Towards a new arms race

When deployed, the National Missile Defence Programme, a key component of the United States' long-term strategic plan, will undermine arms reduction efforts worldwide.

R. RAMACHANDRAN

BILLIONS of dollars had been spent in the years preceding the event. And fortunes several times larger seemed to be riding on its outcome. But the July 7 test of an outer-space interceptor that was designed to serve as the building block of the United S tates' ambitious National Missile Defence (NMD) system was an embarrassing failure.

This is the second consecutive failed missile interceptor test. The last one on January 18, had also failed, with the interceptor missing the target completely. In the more recent instance, though, the interceptor simply failed to separate from the secon d stage of the launcher. This was decidedly not a failure at the frontiers of technology. Rather, it was the chastening failure of a system that has acquired the status of a routine, having been applied with consistent success in space launches over deca des.

For President Bill Clinton, the outcome of the test - the fifth in the NMD series - was to form the basis for a decision on a "limited" NMD deployment. Now he seemingly has little to go on as the basis for a decision that is expected to shape the future course of the international arms control dialogue. The first interceptor test on October 2, 1999, was labelled a success by the Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO), the arm of the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) that has been handling the enti re programme since the days of Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or "Star Wars". But most experts find this claim rather implausible, since test conditions were doctored to make a successful hit virtually unavoidable. Prior to these inte rception tests, two sensor fly-by tests had been carried out in June 1997 and January 1998.

The stated purpose of the NMD system is to protect sovereign U.S. territory from attacks by a "limited" number of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. These could range in number from a few to a few tens of missiles. These attacks, according to the strategists of the NMD programme, fall into three categories: a small accidental or unauthorised launch from Russia; a deliberate or unauthorised attack from China (which is estimated to have some two doz en ICBMs capable of reaching the U.S.); and a deliberate attack from a hostile emerging missile state - termed by the U.S. administration until recently as a "rogue" state, now changed in deference to political correctness, to a "state of concern". It is the latter threat - focussed on North Korea, Iran and Iraq - that has provided the political push for a near-term NMD deployment decision.

The NMD programme has its origins in Star Wars and these technologies were lavishly funded in the research and development phase in the 1980s. In the post-Cold War scenario, funding was scaled down, and though pronounced dead by U.S. Defence Secretary Les Aspin in 1993, Star Wars acquired a new content from around the mid-1990s. In April 1996, under pressure from the Republican Party in Congress, which wanted to mandate legislatively an NMD deployment by 2003, the Clinton administration shifted its e mphasis from research and development (or "technology readiness") to what was called "deployment readiness". From then on, larger infusions of funds have been made into the NMD programme.

The deployment readiness programme is commonly referred to as the "3+3 Plan", whose goal is to devote three years to development work and prepare for deployment three years thereafter, if the threat warranted it and the system was technologically ready. The time frames were based on intelligence inputs about emerging missile threats from "states of concern". The Clinton administration concluded that the "3+3" formula would give the U.S. sufficient advance warning to deploy an effective defence. The idea was that each year, starting 2000, the administration would decide whether to deploy a system three years hence.

The NMD system would be a complex of many parts: a number of sensors based both on the ground and in space to provide early warning of attacking missiles; ground-based radars to identify and track incoming warheads; ground-based interceptors that would b e launched by rocket boosters to destroy incoming warheads by impact; and a battle management, command, control and communications system (BMC3).

Some of the opposition to the NMD proposal, both within the U.S. and outside, is based on the perception that it is derived in essence from the ill-conceived Star Wars programme. The BMDO director, Lt.Gen. Ronald Kadish, has however, dismissed any such p arallel: "The system we are developing is certainly not Star Wars, or even 'Son of Star Wars'. Our architecture does not incorporate space-based weapons and is not designed to handle thousands of warheads in a massive nuclear exchange. Today's NMD is des igned for a limited threat."

THE U.S. scientific community has nevertheless denounced the idea on both technical and strategic grounds. Russia sees the NMD proposal as a blatant violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty and has threatened to scuttle the strategic ar ms reduction process if the U.S. were to go ahead with it. Also in peril are other arms control measures such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Kadish's remarks notwithstanding, China too has strongly c ondemned the NMD, which it sees as a violation of the 1967 treaty reserving outer space for peaceful applications and explicitly forbidding weapons tests and military manoeuvres in outer space.

China also has reason to feel deeply aggrieved at the U.S' ongoing Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) programme, that is, ballistic missile defence designed to operate in specific regional theatres of engagement. China believes that the TMD system is directed against it, because of its intended use in Taiwan.

