`The struggle for more freedom and justice is always an uphill task'

N. RAM

Interview with Noam Chomsky.

In most oppositional writings, any challenge to the conventional wisdom about recent developments in international politics sparks the most outraged mail. The response is not surprising; it has been the experience of several dissident writers that holding the United States' military and politicians accountable for war crimes is a sure way to anger many Americans. It is especially threatening to suggest that the war that was supposed to have helped Americans regain their national pride was in fact a depraved exercise in mass murder. The dissident writings of Noam Chomsky and Edward Said amply indicate that the nature and function of an intellectual can be debated only if his critical politics is related to his function and his position in society. All radical work for the transformation of society has to be carried out at the site of his academic or professional activity.

Politics, as is often thought, does not only operate outside the university. What goes on inside the classroom is as political as what goes on in overtly political areas. Teaching and research must undermine existing hegemonies and produce what Frank Lentricchia calls a culturally suspicious, trouble-making readership. It is then that we can provoke a collective will for transformation. Thus intellectuals have to be castigated for a progressive withdrawal from the general issues of public concern and responsibility and for an increasing collusion with institutionalised and professional structures of specialisation that leave no scope for radical engagement within society. There seems to be a failure of intellectual confidence, and if this could be revived, the overall effectiveness of the academia could be ensured.

The writings of Noam Chomsky, Edward Said or Howard Zinn draw attention to a life of resistance, the only way "to effectively challenge attitudes and beliefs that should be challenged and undermined".

Shelley Walia, Senior Fellow at Rothermere American Institute, University of Oxford and a Professor of English Studies at Panjab University, Chandigarh, met Noam Chomsky on May 21 in Oxford and talked to him about certain important issues.

Chomsky was in Oxford to deliver the Olof Palme Memorial Lecture at the Shaldonian Theatre. The lecture, entitled "Doctrines and Visions: Who Is to Run the World, And How?", was attended by about a thousand academics and students. But intriguingly, as soon as Chomsky began his lecture, the lights went off. It will not be incorrect to say that this must be the first time in modern times that such a power-cut has taken place at the Shaldonian. One can only speculate that the provocation came from the subject of Chomsky's lecture.

Coincidentally, a few weeks before this lecture there was a bomb scare when Chomsky began his lecture at Cambridge. Such incidents only confirm that the sabotage of intellectuals engaged in attacking state policy is quite common and is enforced without any qualms. Excerpts from the interview:

I see long-term economic and political threats facing the U.S. and the rest of the world. In this context, is it not a strange and frightening world that seems to be taking shape? I ask this in the context of the rampant American power and the paranoia that it seems to be suffering from.

I quite agree. The element of paranoid fear is very old. There is a very good study of these matters in popular American literature, from the earliest days, by literary critic Bruce Franklin (War Stars). He finds a persistent theme: we are just about to be destroyed by evil monsters, when at the last minute we are miraculously saved by a superhero or a superweapon. Furthermore, rather typically, the evil monsters are those we are crushing under foot: Indians, Blacks, Chinese coolies... Some of the examples are quite startling. Take Jack London, a very progressive populist figure, a socialist writer. In one of his novels he calls for the extermination of the people of China by bacteriological warfare, to protect ourselves from their insidious campaign to wipe us out. It continues to the present, and relates in complicated ways to the extremist religious fundamentalism that is also unique to the U.S. among industrial societies. These fears are exploited constantly by cynical political leaders. The Reaganites were masters of it. Every year or two the U.S. was facing some dire threat. It didn't matter how crazy it was: Libya, Grenada, Nicaragua, Arab terrorists, crime (by implication Blacks), drugs (Hispanics)... Reagan himself may even have believed it; some of his performances were astonishing. It is an efficient way to mobilise people, and important when carrying out policies that are harming them. The current administration, drawn from the same circles (often the same people), simply inherits the technique as a reflex. And paranoia combined with immense power and an extremely cynical and violent leadership is a dangerous combination, no doubt.

Can you comment on the neo-conservative Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and its rhetorical justification of war on terrorism? Is it not clear that the aim is less to combat terrorism than to use military supremacy to intimidate and discipline potential competitors? I mean, is the aim not to perpetuate neoliberal capitalism?

