Echoes in Pakistan

The Musharraf government is faced with a delicate situation as it struggles to rein in the jehadis without upsetting the Kashmir cause.

STILL under the shadow of September 11, the military government in Pakistan is confronted with another crisis, the one arising out of the December 13 attack on Parliament House in New Delhi. It does not require much imagination to foresee the repercussions of the attack on the already strained India-Pakistan relations. Given the rhetoric on both sides, the ties are bound to suffer further. Any hopes of a revival of the dialogue, on the sidelines of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in Kathmandu in the first week of January, lie shattered.

A suicide attack like the one carried out in New Delhi is not beyond the capability of some of the Pakistan-based terrorist organisations. The Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) had owned responsibility for the attack on the Red Fort in December 2000.

However, there are unmistakable signs that India is trying to imitate Washington after the World Trade Centre attacks. The blame game began in less than 24 hours. In the process some silly mistakes appear to have been made by India, as did the U.S. The military regime in Islamabad could only be expected to exploit the situation fully.

Forty-eight hours after Pakistan's High Commissioner in Delhi Ashraf Jehangir Quazi was summoned and handed over a demarche outlining three specific demands on the military government, the Delhi Police Commissioner made disclosures that were contrary to the assumptions made by the Indian establishment.

New Delhi had asserted that the attack was the handiwork of the Pakistan-based LeT. But the Delhi police chief made it out that it was actually the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) that was behind the attack. He was careful to add that Jaish could have been aided and abetted by LeT under the overall supervision of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

There was no dearth of reports in the Indian media about how cocksure the government was about the identity of the attackers. Some newspapers even suggested that the Vajpayee government had already shared details of the vital 'technical evidence' with diplomats of 'friendly countries', including the U.S.

Ironically, the day after the attack, Robert Blackwell, U.S. Ambassador in India, visited the office of Union Home Minister L.K. Advani and offered the services of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to assist in the investigations into the attack, perhaps implying that the U.S. was not convinced with India's deductions.

The visit assumed significance as the militant organisations in Pakistan had lost no time in pointing fingers at the Indian intelligence agencies for the outrage. After the ritual condemnation of the attack and the offer to examine any proof in order to consider the demands made by the Indian government, Islamabad virtually endorsed the viewpoint of the militant groups. Pakistan says it is prepared to help or join in any 'joint investigation'.

Pakistan has raised a number of questions and even accused India of 'stage-managing' the whole operation. Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf has talked of the possibility of a "design" behind the attack and warned India of dire consequences if it attempted any 'adventurism'.

IN a way, it is ironical. Both India and Pakistan are supposed to be partners in the international coalition against terrorism pieced together by the U.S. However, the gulf between the two countries has in reality widened since September 11. The second week of October witnessed a sudden spurt in firing along the Line of Control (LoC) and the international border. Such a heavy exchange of fire had not been seen on the border since both sides began observing an undeclared ceasefire in June 2000.

There is little doubt that Musharraf is faced with a delicate situation as he struggles to restrain the jehadi outfits in his country without undermining Islamabad's pet project, the 'Kashmir cause'.

The attacks on U.S. cities knocked the bottom out of Pakistan's foreign policy and impacted its defence preparedness. It now has a threat from its western border as well. With the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan in its final stages, those who matter in Pakistan are no longer shy of admitting the changed realities. In recent days a number of people have been urging Musharraf to seize the opportunity thrown up by the Afghanistan developments and go the whole hog in reviewing the country's foreign policy.

The dominant opinion is that jehad as an instrument of foreign policy has run its course in the post-September 11 world and Pakistan now has to re-fashion its thinking in the wake of the Afghan experience.

With the collapse of the Taliban regime, it is felt that Islamabad has lost not only 2,500 km of strategic depth on its western border but also the ideological justification for the continuation of jehad in Kashmir. The prospect of the fallen warriors heading home and the growing voices around the globe against militant ways to espouse political causes are a matter of serious concern to civil society and the government in Pakistan. After all, world attention is focussed on the country and the region as never before.

Musharraf is very much aware of the dangers involved in the pursuit of the policy of jehad in the 'New World', but can he afford to abandon it without endangering his own position? The fundamentalist religious lobby is down after the collapse of the Taliban militia but certainly not out. Besides, the military establishment can ill-afford to be seen to be compromising on the Kashmir cause. Thanks to the manufactured consensus, the Kashmir cause in Pakistan has come to be identified as an issue of the masses. The jehadis are so well entrenched that it would be a stupendous task for any establishment to take them on. The jehadis gained legitimacy during the Zia-ul-Haq regime, when, between 1979 and 1989, the state encouraged them by all means to fight a proxy war for American in Afghanistan. Once the Afghan war ended most of them turned their attention to Kashmir.

In recent months, the U.S. has been pressuring Islamabad to tame the jehadis for reasons including their collaboration with forces (such as Osama bin Laden) that began challenging the U.S. agenda and the damage they are causing to U.S. economic interests in the region. There were attempts, half-hearted though, by the Musharraf regime before September 11 to rein them in. But these never made much headway as the policy at the top was never clear and the state apparatus was wary about ruffling fundamentalists feathers. The much-touted de-weaponisation programme and the ban on forcible collection of funds in the name of jehad best illustrate the point. Interior Minister Lt. Gen. (retd) Moinuddin Haider came under vicious attack from the fundamentalists for his 'un-Islamic' utterances and that was the end of the matter.

The military establishment is now trying to demonstrate a new sense of urgency to tackle the extremist elements. An ordinance is on the anvil to regulate the functioning of religious schools, some of which are considered jehad factories.

The impact of the U.S. war is also beginning to be seen. Two interesting developments of mid-December are cases in point: The LeT began insisting that it has always been operating from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and not Pakistan, and JeM assumed a new name, Al Furqan. The U.S. put both organisations in the 'terrorist exclusion list' on December 6.

The belligerent posture of New Delhi and any ill-conceived action across the LoC could actually give a new lease of life to the jehadi forces in Pakistan, which are now desperate and demoralised.