Many of the U.S' closest allies have also refused to endorse the NMD programme, since they feel that the collapse of the ABM Treaty could undermine European security. The U.S. argues that after securing its own sovereign territory against missile attacks , it would be free to undertake major security commitments in diverse parts of the world. But the Europeans are unconvinced. The U.S. tendency to take unilateral military decisions has been causing some concern. And the American aversion to incurring cas ualties even in what may be considered worthy security operations does not constitute a good advertisement for its commitment.

Despite these concerns, the Clinton administration announced in January 1999, that it would make a deployment decision in the summer of 2000 based on four criteria:

* The existence of a ballistic missile threat to the U.S. that warrants deployment; in particular, if the magnitude and character of the missile threat from North Korea, Iraq and Iran evolve as expected;

* The technological readiness of the missile defence system to be deployed;

* The potential security costs, including the feasibility of securing Russian agreement to amend the ABM Treaty to permit the deployment of a U.S. NMD system, and the reaction of other countries; and,

* The cost of the system.

The U.S. presidential decision was originally expected to be made in June, but it had to wait till the test was carried out. For technical reasons, this test was postponed from April 27 to July. Clinton is now expected to make his decision before October . The deployment decision is, in fact, now mandated by the National Missile Defence Act of 1999, which calls for deployment "as soon as technologically feasible".

The failure of the July 7 test raises serious questions about the second of the criteria above. The BMDO has in all scheduled 19 tests of the NMD system. However, the fact that a decision on deployment was to be made after only three tests which involve d all the key elements of the system - in particular the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) which is meant to seek the target and destroy it by physical collision at speeds exceeding 25,000 km/hr ("hitting bullet with bullet") - indicates how political p ressures have been brought strongly to bear on the decision.

With the technology being far from established, the issue has been moved out of the technical realm. It is now likely to become one of the most important campaign issues in the presidential election. The Democrats are running scared under pressure from t he Republican right-wing. As John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists remarked, the NMD has less to do with protecting the U.S. against North Korean missiles, than with protecting Democratic presidential hopeful Al Gore against a Republican att ack. Clearly now, the question is not "Whether NMD?" but "When NMD?" and the Republicans would want the system to be implemented sooner than later.

In the light of the failure, Clinton would in all likelihood leave the decision on deployment to his successor. Kadish, however, has stated that the recent failure had nothing to with the feasibility of the NMD technologies themselves. The successful tes t of October 1999, according to him, had proved beyond doubt that the "hit to kill" concept, which forms the basis of the NMD, is feasible and workable.

Apart from the failure of the kill vehicle to separate from the rocket booster, the test also showed up another anomaly, namely, the failure of a decoy balloon to inflate. Interestingly, Kadish has turned this element of adversity to advantage. Critics o f the NMD have long argued that multiple decoys as countermeasures could easily fool the system and enable a real missile to get through. Kadish has now turned this argument on its head: the failure of the decoy balloon in the last test, he argues, shows that it "is not so easy to deploy a decoy".

BOTH Gore and the Republican presidential contender George W. Bush are committed to NMD deployment. The latter indeed lost little time in affirming his continuing faith in the mission of missile defence, despite the test failure. "While last night's test is a disappointment," he said on July 8, "in view of the potential threat we face from an accidental launch or an attack from a rogue nation, the U.S. must press forward to develop and deploy a missile defence system." "Development of a missile defence system will be a priority in my administration," he promised.

Various congressional lawmakers too have urged Clinton to leave the deployment decision to the next administration. The technological state of the art of the NMD system will be assessed as part of the Deployment Readiness Review this month (July) by Jack Gensler, Under-Secretary for Defence (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics). His conclusions will be reported to the Secretary for Defence, William Cohen, who in turn will provide the necessary inputs for the President's decision. Even in the best poss ible scenario, if the test failure should prompt the President to negative the proposal, this would not imply the abandonment of the system. Rather, it would only mean a delay - probably minor - in the decision on deployment.

Gensler's observations on the failure could be indicative of what the DRR is likely to recommend. A successful outcome, he has said, would have given more information on the terminal phase. The new element in this test was apparently the communication li nk from the ground-based X-band radar to the interceptor which, he says, performed well. The next test is due for October or November but given the current missile threat perceptions and the target date of 2005, Gensler feels that the construction of an X-band ground-based radar at Shemya in Alaska is critical and should get under way by the fall of 2001. This implies that a presidential decision would have to be taken by October or November. The other element planned by the second quarter of 2001 is th e upgrading of the existing early warning radars.

