Origins of a rift

The Muslim League's intoxication with power after the general elections to the Provincial Assemblies in 1937 opened its rift with the Congress.

LIONEL CARTER has laid students of history in debt by compiling five volumes of Punjab Governors' Reports (1936-47) and two of United Provinces (U.P.) Governors' reports (1936-38) to the Governor-General. The present volume on 1939 is in that useful series. It is a model for editors and compilers of documents. Very many of them randomly obtain copies of documents from the archives and publish them, without annotation or even a good introduction.

Lionel Carter served for over a decade in the Nicholas Mansergh-led team that produced the 12 documents on The Transfer of Power in India (1942-47) published by the British government.

The rift between the Congress and the Muslim League opened after the general elections to Provincial Assemblies in 1937. The Government of India Act, 1935, made the provinces autonomous. The tallest leaders of the Congress became Premiers, as they were then called; Rajaji in the Madras Presidency and G.B. Pant in the United Provinces. The Congress and the League had fought the elections more or less in harmony.

K.M. Munshi writes in his memoirs, After the elections were over and the Congress had agreed to accept office, Jinnah told me, when we were by ourselves in the Bar Library of the Bombay High Court, that we' (Congress and the Muslim League) should work together. I promised to convey his wishes to Sardar and Gandhiji, which I did. I understood at the time that Jinnah had a similar discussion with Kher. After we were sworn in as Ministers, Sir Cowasji Jehangir formally approached Sardar and the Maulana on Jinnah's behalf. At the time, both of them were my guests in Poona, and Kher and myself were present on several occasions when the discussions took place ( Pilgrimage to Freedom, Volume 1; page 47).

The Congress insisted that both in United Provinces and Bombay the Leaguers should join the Congress. The League refused. The reason is not what Munshi provided with hindsight. It was intoxication with power.

In June 1939, Sir Harry Haig, the United Provinces' Governor, accurately described the cause of the rift: There was a time when the Congress Ministry took office in July 1937 when a new direction could have been given to this problem. The Congress had since the general election been flirting with the Muslim League and suggesting some form of coalition. These conversations resulted in the Muslim League holding aloof from my minority Ministry. But when the Congress took office they decided to reject the idea of a coalition with the Muslim League and to pursue instead a policy of direct approach to the Muslim masses. Had they entered into a coalition, I cannot help feeling that Muslim solidarity would soon have been undermined. There are bound to be differences between Muslims on the main agrarian and economic issues. The Muslims in office would have to make themselves responsible for definite policies in regard to these matters; they would have received the support of some Muslims and aroused the opposition of others. Nothing seems to be so effective in disintegrating a party as the taking of office. Wise words these, as experience proves.

By 1939 the League, denied a share in power, began thinking of alternatives to a federation. In March 1940 it adopted the Pakistan resolution. However all was not lost.

Even on October 19, 1939, Haig reported to the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow, I gathered that Jinnah has now really become anxious for an understanding with the Congress.

This volume, like others, contains a wealth of material on administrative matters of contemporary relevance.