Fact, fiction and the fidayeen

ON December 12, All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) chairman Abdul Ghani Bhat told journalists to expect dramatic developments over the following 12 hours. For once, the flamboyant leader's predictions turned out to be correct, but not the way he had intended. Hours after the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) suicide squad intruded into the Parliament House complex, Bhat hastily let it be known that he had referred to a meeting scheduled to take place in New York, which he claimed the Prime Minister's Office was "well aware of".

It seems probable that the ongoing covert peace initiative in Jammu and Kashmir, led by the Prime Minister's Office's top-gun, Brajesh Mishra, and former Research and Analysis Wing chief Amarjit Singh Dulat, will be one of the casualties of the events of December 13. Investigations into the attack on Parliament have made clear that there was significant support to the enterprise by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). But important players in New Delhi appear to be using the situation to salvage their own political position. Their self-serving hawkishness could have serious consequences for efforts to bring peace to Jammu and Kashmir.

Union Defence Minister George Fernandes' handling of events after the attack is a case in point. Despite the Home Ministry's express reservations, sources told Frontline that Fernandes insisted on despatching troops to Parliament. Since they arrived well after the shooting was over, it is clear the sole purpose of their deployment was to allow the Minister to score public relations points. Weapons like shoulder-held missile launchers looked impressive on television, but are useless for purposes other than bringing down Parliament House itself. Nor were the troops which arrived trained in specialised hostage rescue techniques.

Similar propaganda tactics were put to work later that day. Television channels endlessly reported explosions along the international border in Jammu, suggesting that some kind of war-like situation was developing. In fact, there was only one set of bomb explosions, along the zero line in the Akhnoor sector, several hundred metres from India's forward positions and the border fence. A second set of explosions did indeed take place in Akhnoor, but was the consequence of Pakistani troops setting fire to elephant grass on their side of the border, setting off their own land-mine defences in the process.

Another case in point is the well-orchestrated hysteria about fidayeen (suicide) squads, on whose alleged prowess both officials and pro-terrorist elements seem united. In fact, available data shows that the fidayeen squads have had a negligible strategic impact in Jammu and Kashmir (see chart). Less than 200 lives have been claimed in such attacks since 1999, a small proportion of the overall toll of civilians and security force personnel. Despite these attacks, record numbers of terrorists have been killed through 2001, while security force losses have actually declined somewhat from the year 2000.

While the suicide squads which attacked Parliament or the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly could have provoked calamitous consequences, the fact is that these actions are entirely consistent with an existing culture of violence, not the outcome of a new fidayeen culture. India has, after all, lost two Prime Ministers to organisations which had never heard of the word. On the ground, most organisations have adopted new tactics to protect themselves against suicide squads, using for example a second ring of guards other than those posted on the perimeter of sensitive installations. The real purpose of fidayeen attacks is to create panic and sabotage moves towards peace, an objective in which at least some of the Union government's luminaries seem only too happy to collaborate.

The sad fact is that the Union government's management of internal security begins and ends with polemic. The use of the attack on the Parliament House to push the case for the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) underlines just how vapid security management has become. Leaving aside the merits or otherwise of the Ordinance, it is clear that suicide squads are not going to be deterred by the Centre waving pieces of paper at them. Terrorism in the Jammu region has not declined a whit despite the imposition of the Disturbed Areas Act in early 2001, and POTO will do little to make Jammu and Kashmir any safer.

Although a large number of terrorists have been killed in 2001, actually the overall security situation in the State remains disturbing. There has, however, been no serious attempt to review tactics, particularly in the more remote parts of the State, and on the heights of the Pir Panjal. Nor does the government appear to have any coherent idea of just how it intends to engage with Pakistan's continuing support to terrorist groups. Several proposals exist on the means that could be used, ranging from the technological to offensive covert strategies, but none has been subject to any rigorous discussion.

Vague threats to target training camps across the Line of Control have little meaning, since these camps consist of little other than an open firing range and a few tents - hardly a serious military target. These threats will, however, have very real consequences in Jammu and Kashmir. They will work to convince the ordinary people that there is no prospect of any progress towards building a democratic dialogue, and that a further escalation of hostilities is imminent. Without the creation of such a climate, whatever backdoor deals Mishra might seek to strike in New York will be completely unsubstantial. With an election in Jammu and Kashmir just over six months away, the loose talk echoing through the corridors of power in New Delhi could cost a number of lives.