A revolt in Tamil Nadu

Tamil Maanila Congress leader P. Chidambaram's estrangement from his mentor G.K. Moopanar has added an "untested factor" to the polarised political situation in Tamil Nadu.

HOW will the "P. Chidambaram factor" unravel itself as the campaign for the Tamil Nadu Assembly elections picks up momentum? With a fiercely contested round of elections on the cards - between a powerful ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam-led front and a f ormidable secular front headed by the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) - the 'PC factor' has become a debating point.

Chidambaram, one of the founders of the Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC) and a former Union Finance Minister, revolted against the party's decision to align with the AIADMK led by former Chief Minister Jayalalitha and formed the Tamil Maanila Congress Democr atic Front (TMCDF). He described it as "a platform for doing propaganda for the next 60 days that a single-party government under Jayalalitha will not provide good governance." Chidambaram said that "if necessary", the TMCDF would ask the people to vote for the DMK-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA).

Chidambaram and three of his supporters - legislators B. Ranganathan and N. Sundaram and K.K. Kasilingam, president of the TMC's Sivaganga district unit - were suspended from the TMC on March 22. Announcing this, A.R. Marimuthu, who heads the party's dis ciplinary action committee, said that the committee was satisfied with the material placed before it that a prima facie case existed against the four. They will be served with show-cause notices, asking them to explain within three days why they s hould not be expelled from the party.

As the TMC executive committee met at the party's headquarters in Chennai under the presidentship of G.K. Moopanar on March 21 to discuss the issue, leaders denounced Chidambaram and a crowd of TMC cadres outside raised slogans against him and distribute d pamphlets criticising him. Moopanar said, "My party is intact. Even in Sivaganga (Chidambaram's home district), 90 per cent of the cadres are with me."

Chidambaram, inaugurating the TMCDF's office, was defiant. He said: "We are also in the TMC and it belongs to us. They can expel me. But can they expel those who sent letters of support to us from different parts of the State, opposing the TMC's alliance with the AIADMK? Can they expel those who rang me up, pledging support?"

He said at a press conference on March 23: "The life and the soul are here (in the TMCDF) and the body is in the Satyamurthi Bhavan (TMC headquarters). The body has sundered the soul." He said that in view of the encouraging response he got from TMC work ers and the public to his recent moves, he would convert the Forum into a long-term movement.

It would be a bitter and anguished parting of ways between Chid-ambaram and Moop- anar. For the past 25 years, Moopanar had encouraged Chidam-baram's rise in the Congress(I) and in the TMC, which was formed in 1996 protesting against the Congress(I)'s de cision to align with the AIADMK. Chidambaram said: "Moopanar has been my leader and a father-figure for the past 25 years."

While it will be difficult to assess the impact Chidambaram's decision, it has lifted the hopes of the DMK-led front. DMK president and Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi gleefully accepted Chidam-baram's offer to campaign for the DMK-led front. The DMK is al so buoyed by Chidambaram's certificate that the DMK has "definitely provided a better government" than Jayalalitha did in terms of "understanding people's aspirations, following democratic norms and respecting the opposition and the Assembly."

The rival fronts are expected to get into full campaign mode by the end of March. The AIADMK has completed the seat-sharing exercise with its constituents. While the AIADMK will contest 141 of the 234 seats, the TMC will field candidates in 32, the Congr ess(I) in 15, the Pattali Makkal Katchi in 27, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Communist Party of India (CPI) in eight each, and the Indian National League (INL) led by M.A. Abdul Latheef, the Forward Bloc (L. Santhanam faction) and the Ta mizhaga Munnetra Kazhagam headed by John Pandian in one each.

The NDA comprises 16 parties, including the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK). This line-up includes caste-based parties, communal organisations and upstart outfits. They include the Makkal Tamil Desam, a party of Yadavas; the Kongu Nadu Makkal Katchi of Gounders; the Tamil Nadu Mutharaiyar Sangam of Mutharaiyars; the Tamil Nadu Muslim United Jamaait; and the Thondar (Volunteers') Congress. By admitting these outfits, the DMK has compromised on one of its fundamental tenets of fighting casteism.

The DMK high command's largesse of giving six seats to the nascent Makkal Tamil Desam, founded by former AIADMK Minister S. Kannappan only in September 2000, and three seats to the Tamizhaga Muslim United Jamaait of J.M. Haroon, MLA, who broke away from the TMC after it allied with the AIADMK, has caused heart-burn not only within the DMK but among its allies too. Karunanidhi initially said that the Makkal Tamil Desam would not be taken into the NDA because corruption cases were pending against Kannappa n, but later he went back on his word with an eye on Yadava' votes in the southern districts. One seat given to the Thondar Congress founded by former Tamil Nadu Congress Committee president Kumari Ananthan in early March is aimed at getting the Nadar vo tes.

The contretemps that surfaced in the seat-sharing talks between the DMK and the MDMK was smoothed out with the MDMK and the BJP getting 21 seats, after the BJP agreed to Karunanidhi's request to give up two of the 23 seats originally allotted to it. But problems remain in allocating seats to the MGR-ADMK and the Tamizhaga Rajiv Congress (TRC).