"In a sense," Gensler stated at a briefing after the failure, "we have tested the major elements of this system sufficiently to say that the design of the system is pretty solid." He therefore believed that since there would be a sufficient number of tes t flights before the decision to build missiles was taken in 2003, there would be little risk attached if radar construction were to begin. The BMDO had originally described two successful intercepts by the kill vehicle as the minimum criterion for a pos itive ruling on the system's technological feasibility. In March, however, the BMDO went ahead with the award of construction contracts based on the single October 1999 success, tainted though it was by suspicions of rigging.

A committee of high-level military and civilian experts headed by Larry Welch, a retired U.S. Air Force General, reported in February 1998 on the risks associated with the test programme. It had cautioned that the strategy of accepting a high level of ri sk to shorten the deployment schedule was more likely to cause programme slips, higher costs and even ultimate failure. In response to this, the Defence Secretary restructured the NMD programme in January 1999 with the objective of fielding 20 intercepto rs by the end of 2005, two years later than originally planned. Following the Secretary's actions, the Welch Panel observed that while restructuring did reduce risks, these still remained high. To address these risks it recommended expansion of the groun d testing capability and provision of additional EKV components for testing.

Current projections are to field 20 hit-to-kill interceptors by 2005 and 100 by 2007. These constitute what is called Expanded Capability I (XC-I) NMD. In fact, only 20 interceptors had been envisaged originally as part of C-I, with full deployment envis aged to be completed by 2026. In future phases, C-II and C-III systems would be implemented. "C-I is designed to counter," according to Kadish, "a handful of missiles with simple countermeasures. Because the threat is dynamic and we expect some dangerous states to be able to launch more missiles in that time-frame, we have moved to XC-I." C-II is designed to defend against a "few complex warheads" and C-III is designed to defend against "many complex warheads".

While "few" has been stated to be five or fewer warheads, no distinction between simple and complex missiles has been made. These clearly refer to counter-measures employed by the attacker and it is these that have formed the basis of a vast body of scie ntific criticism of the entire NMD concept.

The C-III system is designed to be compatible with further expansions such as more interceptor sites (the initial site is Grand Forks, North Dakota) and space-based lasers. Research work on the latter is already on.

In a May 31 report on the "Status of the National Missile Defence Programme" the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) also concluded that even with additional testing, funding and a two-year delay in the fielding of interceptors, significant performance and schedule risks remain. It observed that developing a highly reliable hit-to-kill capability is very difficult and in various missile defence programmes only about 30 per cent of the attempted intercepts outside the atmosphere had succeeded. This diff iculty had been greatly underestimated, said the GAO.

The audit report also pointed out that only three of the 19 planned intercept tests were scheduled before the DRR. These three, as also the following three scheduled tests, would only use the two-stage rocket (known as the "surrogate rocket") and would n ot expose the EKV to the higher acceleration and vibration loads of the three-stage booster rocket of an operational NMD system. Because of the NMD's aggressive schedule - driven largely by missile threat perceptions - the estimated development and deplo yment schedule of 12 years had been compressed by at least four years. In comparison, a more modest programme like the Theatre High Altitude Area Defence system - a variant of the TMD concept - is estimated to take 15 years.

The Welch Panel, in its November 1999 report, had identified the limited number of tests, none of which would use the three-stage booster rocket of an operational system, as a high-risk element. This is significant in the light of the recent booster-kill vehicle separation failure, even at the lower acceleration and velocity imparted by the two-stage rocket. In addition, the Welch committee also pointed out several test limitations arising from the absence of real attack conditions, such as having to en gage more than one missile simultaneously.

The GAO report also made a series of observations on earlier claims of successful tests. The October 1999 test demonstrated the kill vehicle's ability to locate the target, perform guidance manoeuvres and collide with the target but it was not designed t o rely on actual NMD system elements such as sensors and BMC3. The kill vehicle was directed to within close proximity of the target by pre-programmed data from test range instruments. In the January test, while actual system elements including ground- a nd space-based sensors and BMC3 were used, the infra-red target-seeking device malfunctioned because of obstruction in its cooling system just six seconds before the scheduled intercept and the interceptor passed the target by harmlessly.

