THE formal acceptance in January 2000 of the report of the State Autonomy Committee (SAC) by the National Conference Government in Jammu and Kashmir generated a heated debate, but in the process not much light has been thrown on the twin issues concernin g the autonomy of the State within India and of the regions within the State, issues which have discredited the very concept of autonomy. In simple words it means self-rule by a unit within a larger unit. How much power should be shared between the Centr e and the State and between the State and a region is a question that has been constantly debated in every federal system. It is a reflection on the present political climate of Jammu and Kashmir that such a debate should degenerate into polemics.
The National Conference argues that the gravity of such autonomy to the State is the only alternative to "azadi" and the only means to fight militancy. There are not many takers for this argument in the Kashmir Valley. For there is hardly any evid ence for the presumption that if the present rulers in the State get more powers, the pro-"azadi" forces and the militants will rally round them. Nor are people convinced that it is lack of adequate power that has prevented the rulers from delivering the goods. In fact, with a two-thirds majority in the Legislative Assembly and almost complete control over the Legislative Council, and with no effective opposition in the Valley, no inner-party democracy and no opposition from any party at the national le vel, Farooq Abdullah enjoys far more power than ever enjoyed by any Chief Minister in any other State of India.
The crucial questions are, autonomy for whom and how it is to be used. Within the same set-up, Sheikh Abdullah exercised far greater political autonomy and was far more popular than his son is. Autonomy can be meaningful only if power is shared horizonta lly and vertically and it enlarges the freedom of the individual and the community. The horizontal autonomous institutions that share power with the government at the Centre, for instance, include the Supreme Court, the Comptroller and Auditor General, t he Election Commission and the Union Public Service Commission. They check any arbitrary exercise of power by the government.
The SAC report prescribes the withdrawal of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over Jammu and Kashmir. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court will then become the supreme judicial authority for the State. But the State Government will acquire the final auth ority to appoint High Court judges as the Supreme Court will be denied any say in the matter. Between the Supreme Court and the State Government, which one will the people trust more? Moreover, the SAC seeks powers for the State Assembly to remove judges and to delete Article 226 of the Indian Constitution which confers on the High Court the power to issue writs of habeas corpus and mandamus. Thus, if the autonomy proposals are implemented, the judiciary in the State will hardly be able to retain its present level of independence.
Similarly, the State Government has given no indication of how the accounts of the State will be audited and how the elections will be conducted after the jurisdiction of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Election Commission is withdrawn. The S tate's record in the matter of keeping accounts and holding elections is scandalous.
But will the situation improve if the State Government acquires full powers over these functions? Other horizontal-level institutions such as universities and academies of culture, which are autonomous in other parts of the country, are fully controlled by the Jammu and Kashmir Government.
Further, the withdrawal of the jurisdiction of the federal autonomous institutions over the State will remove the checks not only on the absolute powers of the State Government but also on the arbitrary interference of the Central Government in the affai rs of the State. And if there is a Chief Minister as pliant as Farooq Abdullah has proved to be, this interference can be ruthless.
The State Government has not shown any inclination to share with the people the power that it seeks from the Centre, through a system of vertical decentralisation. After the head of the Regional Autonomy Committee (RAC) submitted his report, he was remov ed and the report was substituted by an official document which did not deal with the issue of granting autonomy to the regions but offered a new concept of regions. It proposes their re-organisation, which was not within the terms of reference of the RA C.
In the case of Kashmir, the proposal means reversion to three old districts of Srinagar, Anantnag and Baramulla, which were only recently divided into six districts. Jammu is proposed to be split into the three regions of Jammu, Rajouri-Poonch and Doda w hile Ladakh will be split into Leh and Kargil.
Reducing the size of the regions will preclude any substantial devolution of power to them. If all the regions claim equality, can the State have eight capitals instead of the present two, one for summer and one for winter? Can High Court benches and uni versities be established in all of them? Will all other regional institutions be established in all the proposed regions or will they be abolished? Clearly the official proposal withdraws whatever autonomy now exists at the regional level.
Further, each of the District Boards, constituted under the State Panchayati Raj Act, has a nominated president, nominated women members who form 33 per cent of the strength, nominated Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe members and representatives of se mi-government agencies. The Deputy Commissioner is its executive head. The same pattern is repeated at the block and panchayat levels, with the result that the State Government is extended to the lowest tier of the administration. Thus the entire exercis e in autonomy is reduced to measures for the fullest possible regimentation and centralisation of power in the hands of the State Government. Already the present unitary form of Constitution which was imposed on the State has an inherent character that c auses regional tensions, which often take the form of secessionism in Kashmir and communalism in Jammu and Ladakh. Further concentration of power can only lead to a more explosive situation.
A far more sinister implication of the official report is that the reorganisation proposal divides Jammu and Ladakh along communal lines. Regional identities, whose erosion had a healthy secularising impact, would thus be replaced by communal identities. Ostensibly, the re-organisation is proposed on ethnic grounds. But whatever variation of dialect, language and culture may exist between the Hindu majority districts of the Jammu and Muslim majority districts of Rajouri, Poonch and Doda, there are far g reater variations within each of the proposed region. In any case, ethnic and cultural differences between the regions of Jammu and Kashmir are far greater than those between the proposed Jammu region and the Rajouri-Poonch and Doda regions. If the latte r cannot live together under one unit of the region, on what logic can Jammu live together under one unit of the State? Similar is the case of Leh. Already the government proposal has provoked demands for the separation of Jammu and Leh from the State. W ith the communally divided regions around itself, the vitality of the over 5,000-year-old Kashmiri identity too is bound to be threatened. Nor is separation the best guarantee for the faster and balanced development of the districts being separated from the Jammu region.
The official report has merely recommended "special consideration for the development of most backward areas." Instead of providing specific safeguards for a share in the political and economic power for each region and for each district, the Government has proposed a division of the regions. Such a step will make each of the parts completely dependent on the State government's good intentions of fair treatment.
The report has also recommended that the government may consider setting up district councils as an alternative to regional councils. If the State Government accepts this alternative and abolishes the administrative units of the regions, its power to dom inate the districts would be far greater than its power over the regions.
Whichever alternative the government accepts, the intention seems to be to centralise further political, cultural and economic power in its hands - the power it does not want to share either horizontally or vertically. It wants neither to transfer power to the people nor have any checks imposed on its use. In such a constitutional and political system of unchecked concentration of power, popular urges will have no alternative but to seek expression in unconstitutional and violent outlets, thus encouragi ng the trends that are already so manifest and have cost the country so dearly.
Balraj Puri was chairman of the Regional Autonomy Committee appointed by the Jammu and Kashmir Government.
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