While MGR-ADMK founder S. Tirunavukkarasu expected at least 10 seats, the DMK offered him only three. TRC president Vazhapadi K. Ramamurthi was angry that his party was offered only three, including two for the two Vanniyar organisations that support him . The TRC executive committee, which met on March 23, made it clear that the TRC should be allotted nine seats in Tamil Nadu and three in Pondicherry.

ALTHOUGH Jayalalitha speedily completed the seat-sharing exercise, the CPI(M) and the CPI were unhappy that they were allotted only eight seats each. The CPI(M) had demanded 25 seats and the CPI 15. In the 1996 elections, the CPI contested 11 and won eig ht seats and the CPI(M) contested 40 seats in alliance with the MDMK and won one seat. At one stage the two Left parties wanted to pull out of the AIADMK combine and contest 20 seats each as a front. But CPI(M) general secretary Harkishan Singh Surjeet r eportedly shot down the idea and directed the State unit to accept the eight seats.

The INL, another ally of the AIADMK, has split. The INL general council expelled its founder Abdul Latheef from the party because he accepted Jayalalaitha's offer of one seat while it had three legislators.

At the heart of the rift between Moopanar and Chidambaram is the question whether the TMC should align with the AIADMK. Chidambaram is convinced that single-party rule under Jayalalitha cannot provide good government. He is chagrined that the TMC offered ''unconditional support" to the AIADMK and did not insist on a coalition government. The PMK, which pulled out of the NDA only on February 15 to join the Jayalalitha bandwagon, had laid down conditions, Chidambaram's supporters pointed out.

Chidambaram's opposition to the AIADMK goes back to February 2000 when the TMC supported AIADMK candidates in three byelections to the Assembly. The AIADMK lost in all the seats because, according to Chidam-baram, the TMC cadre did not vote for the AIADM K. On December 27, 2000, when Moopanar was re-elected party president, Chidambaram appealed to him to take "a quick decision" on the TMC's allies. Moopanar avoided giving a direct reply but said the TMC would support the Congress (at any cost).

In February this year, Chidambaram complained that he was not consulted on the constitution of the TMC election committee. For several weeks, he kept away from various TMC office-bearers' meetings. On March 9, Jayalalitha and Moopanar signed an agreement under which the TMC and the Congress(I) were together apportioned 47 seats.

Two days later, Chidambaram raised the banner of revolt and appealed to the leadership to reconsider the decision taken "without consulting me". According to him, good governance depended on the following questions: "1. Who will head the government? 2. W ho will be the constituents of this government? 3. What will be the common minimum programme of the government? 4. Will the government abide by a code of conduct?" None of these questions was answered by the alliance, he said. He maintained that single-p arty rule under Jayalalitha would not guarantee good governance.

Senior TMC leaders refuted on March 12 Chidambaram's claim that he was not consulted on the alliance. They said that he "boycotted" the party meetings but was informed of the decisions. Besides, they added, Moopanar sought Chidambaram's views. They said it was a "unanimous decision" by TMC leaders and cadres to work with the AIADMK.

Chidambaram met Moopanar on March 15 and a rapprochement was expected. One version had it that Chidambaram wanted Jayalalitha to accept a common minimum programme but she refused. Then Chidambaram appealed to Moopanar to reconsider his decision. There wa s no reply. So Chidambaram decided to stick to his guns and announced the formation of the TMCDF the next day. He said he and his supporters would not quit the TMC because he was "confident that after 60 days, the TMC will return to its original path cha lked out in 1996 (of opposing the AIADMK)."

Chidambaram met Karunanidhi and told him that he would campaign, asking people to vote for the DMK-led front. Karunanidhi offered three seats to the TMCDF aspirants but Chidambaram insisted that the TMCDF was not a political party but a forum to ensure g ood governance. His supporters were free to contest as independents, he said.

Leaders of the TMC take Chidambaram's challenge lightly, saying that he would not be able to make a dent because he was "not a field worker who mixed with party workers and understood their sentiments." No district president, town president or block pres ident has thrown in his lot with him. According to them, all those who opposed Moopanar in the undivided Congress proved politically unsuccessful.

A TMC leader who was anguished over the developments said that if Chidambaram had attended all the TMC office-bearers' meetings in the last two months, Moopanar, who was not keeping well now, would have gladly handed over the party's reins to him.

Chidambaram's supporters said that he had "a clean image", which would appeal to the voters. (Besides, he is a good orator in Tamil and English.) They said that Moopanar was not able to give a convincing reply when asked whether Jayalalitha could assure good governance. The TMC could not justify its tie-up with the AIADMK because its raison d'etre was opposition to the corrupt ways of the AIADMK, they argued. Those denied the party ticket for the elections would flock to Chidambaram and "dissiden ce in the TMC will be felt only in the last 10 days of the election campaign," they said.

According to the TMCDF's supporters, the confrontation with Chi-dambaram would not have occurred if a third front comprising the TMC, the Congress(I), the Dalit Panthers and the caste-based parties had been formed. Leaders of these parties met Moopanar a ny number of times "but Moopanar kept them guessing." "TMC workers were hoping for a share in power after being in the wilderness for 30 years. Moopanar has now pushed them into nothing," an admirer of Chidambaram said.