It should be remembered that the "war on terror" was declared in 1981, when the Reagan administration came into office, proclaiming that a centrepiece of its policy would be to defend us from the plague of the modern age, etc. - pretty much the same rhetoric as today. It quickly turned into a murderous and destructive terrorist war, but that is largely excised from history as completely unacceptable to educated opinion. The PNAC is not out of the mainstream of planning, back to the early days of the Second World War, though it is at the extreme edge of a rather narrow spectrum. The term "neoconservative" is highly misleading: the programmes are not new, and they have no relation to conservatism, if this term retains any meaning. The same can be said about the term "neoliberal". The policies are as old as European imperialism, and are remote from liberalism in its classic or modern sense. The so-called "neoconservatives" share the general foreign policy aim of elites, including the unilateralism. Clinton, for example, announced clearly that the U.S. would use force unilaterally when necessary if access to markets and resources were threatened. The general shared goal is to ensure global dominance and free access to markets, resources, investment opportunities on the part of the concentrations of economic power that largely dominate the political system and policy planning. The "neocons" are sharply criticised even within the foreign policy elite, but on quite narrow grounds: their brazen arrogance and incompetence causes problems for basic U.S. interests. As for the "war on terror", it is not considered a high priority. Even the invasion of Iraq illustrates that fact. The invasion was undertaken with the anticipation that it would probably increase the threat of terror, as it did. And there are many other illustrations, quite regularly.

Keeping in view the totalitarianism behind the Patriot Act, do you not think that the war on terrorism is more dangerous than terrorism?

Terrorism is an extremely dangerous phenomenon, including the subcategory that passes through the doctrinal filters: their terrorism against us, the standard usage, probably close to a cultural universal. A serious effort to combat this category of terrorism would be welcome and important, but it would not proceed along the lines of the proclaimed "war on terror". That "war" increases the threat of terror, for reasons discussed in considerable detail by specialists on the topic who regard mitigation of the threat as a high priority, unlike the administration and its acolytes. For these reasons, I cannot really address the question, as posed. As for the Patriot Act, if those who framed it were free to impose their will it would be quite dangerous. Even more dangerous would be the extension of it that [Attorney-General John] Ashcroft and the rest tried to push through, though they had to draw back because of popular opposition. The Act itself has many entirely indefensible and harmful features, but we should bear in mind that it does not approach much more severe episodes of repression, such as Woodrow Wilson's "Red Scare" after the Second World War, or the COINTELPRO operations of the national political police (the FBI) that ran through four administrations, and reached as far as political assassination. That too is pretty well wiped out of history, because the facts are unacceptable to prevailing ideology, across the spectrum.

Do you think there are any ways of effectively resisting the PNAC project, which has an all-pervasive hegemony in almost all political and cultural and economic spheres?

As mentioned, I would not describe it as a PNAC project: that is only an extreme version of prevailing foreign policy doctrine. And that extreme version has, to a significant extent, been withdrawn because of their astonishing failures and incompetence in Iraq. The U.S. does not have pervasive hegemony apart from its military power, which is unique. Economically it is one of three major centres of power in a tripolar world: North America, Europe and Northeast Asia (with others on the periphery). Cultural factors are complex, political as well. I don't think one can speak of pervasive hegemony in these domains. Means of effective resistance to U.S. violence and repression are readily at hand, within the U.S. and elsewhere - and the same is true with respect to other centres of illegitimate and often viciously criminal authority; the U.S. is hardly alone in this regard.

Your contribution to the resistance movement in the 1960s brought about a mass reaction to the Vietnam War. From Vietnam to Iraq, do you think activism has almost disappeared, or has it become more intense? The first anniversary of the war on Iraq did not bring many demonstrators on the streets. On the other hand, your role in the East Timor cause is a singular instance of achievement against U.S. and Indonesian domination.