More significantly, the GAO has quoted a letter from the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, of the DoD to Gensler, pointing out that previous tests have taken 10 to 18 weeks for complete data analysis. In view of this, Gensler would not have much time to carry out an analysis of the July 7 failure, since he would have to submit his findings to the Defence Secretary this month. This would make it extremely unlikely that the scheduled DRR would have all the necessary parameters to guide a realisti c decision on NMD deployment. Gensler's and Kadish's claims notwithstanding, the technological readiness of the system remains doubtful.

The GAO has also commented on the last criterion that Clinton will have to consider, namely, cost. The original estimate, when the programme was initiated in 1996, was $12.5 billion. The GAO's estimate of the cost of the system, after the proposed expans ion and increased testing in the current year (that is, C-I and XC-I together) is $36.2 billion compared to $28.7 billion estimated in 1999 before the programme expansion. The decision to field 100 interceptors instead of the original 20 itself accounts for $2 billion. These cost estimates are likely to increase, the GAO has pointed out, since the risk factors that remain could lead to further delays. At current spending rates, a month's delay would cost $124 million.

Further, the decision to enhance the system to C-II and C-III levels - whose costs have not been fixed by the DoD - would substantially increase overall budgets. According to the April estimates by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), C-II would imply an additional cost of $6 billion. And achieving C-III, the most extensive and sophisticated stage of NMD deployment, would mean an additional $13 billion. This means that the NMD system, in its entirety, would cost (at current levels) over $55 billion. T hough these figures have been hanging in the air for long, they have not been seriously questioned by the DoD.

"The NMD is on a fast acquisition track for one reason and one reason only - the threat," Kadish told Congress recently. "The projected threat to our homeland is growing," he said. His remarks were based on testimony by the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Director, George Tenet, to Congress in February this year on the growing missile threat to the U.S. "North Korea has the ability to test its Taepo Dong-2 missile this year; this missile may be capable of delivering a nuclear payload to the U.S.," said Tenet. Recently, other CIA officials too have been saying that North Korea could test the Taepo Dong-2 this year. These remarks are based on a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) carried out in September 1999 of Ballistic Missile Threats to the U.S . over the next 15 years.

The report projected that during the next 15 years, the U.S. most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq. The Russian threat, although significantly reduced, will continue to be the mo st robust and lethal, considerably more than China's, and orders of magnitude more than that potentially posed by the others. However, it added that unlike the unpredictable threats of others, Russian and Chinese threats can be handled by mutual deterren t diplomacy.

These assessments bear interesting comparison with those made in 1993 and 1995. In 1993, the CIA stated that "only China and the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) strategic forces in several states of the former Soviet Union currently have the cap ability to strike the continental U.S. with land-based missiles. Analysis shows that the probability is low that any other country will acquire this (ICBM) capability during the next 15 years." The report argued that Iran, Iraq and North Korea had the te chnical capability to develop an ICBM indigenously within 15 years. Yet, "for different reasons", it concluded, "including political and economic, it is unlikely that any of these will complete development in that time."

The 1995 estimate did not differ substantially from the 1993 one. It stated that in the next 15 years no country other than the major declared nuclear powers would develop a ballistic missile that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada. North Korea was developing the Taepo Dong-2, which could reach Alaska or the Hawaiian island chain or even some U.S. territories in the Pacific. However, the 1995 assessment was that in the next 15 years North Korea was unlikely to obtain the technological cap ability to develop and deploy a longer range ICBM capable of reaching the 48 contiguous states. It also observed that no other potentially hostile country had the technical capability to develop an ICBM in the next 15 years.

However, certain members of Congress alleged that the NIE 1995 report had been "politicised", implying that the intelligence community's analysis had been influenced by policymakers or individual policy preferences seeking to downplay the missile threat. An independent panel under former CIA Director Robert Gates was appointed to review the assumptions underlying the estimate. The panel found no evidence of politicisation and concurred with the report's estimates.

A Commission was set up under Donald H. Rumsfeld to assess the ballistic missile threat to the U.S. This body included weapons experts of repute, including Richard Garwin and General Lee Butler. In its report issued in July 1998, a month before North Kor ea's attempted satellite launch in which its third stage failed, it said: "A new strategic environment now gives emerging ballistic missile powers the capacity to acquire means to strike the U.S. within five years of a decision to acquire such a capabili ty. These newer, developing threats in North Korea, Iran and Iraq are in addition to those still posed by Russia and China. During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware that such a decision has been made." Incidentally, that North Korea had developed the capability to build a three-stage rocket became known to U.S. intelligence only after the failed satellite launch on August 31, 1998.

