For a new security grid

Published : Nov 22, 2002 00:00 IST

NO ONE knows just what implications the rise of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed might have for the future of counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir. The Army, for one, does not want to take any chances. A confidential paper prepared by Northern Command headquarters in Udhampur has called for drastic changes in the structure of command. If the ideas are implemented, the Army would have direct command of not only of counter-terrorist operations, but also influence key processes of civilian governance in the State.

In April, sources told Frontline, Army Headquarters in New Delhi circulated a document called "J&K Strategy for Resolution of Internal Conflict". The Northern Army Commander, Lieutenant-General R.K. Nanavaty, was charged with fleshing out the document, and providing a structure in which the Army would acquire what it describes as a "lead role" in the management of the low-intensity war in Jammu and Kashmir. Gen. Nanavaty's recommendations have been circulated among the Central bureaucracy and intelligence community, and Sayeed himself is to be briefed on the issue in the coming weeks.

Gen. Nanavaty has recommended that overall control of all counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir be handed over to a new Action Group in the Ministry of Home Affairs. Within Jammu and Kashmir, command would rest with the State Security Council, chaired by the Chief Minister. All its constituents would have representation in three subordinate bodies, the State Internal Development Office, chaired by the Chief Secretary, the Public Information Office, chaired by an officer on special duty, and the State Internal Review Committee, chaired by the Intelligence Bureau. Actual control of operations would lie with a Regional Operations and Intelligence Coordination Committee, chaired by the commanders of each Corps in Jammu and Kashmir, which would have an intelligence sub-committee chaired by the Corps-level officers.

Annexure 4 of Gen. Nanavaty's paper gives the Army "primacy... for the conduct of counter terrorist operations in (the) State." It calls for "all central SF (security forces) specifically allotted to the State for counter terrorist operations" to be placed "at the disposal of Northern Command." "PMF (Paramilitary Forces) and CPO (Central Police Organisation) sector, unit and sub-unit down to company level (or equivalent)", the document continues, will be "at the disposal of Army formation HQ and/or unit as applicable." Northern Command would have overall responsibility to "deploy, employ and task all such forces." The paper asks planners to, "wherever feasible, ensure co-location of military, civilian and police HQ and coordination of boundaries."

Northern Command has clear ideas on the kinds of civilian initiative needed to hold the ground. It suggests that the Army be given direct control of developmental work and administration of special border areas, starting with Kanzalwan, Tangdhar, Uri, Poonch and Rajouri. It calls for "strict control" of Gujjar and Bakkarwal settlements in the "non-traditional areas" like the Hindu-dominated areas of Jammu a long-standing demand of 16 Corps. It asks that migrant communities, which provide shelter to terrorists at altitude, be denied access to Ladakh. Finally, the paper calls for a one-time payment of Rs. 5 lakhs compensation to surrendered terrorists, to be released after a five-year "good behaviour" lock-in period.

The objectives of the set-up would be much the same as they were for the old. Gen. Nanavaty's paper calls for "effective military domination of the Line of Control and (the) IB (International Border)", which would "deny any encroachment, intrusion, infiltration and/or exfiltration." To this end, it demands the suppression of "all terrorist groups opposed to a peaceful resolution of conflict." This would be done by sharpening the divide between foreign and ethnic-Kashmiri terrorists, neutralising the terrorist leadership, eroding the groups' support base and overground infrastructure, and building public support through "people-friendly operations".

ON just how all this is to be achieved, however, the Northern Command is vague. Paragraph 22 refers to the need for new hardware, including electronic warfare and direction-finding gear, night vision devices, surveillance radar and even non-lethal weapons. The rest of its strategy seems to depend on variables well outside the Army's control. The economic measures suggested to bring pressure on Pakistan include revoking the Most Favoured Nation-status that India has granted it, suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, and forcing "competitive defence spending". Not a great deal of thought seems to have gone into these proposals. It will be decades before India could, for example, build dams on the Indus that would give meaning to suspending its treaty. Nor is the volume of Pakistan's exports to India adequate to ensure that their loss would impose significant costs on that country.

Instead, the paper focusses on external instruments to bring about the desired results. Paragraph 3 calls for India to work to "increase international (US: brackets as in the original) pressure to force Pak(istan) to stop proxy war and support for terrorism in J&K." It asks that India strengthen its "strategic partnership with (the) US with particular reference to (the) global war against terrorism." India's diplomatic establishment has been trying to achieve exactly this, with no evident success. The reason is well known. The U.S. sees Pakistan as a key partner in securing its objectives in West Asia and Central Asia. It is simply not willing to sacrifice that more crucial objective because of Pakistan's well-documented role in encouraging terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Army's proposals, then, rest on the a priori assumption that handing over control of operations would in and of itself improve efficiency. There is little introspection on why it has not been able to contain infiltration from Pakistan to any significant degree, or what institutional and structural reforms are needed to improve depth-area efficiency. The fact is that rigidly hierarchical command structures of the kinds that Central police organisations and the paramilitary forces are as mired in as the Army, are fundamentally unsuited to counter-terrorist work. This has been a long-standing problem in Jammu and Kashmir, and although most officials in private acknowledge that the problem exists, no initiative has been taken to address it. The best results have come where the multiple forces operative have achieved functional relationships at the grassroots level, a process that cannot be duplicated by the mindless application of new command system.

Nonetheless, the Gen. Nanavaty proposals have pointed to issues confronting the management of internal security. Many of the officers now commanding counter-terrorist operations cut their teeth in Punjab, and none is keen to experience the tragic wake of 1988 again. Then, the security establishment was forced to work outside the control of the ruling Shiromani Akali Dal government of Surjit Singh Barnala, which was a near-impossible task. The problem applies not only in the Army, but even the State police. No Director-General of Police since 1996, for example, has been free to post officers he believes are efficient even at relatively junior levels, and political interference has been rampant. The15 Corps Commander, Lt.-Gen.V.J. Patankar, made clear at a recent press conference his disquiet over the decision to wind down the Special Operations Group - another sign of political disregard for the concerns of security professionals.

Just how far the new proposals will go, of course, remains to be seen. Past efforts by the Army to take overall control of Central forces, and to have a say in administration, were scuppered by the bureaucracy. A problem has now been stated frontally: and it is up to the politicians to find workable answers.

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