That vastly exaggerates my contribution. I was one of many, and the sources of the mass reaction were complex. The East Timor case was not much of a success. There were only a handful of activists, for many years, even though these crimes came as close to literal genocide as anything in the modern period, and could have easily been terminated simply by withdrawal of participation and support by the U.S. and its allies - no bombing, no troops, no economic measures - just stop participating. After almost 25 years, the Clinton administration came under enough international and domestic pressure to instruct its Indonesian clients that the game was over, and they instantly withdrew, revealing very clearly where the responsibility lies for these crimes, though the lesson cannot be drawn, with regard to England either.

The Timorese resistance is remarkable and inspiring, and there are a few outsiders - mostly little known, as usual - who deserve great credit for their perseverance and dedication. As for activism in general, it is more intense and widespread than at any time in the post-Second World War period, apart from a few brief moments, and covers a very wide range. The reaction to the Iraq war is a good illustration. This is the first time I can think of in the history of Europe and its offshoots that there was massive protest against a war even before it was officially launched. That is highly significant. The fact that articulate protest was less after the war doesn't mean much: what would the protestors have been calling for? True, there were major issues, but not the kind that rally mass demonstrations.

How far do you think that resistance/dissidence can achieve the desired effect of putting pressure on policymakers so as to secure the defence of a democratic culture? Protest, resistance and dissent against the concentrated power centres are pertinent in a society where the practiced way has yielded negligible results. Out of this opposition, as is clear from your political interventions and writings, arises introspection and rethinking on how contrary opinions are left out or relegated to the margins.

I don't regard the results as negligible at all. It is easy to show that the U.S. (and not the U.S. alone by any means) is a much more civilised society than it was not many years ago, largely as a consequence of protest, resistance and dissent. Of course, critical opinion will be marginalised by power centres to the extent that they can do so. Some of the methods are new, but the practice is venerable, and only to be expected. And the ways of countering it are also familiar, and available, even more so than in the past in many respects. Naturally, power centres will seek to impose what the public relations industry sometimes calls "a philosophy of futility", a sense of hopelessness and impotence. There is no more reason to succumb to that than to other propaganda exercises.

You say that the American humanistic culture is limited to the few students and younger faculty members who would engage in disruptive acts. I mean few people, such as Gore Vidal, Ramsey Clark, Howard Zinn, Robert Jensen, Rahul Mahajan, or the Soviet newscaster Vladimir Danchev or Norman Finkelstein, can really not access the mainstream media to have a tangible impact on public opinion. I admire their political activism, but don't you think that the decision-making positions remain unaffected?

I would not say that. The "humanistic culture" is very deeply rooted in the society. There is participation by students, and some faculty and prominent intellectuals, but it goes far beyond that. Take, for example, the solidarity movements of the 1980s, which opened new paths in the history of imperial violence. Thousands of Americans not only protested the crimes of state, but joined the victims, to live with them, help them, offer them some protection against U.S.-run terrorists. Who even thought of living in a Vietnamese or Algerian village for those purposes? These movements developed in mainstream America, often in church-based groups, and mostly outside of the elite centres. And that is by no means the only case. Again, one does not expect mainstream media to offer openings to efforts to undermine the system of power and domination of which they are a part. That has never been true in the past, and is not true now, nor should we expect anything different. Successful popular movements have always taken that for granted, and found other ways to influence public opinion, creating conditions to which those in decision-making positions have to adapt, and in a longer-term framework, changing these institutions so that they become more democratic and free.

The record of the academia and the media has in recent years been nothing but minimal and disgraceful. You were mentioned only once in The New York Times after the 9/11 tragedy and Edward Said not even once. Would you say that the access to the media has improved over the last few years?

Access to the media is not to be expected, for very good reasons. It is probably about the same as it has been in the past. The media themselves, however, have changed. They are not divorced from the general society, and as attitudes and understanding evolve, the media cannot fail to reflect it. In that respect, they are more open now than they were in most of the past. As just one of many examples, think of the Vietnam War. It took years before the media would even tolerate minimal criticism, and even then it barely went beyond considerations of tactics and cost. That was true even when the large majority of the public regarded the war as "fundamentally wrong and immoral, not a mistake", a position scarcely allowed any voice in the media. And that was after many years of a savage attack against South Vietnam that had largely destroyed the society, and had by then extended to the rest of Indochina. It is quite different today, in many other domains as well.