Interestingly, the report also rejected the intelligence committee's earlier estimates about the pace at which capabilities would be developed. The North Korean launch, was in a sense, it said, evidence of a rapidly evolving capability. Though the Rumsfe ld Report did not refer to missile defence systems, it became the basis of missile threat perceptions and provided the impetus to speedy implementation of the NMD. The appropriate legislative framework soon evolved in 1999, followed by Clinton's decision last year to decide on deployment in 2000.

In a surprising turnaround from its earlier estimates, the CIA has tried to portray an even more alarming picture in its latest estimate, perhaps in response to the Rumsfeld Report's uncomplimentary remarks about its projections. Overriding its earlier f orecasts, the CIA has now warned of a North Korean ICBM launch this year. This forecast may well be intended to influence Clinton's pending decision, just as the Pentagon and the BMDO have pronounced a favourable judgment on the workability of the interc ept concept on the basis of just one rather dubiously successful test.

The claims of the administration - that all its ballistic missile defence systems, including the NMD, are of a defensive nature - may not represent the whole truth if one goes by what the U.S. Space Command has to say. In a perspective plan for the year 2020 submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (the Coyle Report), the U.S. Space Command calls for a joint initiative by the services to dominate "the space dimension of military operations to protect U.S. interests and investment, integrating sp ace forces into warfighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict." A fully deployed C-III NMD will have the elements meant to serve as an offensive system against the targeted countries. The fact that one of the X-band radars is being sited at Vardo, Norway, has already raised doubts about the objectives of the NMD system. A radar at Vardo would directly face the Russian border and have the capability to monitor that country's missile sites. This would tend to cast more than a semblance of doubt on the claim that the NMD is intended only for a handful of missiles from "states of concern".

Shortly before the Rumsfeld Commission report was released, one of its members, Richard Garwin, reacted to a campaign of inspired media leaks and disinformation by denouncing the political abuse of the body's main findings. The scientific community is ba ffled by the U.S. administration's effort to make the missile development programme in impoverished North Korea the pretext to overturn all the achievements of the last two decades in global arms control. They point out that the North Korean missile prog ramme has effectively been on hold for the last two years if not more. Evidently, though, reason is the first casualty when the pecuniary interests of the defence contractors lobby meets the paranoia of the Republican right-wing in the United States.

* * *R. RAMACHANDRAN

THE legislative framework to establish a National Missile Defence system dates back to June 1994 when the Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO) was established under the Department of Defence (DoD). Since this followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the NMD's precursor, the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), its basic charter was also different from that outlined by Ronald Reagan in 1983.

The BMDO's mandate included research and development on NMD technologies towards the "technology readiness" policy on the NMD. The Ballistic Missile Defence Act 1995 was the first U.S. law that laid down the ballistic missile policy of the country. It ma ndated deployment at the earliest practical date of an NMD system "that is capable of providing a highly effective defence against limited ballistic missile attacks." It even stipulated what the basic configuration of such a system: 100 intercepto rs, fixed ground-based radars (ABM-compliant) and space-based sensors.

The next major piece of legislation that paved the way for the current NMD system was the American Missile Protection Act of 1998 which was moved by Senator Thad Cochran. It said: "It is the policy of the U.S. to deploy as soon as is technologically poss ible, an effective NMD system capable of defending the territory of the U.S. against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorised, or deliberate"). This Bill was defeated repeatedly until on February 4, 1999 a bi-partisan Bill was i ntroduced in the House.

The Bill (H.R. 4) states simply "that it is the policy of the U.S. to deploy a national missile defence system." It was sponsored by Republicans Curt Weldon and John Spratt with 30 Republican and 28 Democrat members as co-sponsors.

President Clinton had previously threatened to veto the Bill, but backed off after the Senate passed a compromise amendment saying that the U.S. would continue to negotiate cuts in Russian nuclear forces. The Democrats believe that the amendment language is inextricably linked to the ABM Treaty, which they consider the key to arms control negotiations with Russia. But the Republicans rejected language that would have explicitly linked the NMD with adherence to the treaty.

The House adopted the National Missile Defence Act of 1999 (also known as the Cochran-Inouye Bill) on May 20, 1999, nearly a year after it was moved, calling for the deployment of the NMD "as soon as technologically feasible". The Bill included two provi sions on arms control. It was signed into law by President Clinton on July 23, 1999, saying that the legislation makes it clear that no decision on deployment has yet been made and that the U.S. will continue to take its non-proliferation and arms contro l objectives into account.