Mixed feelings

Published : Jul 21, 2001 00:00 IST

There is a sense of satisfaction, though tinged with disappointment, in Pakistan. The satisfaction is over the fact that both sides are back on the track of engagement, and the disappointment is over the missed opportunity to assert their commitment to the normalisation of relations.

SO near and yet so far. It is no doubt a cliche, but the temptation to use it is too strong in the context of the summit-level dialogue between India and Pakistan.

Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and the Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf almost agreed to signing an agreed declaration at the end of their two-day, marathon parleys at the historic city of Agra. And, if reports are to be believed, there was consensus on at least two of the three drafts prepared by the Foreign Office officials of both sides, after burning the proverbial midnight oil. However, ultimately, the two sides could not even arrive at a mutually acceptable joint declaration. A tragedy, to say the least, for the mass of more than one billion people in both the countries.

Perhaps no summit in recent times had generated so much hype and hope. And there were good reasons for the heightened expectations on either side. For it was no ordinary Summit by any yardstick. Two neighbours, with their newly acquired status as nuclear powers, had at last agreed to end their 18-month-old "no-contact, no-dialogue" stance and sit down at the negotiating table to resume a stalled dialogue process.

The manner in which the invitation to visit came from Vajpayee and the military ruler readily accepted it generated hopes of a new beginning in the troubled history of the two nations. The flood of statements from the capitals of both Pakistan and India, at least in the first few days after the invitation, gladdened those who had been campaigning for a resumption of dialogue.

Just the sheer number of the "firsts" that are associated with the Bharat yatra of Musharraf makes it all the more ironical. When historians record the saga of Indo-Pakistan relations, the Agra Summit will undoubtedly figure prominently for more than one reason. It was the first ever visit to India by a Head of State of Pakistan in "normal circumstances". As Dr. Riffat Hussain, a distinguished academician and head of the Department of Strategic Studies at the Quaid-e-Azam University, told Frontline, "never in the history of the two countries had India extended an invitation to a Pakistani Head of State for a dialogue to discuss all outstanding issues including the contentious Kashmir dispute."

All the visits of Pakistani leaders at the highest level in the past were warranted by extraordinary circumstances. The 1972 visit of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, which led to the Simla Agreement, best illustrates the point.

And again never was any leader of Pakistan on a visit to India as powerful as Gen. Pervez Musharraf. He not only presides over every institution of government but did not face the handicap, unlike others, of having to look behind their back constantly in their engagement with the Indian establishment.

Look at his first day's engagements in New Delhi. Some of the things he did were unthinkable, for former rulers of Pakistan, at least for the civilian ones. He not only paid a visit to the Samadhi of Mahatma Gandhi but, in his message scribbled in the visitors' book kept at the monument, underlined the relevance of the philosophy of non-violence espoused by Gandhi. It was almost on a par with what Vajpayee did when he visited Minar-e-Pakistan in Lahore during his much-publicised bus ride in February 1999. Once again, it was for the first time that the national anthem of Pakistan was played on the forecourt of Rashtrapathi Bhavan. In his speech at the banquet hosted by President Narayanan, the General had the courage to acknowledge that there could be no military solution to the Kashmir dispute. It was the same Musharraf who justified the jehad (holy war) in Kashmir in the early months of his rule.

It must be said to the credit of Musharraf that he did make an attempt on the home ground to take everyone on board before his mission to Agra. He initiated the process of consultations with a broad spectrum of Pakistani society. Despite the grumbling by the two mainstream political parties - the Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan People's Party - it was clear that Musharraf did travel to India with the blessings and backing of practically the entire nation. The quarrel of even these two political parties had more to do with the manner in which Musharraf grabbed the office of President rather than his decision to respond to the invitation from Vajpayee.

Before leaving for India, Musharraf did make an attempt to tackle even the fundamentalist and jehadi elements. He did what could have been unthinkable for a civilian set-up. Musharraf used the occasion of Prophet Muhammad's birthday celebrations to deliver a stern warning to the extremist fringe. He asked the extremist elements to scale down their "anti-India rhetoric" and forget their dream to see the flag of Islam fluttering on the Red Fort. He did achieve a degree of success in taming the forces that were opposed to the very idea of normalisation of ties with India. Jamaat-e-Islami, the best-organised right-wing religious party in Pakistan, is a case in point. The organisation, which fought pitched battles with the police in Lahore in February 1999 in protest against the visit of Vajpayee, extended "unconditional support" to Musharraf. Barring the Lashkar-e-Toiba, no other Pakistan-based militant outfit made much noise against the Summit.

There was consensus at least in Pakistan that with Musharraf (a military ruler) at the helm of affairs in Islamabad and Vajpayee (the head of a BJP-led government) in command in New Delhi, this was the best opportunity to take forward the initiative for the resolution of all outstanding issues between India and Pakistan.

