below 1990 levels for developed countries and a substantial deviation (of 20 per cent) below the BAU projections for developing countries. In our view, 2020 emission levels exceeding 44 Gt CO2-eq/yr should come with a warning label. The prospects of limiting global warming [on the basis of the accord] are in dire peril.

Despite these grim warnings from scientists and climate analysts, developed countries are bent on dismantling the current global climate regime and replacing it with a weaker system of voluntary pledges a la Copenhagen Accord. This became evident at the 12-day-long climate talks held in Bonn during May 31-June 11.

In retrospect, the direction in which the talks were being driven should have been suspected after the first round, from April 9 to 11 (Bonn I). When the parties met at Bonn I, the ostensible aim was to pick up the broken pieces of Copenhagen and salvage the legitimate negotiating process under the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC. The Copenhagen Accord, developing countries liked to believe, was an aberration, and they could now set the Kyoto process and the Bali Road Map back on their respective parallel tracks. Many believed that the U.S. was the only country that accorded legitimacy to the accord. The general talk was of the need to restore the trust that had been eroded at Copenhagen between developed and developing countries. But the subtle moves in Bonn I were aimed at slowly giving primacy to the accord and scuttling the Kyoto-Bali process before COP16 at Cancun, Mexico, in December.

The four years of negotiations under the AWG-KP were aimed at delivering a top-down framework for emission targets of Annex I parties in the second commitment period, that is, one works down from an aggregate target to arrive at an individual country's commitments. The accord's voluntary pledge mechanism, on the other hand, is a bottom-up one, which cannot, and does not, lead to the emission cuts demanded by science to keep global warming under 2C. By treating developing and developed countries on an equal footing, the bottom-up approach does not take the historical responsibility of developed countries into account. Nor does it include the climate justice and equity that developing countries demand and which have been enshrined in the convention. It is, in fact, an attempt to shift a good part of the burden of mitigation on developing countries.

The Bolivian negotiator gave an apt analogy for this bottom-up approach at Bonn I. Just as in the construction of a dam, where one needs first to agree on the size and height of the dam, here one needs first to agree on the emission reductions, he said. Once the dam size and height are fixed, then one can bring the required amount of stones and other materials to build it. The Copenhagen Accord is like everyone bringing what they can and then trying to build the dam. We need to return to the Protocol's essence and system. Otherwise humankind will be swept away, he said.

The turning point at Bonn I occurred when, after prolonged negotiations, the Chair of the AWG-LCA, Margaret Mukahanana-Sangarwe of Zimbabwe, was allowed to draft a new negotiating text. Stating that a number of parties had wanted to draw on points of convergence reflected in the Copenhagen Accord and utilise them to advance the work of AWG-LCA where appropriate, she mooted the idea of a new text on April 9. She said that it would be part of the documentation required for the Bonn II negotiations in June. While developed countries and a few developing countries favoured this, the bulk of non-Annex I countries resisted and pointed out that no opportunity had yet been provided to discuss the AWG-LCA documents from Copenhagen that had been adopted by consensus.

Several countries pointed out that COP15 had requested the AWG-LCA to draw on its report of the Copenhagen summit and the subsequent work undertaken by the COP on the basis of the report and continue the talks. Since the accord was not a consensus document and did not have a legal status, the consensual outcome of the AWG-LCA at Copenhagen should be the basis for negotiations to move forward, India and China stressed.

On the other hand, developed countries, led by the U.S., wanted the Chair to make a new draft that took into account both the accord and the AWG-LCA's Copenhagen text. After intense negotiations, the Chair was finally allowed to prepare a facilitating text, under her own responsibility, drawing on the AWG-LCA Copenhagen report and on work undertaken by the COP on the basis of that report.

This was endorsed by G77+China as well. The parties were also invited to make submissions on additional views latest by April 26. Russia, however, said that it was willing to accept this proposal only if it also allowed the Chair to take cognisance of the COP's decisions at Copenhagen. Since the accord was noted by the COP as one of its decisions, the Russian demand was also supported by the U.S. and the European Union (E.U.). It was finally decided that parties could make submissions on issues, including those that were not openly negotiated (referring to the accord) for the Chair to take note of, which Russia accepted.

Having thus secured the necessary leverage with the accord as the fulcrum, developed countries steered the Bonn II AWG-LCA talks cleverly by influencing the Chair, Margaret Mukahanana-Sangarwe. The AWG-LCA talks at Bonn II began around the facilitating text, which had been circulated on May 17 to all the parties. But several developing countries felt that the text did not treat the issues equitably and that it had to be restructured according to the Bali Road Map.