Do you not think that it is finally the end of an open society and that we are gradually moving towards feudalism? As you argued recently in an article in The Guardian, in the post-9/11 months all popular movements are unscrupulously being rolled back. A few people do engage in dissident writing, but what impact can it have on the masses or the powerful elite? Speaking truth to power or speaking truth to the masses has helped in a small way, and I do agree that we all in our small way do provoke an angry readership which somehow does keep the establishment on its toes.

I don't recall saying that popular movements are being rolled back. I certainly do not believe it. True, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, they drew back briefly, and there was some change of focus and activism, quite properly. But they continued to grow. Just take the World Social Forum. A few months after 9/11 its annual meeting drew perhaps four times as many people as the year before, with much larger U.S. participation as well - and that reflects success of continued local organising. The growth of popular engagement is clear by almost any measure I can think of. In fact, one effect of 9/11 was to provide an impetus to it. One can see that clearly in sales of books by dissident publishers, sharp increase in invitations for those few people who are available to appear at public meetings, enormous growth of audiences both in scale and in concern, etc. It is true that the current period is one of major efforts to beat back the achievements of popular activism in the past, but that is a cyclic phenomenon, to be expected, and should be understood as a reaction to their success. Today in the U.S., for example, it is necessary to defend the limited systems of protection and support for the general population; not many years ago there was no need to do so because they did not exist. And there is nothing to prevent further progress, apart from lack of will and dedication. That does not mean that we should refuse to recognise reality, with all of its grim aspects. But again, we expect that systems of power will try to impose a sense of futility and hopelessness: that is their task, and it is our task to dismiss those efforts and continue to use the many means we have to move forward.

You say dissidence is irrepressible now. Can you elaborate the concrete gains that have been made, say, with regard to the question of human rights or peace movements?

Just to keep to brief mention, compare the current situation with 40 years ago. The peace movement was so minuscule then that there was virtually no detectable opposition even to the monstrous war against Vietnam for years, and when protest finally developed it was focussed mostly on the attack against the North, criminal no doubt, but nothing remotely like the attack against the South, which barely entered consciousness. Human rights were scarcely on the agenda. The women's movement, for example, was largely a product of the 1970s and later, and the same is true of international human rights activism. There was no organised environmental movement. Solidarity movements were extremely limited. There was nothing remotely like today's huge global justice movements. Virtually without popular opposition, the U.S. was imposing and backing murderous national security states throughout its domains, in ways that are hardly imaginable today.

Many of the worst atrocities were scarcely even noticed: the huge Indonesian massacres of 1965, for example, which were welcomed with unrestrained enthusiasm in elite circles, and elicited virtually no protest. And on, and on. The changes have been enormous, and as in the past, they did not come as gifts from above, but resulted from committed popular engagement.

Can you mention a few writers, journalists, academics who you think are engaged in significant dissident practice?

I don't like to pick out individuals. Many of the most important figures, as in the past, are people who are scarcely known and will not enter recorded history. We can make our own evaluations of those who are privileged and prominent enough so that they are reasonably well known.

Would you say that your view of history requires, from the Italian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci's perspective, a good deal of rethinking in the light of the unprecedented historical developments unsettling the world, which become important for the understanding of cultural change in terms of colonialism and the notion of a single linear narrative of any natural trajectory of history?

There are always important changes, and one always has to re-think and adapt to them. I don't see anything particularly dramatic or out of the ordinary about the current period, in these respects.

I know you are optimistic about the future of our society and the world. But in the context of your Olof Palme lecture do you not feel that it is an uphill task and that something concrete has to be achieved by the public opinion to put an end to all state secrecy so that full participation of the people becomes a way of checking state power and exploitation?

The struggle for more freedom and more justice is always an uphill task, almost by definition. And the more far-reaching the ends, the harder the struggle. About the future, I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic, nor do I see much importance to subjective judgments concerning matters that we can know very little about. In this case, because they depend on will and choice, unpredictable factors.