A cautious approach

Although "U.S. mediation" to resolve the Kashmir issue is anathema to India, the U.S. may be interested in impressing upon India and Pakistan to take note of the suggestions it may have.

EVEN THOUGH it has not yet said anything substantive on the India-Pakistan summit, the Bush administration is watching the developments closely. The Agra meeting itself is seen as a welcome development but few in official and non-official circles in Washington hold out hopes of a breakthrough.

President Pervez Musharraf's reported remark that it was owing to Washington's pressure that New Delhi extended an invitation for talks might have been the consequnce of a little stretching of the imagination. But he would not have been wide of the mark had he said that for the last two years or so the United States had been nudging India and Pakistan to go to the negotiating table and create proper conditions for talks.

Addressing the Pakistan American Congress, Christina Rocca, the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, said that the U.S. was "pleased" with Pakistan for following the path of dialogue with India so as to resolve the serious differences between the two countries. Wishing the leaders success in their summit, Rocca said: "I know for Pakistan Kashmir is at the heart of these differences. We believe that it is important for all sides in Kashmir to exercise restraint and reduce violence. Restraint on all sides will facilitate prospects for any dialogue to produce positive results."

From the perspective of the Bush administration - and of the earlier regime - India and Pakistan will have to hold talks to ease the relations and the absence of dialogue has created a disturbing situation in the subcontinent. The fact that the two South Asian neighbours are nuclear-armed has made matters worse. A conviction in some quarters in Washington is that restraint is not the name of the game in the subcontinent.

In fact, a recent publication of the Stimson Centre, "The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia", argues that India and Pakistan face far greater difficulties in establishing nuclear safety and stability than other nuclear weapons States. In his contributory piece, Michael Krepon has said that "if India and Pakistan are to demonstrate a superior wisdom that resists ever increasing nuclear capabilities, they must first demonstrate a superior wisdom to reduce nuclear risks".

If Kashmir is going to be the core issue as far as Musharraf is concerned and if Pakistan hopes somehow to rope in the U.S. into the scheme of things, it is not going to work. At the same time, although the word "mediation" is anathema to India, the U.S. may be interested in impressing upon the two sides to take note of any ideas and suggestions it may have. In any event, the way in which the Bush administration goes about this business is bound to be marked by extreme caution. "We are not going to mediate in this dispute. But if we can be helpful and both sides want us to be helpful, then I think we should be," said American Ambassador-designate Robert Blackwill in his confirmation hearing. "In the end they are going to have to find a way to resolve this issue, hopefully peacefully, between them," Blackwill argued at the Senate Sub-committee on Near East and South Asia.

If there is one thing that is working in India's "favour", it is the Bush administration's assessment of terrorism, especially the cross-border variety. Of late, the U.S. is extremely concerned about the terrorist menace sitting on Pakistan's borders, which has implications for not only the region but the entire world.

Islamabad's relationship with the Taliban in Afghanistan has not gone down well with the U.S politically. U.S. lawmakers have wasted no time in slamming Pakistan for not doing enough to rein in the Taliban, which has been harbouring Osama Bin Laden, a bogeyman in the U.S. And, over the last two years, Indian officials have done well to impress upon the U.S. administration the meaning of India's stance that there can be no talks unless there is a let-up in terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir.

In the run-up to the summit, the Bush administration has had a chance to get a closer look at - and perhaps even a rare preview of - what could be expected from Agra between July 14 and 16. The opportunity was provided by two important visits from the subcontinent - of Pakistan Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar and India's National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra. And it would be naive to believe that senior officials of the Bush administration were passive spectators.

It was during Sattar's visit to Washington that Musharraf appointed himself civilian President - a move that attracted quick criticism and indignation from the State Department. That Sattar himself was unaware of the development when he had his meeting with Secretary of State Colin Powell was a different story. Powell might have endorsed the road map to democracy in Pakistan, but the following day Sattar got an earful. The reaction from Capitol Hill was equally strident. Senator Paul Wellstone, Democrat from Minnesota, said during the confirmation hearing of Wendy Chamberlin, the Ambassador-designate to Pakistan: "A long-time friend, Pakistan may now be in need of some tough love. The next Ambassador to Pakistan will have to convey a strong message about America's commitment not only to nuclear non-proliferation but also to democratic values, human rights and opposition to Taliban-inspired militancy. The decision of Musharraf to anoint himself President last week... is surely a troubling development." Chamberlin said that she would be taking the Senator's remarks as instructions to the next envoy to Islamabad.

BRAJESH MISHRA'S visit was different in scope and was seen in some quarters as yet another instance of the U.S. and India taking on a qualitatively different path in their bilateral relations. In Washington at the invitation of his U.S. counterpart Condoleeza Rice, Mishra had substantive discussions with her on the usual range of subjects. He also had meetings with Vice-President Dick Cheney, a major domestic and foreign policy actor in the Republican administration. Among others Mishra met were Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, senior lawmakers like Senator Sam Brownback and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) George Tenet.

The meeting with Tenet was especially interesting but officials and diplomats in Washington are playing down its significance, saying that it was nothing more than a return courtesy call. But it could turn out to be something different.

If there is one area that many in Washington want India and Pakistan to concentrate on, it is confidence-building measures. The idea is that the two sides would have to come to grips with mechanisms that will help reduce the level of confrontation between them and, by extension, the extent of danger to the region. The CIA and George Tenet, having been actively involved in playing a role between the Israelis and the Palestinians during the time of President Bill Clinton, have had a lot of experience in this area.

A useful role for the CIA in confidence-building does not signal "mediation" as some in the subcontinent would be tempted to see. Rather, it is a role that will help New Delhi and Islamabad come to terms with issues that the officials of the two sides find problematic and in some ways beyond their control. For instance, the CIA has been able to help Israel and the Palestinian Authority to come to grips with the problem of extremism. What remains to be seen whether the CIA's help is sought for a similar purpose.

The Mishra-Tenet meeting is also significant in the context of India's proposal to establish a centre for counter-terrorism. The idea is at a preliminary stage but it is learnt that the Bush administration has responded positively. Any such centre will have to involve high-profile intelligence agencies like the CIA or, for that matter, the anti-terrorism division within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

It would not be prudent for either India or Pakistan to overplay the Washington card at the summit or beyond. Recent formulations of senior officials of the administration have made it abundantly clear that the U.S. is not interested in supporting one country at the expense of the other. The Republican administration may be inclined to get closer to India on the merits of bilateral relations as also because of the China factor. The latter is crucial for the U.S., irrespective of whether India buys the line or not. But to imagine that Pakistan has been relegated or written off would be a short-sighted view. The Bush administration may be inclined to see India not as a regional power but as a global power with a truly international role to play and Pakistan as a regional power with a limited agenda. Still the point being made is that the Bush administration is keen on developing a relationship with Pakistan that is "about" Pakistan and which will stand on its own merits.

In a recent interview published in The Hindu, Armitage said: "For years we had an unbalanced policy in South Asia and people would look at it superficially and say we had a great relationship with Pakistan, but it was in a way a false relationship because in the first instance it was built against the India-Soviet Union axis and then latterly it was against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. So we didn't have a policy for Pakistan; we had a policy with Pakistan directed against something else; what we are desirous of is for our Pakistani friends to try and develop a relationship about Pakistan..."