THEN the big question is what went wrong? It is difficult to come to a definite conclusion, but there is evidence to suggest that "unpreparedness" on the part of New Delhi could have partly contributed to the process. Weeks before Musharraf and his entourage landed in India, the position of Pakistan on every issue was crystal clear. In his every interaction prior to the visit, Musharraf made it amply clear that he had one and only one agenda - Kashmir. Going by the initial accounts of all that transpired on July 15 and 16 at Agra, the Vajpayee establishment had not done its homework. Look at the case of the military government. The Indian Prime Minister chose to invite him for a dialogue knowing full well his views on the contentious subject of Kashmir, and when he actually sat down at the negotiating table, New Delhi had nothing to offer.

What was the calculation of the BJP-led government in extending the invitation to the military ruler? Did it think that it would put the General on the back foot and in the process put him in a hot spot on his home ground? Just days before the visit, New Delhi made "non-issues" into issues and in the process, perhaps unwittingly, played into the hands of the military regime. The Hurriyat invitation issue is a case in point. No doubt, the Pakistan government went back on its promise, or a gentleman's agreement, to keep the Hurriyat away from the General. But the way the BJP government reacted was totally unwarranted, to say the least. The major portion of the blame for creating the storm in the tea cup has to be shared by the Vajpayee government.

The so-called confidence building measures (CBMs) in the name of "unilateral positivism" from New Delhi were baffling. They gave room for suspicion, with good reason, in Islamabad as to what were the actual designs of New Delhi in rushing with the announcements a few days before the Summit. New Delhi's claim was that they were meant to create the necessary atmosphere, but what they actually created was the feeling in Islamabad that they were part of a "propaganda exercise" to impress the international community. Such was the indecent haste that India did not even bother to inform Islamabad about its decision to send its Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO) before going to the press. The Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi is called to the office of the Foreign Secretary a day after the Ministry spokesperson casually announces the decision in the course of a routine press conference. What is worse, the DGMO calls up his counterpart in Islamabad to tell him that he is boarding the next available flight to discuss the most contentious issues that have dogged relations between the two countries for 53 years. All this, and the cussedness on the part of New Delhi over the "high tea" hosted by the Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi in honour of Musharraf, did not certainly help create the necessary confidence on the eve of the Summit. The question whether they were CBMs or ICBMs (inter-continental ballistic missiles) asked by a senior official in the Pakistan Foreign Ministry brought out the irony of the situation.

And then there was the brusque manner in which Union Home Minister L.K. Advani brought up the subject of the extradition of Dawood Ibrahim and the persons who hijacked an Indian Airlines flight to Kandahar, even before Musharraf could settle down for serious business.

Next comes the decision of Information and Broadcasting Minister Sushma Swaraj to brief the electronic media on the progress of the talks at the Summit, without mentioning the subject of Kashmir. She is a seasoned Minister and could not be unaware of the reaction that such a choice of words could invite from the Pakistani side.

DOES this mean everything is lost? Fortunately that is not the case. This is evident from the mood in Pakistan, at both the establishment and non-establishment levels. There is a sense of satisfaction, though tinged with disappointment, in Pakistan. The satisfaction is over the fact that both sides are back on the track of engagement, ending the estrangement of about two years. The disappointment is over the missed opportunity at Agra to arrive at a mutually agreed declaration asserting their commitment to efforts towards the normalisation of relations.

Dr. Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty, President, Association of Retired Ambassadors, and vice-president, Islamabad Council of World Affairs, perhaps best summed up the three-day visit of Musharraf to India. He said: "The outcome of the Summit dialogue is better than the worst expected and worse than the best expected. We do hope that there would be hope for further one-to-one meetings between Musharraf and Vajpayee when they meet on the sidelines of the United Nations Security Council meeting in early September."

Bhatty said that the very fact that both the leaders of the subcontinent had struck some rapport in the course of their one-to-one meetings gave reason for hope in the future. "The very fact that Vajpayee has accepted the invitation to visit Islamabad is an indication on the part of both to continue the process of engagement and dialogue. Besides the possibility of a visit by Vajpayee to Islamabad, the two leaders could also hope for a meeting at the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) summit-level meeting as and when it is held." At the same time Bhatty conceded that in view of the expectation generated during the day about the possibility of a joint declaration, there was a certain amount of disappointment.

The former Ambassador noted what he termed as two or three important developments during the India visit. To begin with, both the leaders have succeeded in having a personal interaction. Besides, the leaders on both sides have managed to establish a rapport. He made a reference to the banquet speeches made by Musharraf and President Narayanan, and said the tone and tenor of the speeches were very positive. Bhatty said the very fact that both sides came so close to signing a declaration was an "encouraging sign". "It is how you look at it. The glass is half full or half empty. We can certainly look forward to a brighter future, now that the ice has been broken. All this has happened in a span of less than two days and it is certainly not bad," he said.

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