Reviving Iraq

Published : Aug 24, 2007 00:00 IST

The essays in this book describe the collapse of the Iraqi state, its fragmentation and the identity crisis that now confronts Iraqis.

CAN Iraq, wrecked and ruined by the United States criminal invasion, be revived and restored? That is the central theme of this book. It is a project of the International Peace Academy. It grew out of a conference in Ottawa on May 11-12, 2006, organised by Canadas Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for which Iraqis and experts on Iraq from the fields of diplomacy and academia were invited.

Their contributions are collected in this volume by editors respected for their knowledge and integrity. Markus E. Bouillon is head of the Academys West Asia Programme. He served previously at the United Nations as political adviser on the peace process in the region.

David M. Malone returned to the Canadian Foreign Service after serving as president of the Academy for six years. He is the author of several books; the last is The International Struggle Over Iraq. Malone is now Canadas High Commissioner to India.

Ben Rowswell is Canadas diplomatic representative to Iraq, and continues as member of the Canadian Foreign Service and is also senior associate at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C. Malone initiated the project.

The editors contribute an introduction and a conclusion to the essays which are grouped in two parts. One set of essays describes Iraq in turmoil. The contributors describe the utter collapse of the Iraqi state, its fragmentation between Shias and Sunnis, Arabs and Kurds; the identity crisis that now confronts Iraqis; their living conditions and the role of religion and nationalism.

The essays are most informative. The plight they expose was predictable to those who launched the criminal venture in 2003. One emphasises its criminality because American critics attack its author, their President George W. Bush, only for its failure. Most lauded it. The New York Times called it a unilateral invasion as if the venture can be consensual or bilateral. Thomas Friedmann called it a war of choice, not necessity, but did not condemn it as crime in internat ional law. His partisanship on West Asia notwithstanding, he is a hero to some in New Delhi. Unlike Hugh Gaitskell on Suez, Americans show no moral anger on the crime.

It is clear that American arms have failed to accomplish results. I write Americans because it is the U.S. which sets the pace, and the allies, if they can be so called, simply go along. The solution must be a political one in both its aspects, domestic and external. They are linked. The Shia factor cannot be separated from Irans role. International Peace Academy president Terje Rod-Larsen rightly points out in his foreword that the key to a solution lies in building up a grand political settlement.

But will the U.S. make the concessions necessary to accomplish that result? As the editors conclude, The increasing loneliness of the United States in Iraq is more than a problem for the United States, however. It deprives Iraq of crucial international support as it goes through an extremely difficult period in its reconstruction phase, just as a broad civil war threatens to engulf any progress made to date. Even if Iraqis bear the primary responsibility of rebuilding their state they cannot do so without international assistance, they need all the help they can get.

There are three major roles the international community can play in helping to stabilise Iraq. These reflect the three major tasks Iraqis must address in rebuilding their state; political support to help Iraqis forge a common identity and an inclusive social contract; security forces to help the Iraqi state reassert its monopoly on violence; and international assistance to reform the Iraqi economy. The prospects for enhanced international efforts for two of these three roles look remote indeed. The United States is likely to remain virtually alone in assisting Iraqi security forces to reestablish law and order until Iraqis can do so for themselves.

But none of this will be possible except as part of a wider regional framework that addresses the interests of all the players. There will be no peace in Iraq except as part of a U.S.-Iran pact. In May 2005, Iran offered such a pact as part of its proposals on the nuclear issue. It was spurned by the U.S. Columnist Nicholas D. Kristoff exposed this in an able report aptly entitled Diplomacy at its worst (International Herald Tribune, April 30, 2007).

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