War and peace

The book is about political developments in Pakistan between 1997 and 2000 as seen through the eyes of a reporter.

This is a reportage of political developments in Pakistan from April 1997 to June 2000 when Amit Baruah was The Hindus Special Correspondent in Islamabad. It saw the initiation in June 1997 of a structured peace process, India and Pakistans nuclear tests in May 1998, the Vajpayee-Nawaz Sharif summit in Lahore in February 1999, the Kargil crisis, the military coup in October and the Kandahar hijacking in December. The author offers his views on India-Pakistan relations as they stand today.

The Joint Statement of June 23, 1997, by the Foreign Secretaries clearly envisaged the setting up of working groups inter alia on Kashmir, as was, indeed, agreed by the Prime Ministers at Male in May. Two days later in New Delhi, Fo reign Secretary Salman Haider said, We have an established position on this subject [J&K]. There is no dispute on our part of Kashmir in the sense of a disputed area. Our concerns relate to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, infiltration and support to terrorism. India reneged on the accord as it did in July 2001 on an agreed draft Declaration. Both, the Statement and the Declaration merely laid down the process for the dialogue.

The author does a good job exposing the falsity of Nawaz Sharifs disavowals on Kargil. Why did he not sack an Army chief who executed a dangerous military adventure without the Prime Ministers approval when he had sent his predecessor packing for remarks on a National Security Council? Having discussed this issue with a variety of people, including senior third-country diplomats based in Islamabad during and after Kargil, I believe that Sharif was informed in general terms about some action to be taken, but not about its specifics. At the best of times, Sharif did not have much of an attention span.

The authors account confirms what Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed said in an interview with the reviewer last March. It was American intervention that foiled the moves for an accord on Kargil and Anthony Zinni, head of the U.S. Central Command, arrived here to pave the way for Sharifs trip to the White House.

The Vajpayee regime leaned heavily on the U.S. From preparing the ground for the Lahore Summit in 1999 to the Pakistani suggestion of a strategic restraint regime to India in 1998, the Americans had been smack in the middle of the India-Pakistan process. Contrary to Vajpayees false claim, it was not what he saw in the eyes of his captive audience in Srinagar on April 18, 2003, but American inspiration that prompted him to offer to smoke the peace pipe with Pakistan. Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali called Vajpayee to take up the offer. Flip-flops in Indias Pakistan policy was a feature of the Vajpayee government. However, the Srinagar speech bailed out India from continuing with its disastrous policy of having no direct contact with Pakistan, opting, instead to activate a channel through the Americans.

Jaswant Singh preferred to take umbrage when in 2004 Colin Powell and others, true to form, bragged how their phone calls achieved results. The Bush administration official was taking credit for scripting the April 28, 2003, telephone call that Prime Minister Jamali made to Vajpayee, during which the two leaders agreed to reappoint High Commissioners and resume civil aviation links. And, not only was the call fixed, Powell also engineered what was going to be said by the two Prime Ministers for starters. Not only did it reflect poorly on the Pakistani leadership, it revealed that the Vajpayee government was more than willing to be led by the Americans.

As a matter of fact the scenario was scripted in the U.S.-U.K. statement of March 27, 2003 a ceasefire and active steps to reduce tension, including moves within the SAARC context. A ceasefire on the LoC followed on November 25, 2003, and Vajpayee duly attended the SAARC summit in January 2004.