Developed countries were, on the other hand, quite satisfied with the text. India stated that the AWG-LCA should strengthen the Bali Action Plan and not weaken it. It said that the issues of mitigation, adaptation, finance and technology should be given equal importance and that the document should not overemphasise shared vision. Nothing should be done to dilute this balance and there cannot be erosion between developed and developing countries, India said.

In the parallel negotiations under the AWG-KP, there was a constant refrain from some developed countries, particularly Japan, to merge the two tracks. There were heated arguments on whether the Chair of the AWG-KP should meet the Chair of the AWG-LCA, which is what developed countries wanted. There were even suggestions that there should be horizontal groups across the two working groups to prioritise issues that overlapped.

Developing countries held that this was not necessary as the two working groups had separate mandates, work programmes and outcomes. But the E.U. went so far as to say that if this was not allowed, it would not support any outcome of the AWG-KP session. Finally, a compromise was reached, which allowed the AWG-KP Chair to meet the AWG-LCA Chair under his own initiative. In the discussions on the mitigation actions to be taken by developed countries, Japan said that the AWG-LCA was the right place to discuss mitigation for all parties. This was supported by Russia, which said that commitments of developed countries alone were not sufficient and added that the bottom-up approach was feasible and durable in determining commitments of Annex-I parties. It also did not want an aggregate target to be set.

Developed countries also sought to standardise monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) along international norms for nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) by developing countries that were internationally financed. They also wanted the issue of international consultation and analysis (ICA), which was introduced into the accord, to be firmed up under the AWG-LCA and made mandatory every two years for the actions taken. Developed countries also argued that it should be made a precondition for developing countries to give details of low carbon strategies and emission pathways to get support for NAMAs. India pointed out that emission pathway was an autonomous and national exercise and could not become part of an internationally agreed mechanism.

The bombshell, however, came on the penultimate day of the talks when the AWG-LCA Chair, in a fiendishly devious way, sprung another new text, which surprised and angered all the developing countries.

A large part of the final plenary session of the AWG-LCA was taken up with severe criticisms of the text by one developing country after another. All the square brackets were missing in the new text, which was made available as an advance draft of the revised text to facilitate the next round of talks in August. The square brackets had been used to indicate the contentious parts in the draft of May 17 that lack consensus of the parties and reflected the issues and concerns raised by developing countries. By incorporating elements of the infamous Copenhagen Accord in fact, in some places the language came straight out of the Danish text that marred the Copenhagen negotiations the new draft patently favoured the perspective of developed countries.

The following is an obvious insertion that stemmed from the accord and demanded that emission pathways be specified: Parties should cooperate in the peaking of global and national emissions by 2020 when the developing countries are not required to specify any peaking year for their emissions. This was clearly an attempt to do away with the negotiating track under the AWG-KP and replace it with a single track.

Interestingly, this was done even though the text did not talk about the targets, peak year and base year for developed countries as required under the Kyoto Protocol.

China pointed out that the text provided by the Chair was her own responsibility and added that the Chair could not just produce any kind of text but should be guided by the parties. Negotiations are among parties and not a dialogue with the Chair, China said. India also pointed out that several formulations in the text were inconsistent with the convention and that there were glaring omissions and options and paragraphs had disappeared.

In particular, it pointed out that there was no reference to its submission on the importance of the equity paradigm in the shared vision. India also said that the unbracketed text gave the impression that there was consensus and added that without reference to the emission targets of developed countries the text gave the impression that the two-track approach had been abandoned.

The 12th Session of the AWG-KP, on the other hand, ended late on June 11 as the talks were held hostage by Russia, whose tendencies were evident in April itself. Russia wanted to prevent any reference to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and to increasing emission reduction commitments for Annex I parties. Initially supported by Japan, Russia held up the conclusion of talks by six hours. In fact, the talks were on the verge of collapse. Finally, Russia agreed to a compromised and diluted wording: a possible enhanced scale instead of increasing emission reduction commitments and subsequent commitment period instead of second commitment period.

Just like the laudatory remarks Yvo de Boer, the outgoing secretary of the UNFCCC, made at a press conference at the Conclusion of COP15 after the Copenhagen Accord, here too, he called the new negotiating text a major advance and said that the talks showed a convergence on major issues even though most developing countries had expressed dismay at the new text and some had rejected it outright.

Developing countries, in fact, finally called the document the Chair's non-paper. They said it did not have any sanctity or basis for the parties' consideration. Of course, de Boer's remarks had their desired impact on the Western media, whose reports and commentaries did not reflect the true state of affairs at the negotiations. In reality, talks under both tracks ended inconclusively, with those under the AWG-LCA remaining in a state of suspension as the text could not be digested by developing countries.

The task for developing countries has now become onerous and more difficult than ever before. Only a collective and determined offensive by them can thwart the devious climate diplomacy, post-Copenhagen, of developed countries.