Given their grossly diminished credibility in global councils, the U.S. and its allies had to rest on falsehoods to win endorsement for their war plans.
A "COALITION of the willing" is what the Bush administration sought to conjure up in a matter of days out of the obvious scepticism of much of the world. And as the weeks gave way to months, United States ingenuity in winning global political endorsement was exposed as trashy commerce rather than a pitch on principle. A number of variants on the theme then began to be developed. "A coalition of the bribed" said some and "a coalition of the bought" said others. Those of more artful expression chose a "coalition of the billing" to express much the same sentiment.
For the Bush administration, which hears nothing beyond the echo chamber of the right-wing media, all this would have seemed rather irrelevant. The reigning clique in the U.S. had set down the mantra: the coalition would not dictate the mission, but the mission would dictate the coalition. The U.S. would decide what needed to be achieved and then invite the participation of other countries in its righteous cause. If they failed to join, that would be their damnation. The strategy worked as long as memories of the September 11 outrage dominated global sentiments, rather than resentment over U.S. unilateral arrogance. The falling away of global endorsement was again of little consequence, since in practical terms all that the U.S. needed was the logistical and locational support of the countries around Iraq - the kind of assistance that would willingly be rendered by states that have in the last 12 years, become virtual protectorates. For Britain though, multilateral endorsement from the United Nations was essential, since Prime Minister Tony Blair was under serious threat of a revolt by his ruling Labour Party.
Finally, when Bush flew down to the Atlantic island cluster of the Azores on March 15 for a war council, the participation merely of three other countries represented a colossal failure of consensus. And there seemed no description more appropriate for the cabal that gathered on the Portuguese island than the "coalition of the hearing impaired". The days preceding had seen demonstrations of an epic character against the war plans in Iraq.
Yet, none of the leaders assembled in the remote island - a venue chosen with deliberate intent to avoid the protestors that could potentially challenge their cosy agreement in mainland Europe or the U.S. - seemed to hear the deafeningly loud expressions of public opinion. Blair summoned up his residual influence in continental Europe to obtain Portuguese sponsorship of the event. Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, a junior partner in many recent destabilisation operations launched by the U.S. in Latin America, dutifully came on board. Spain had joined the U.S. and the U.K. in sponsoring a resolution in the U.N. Security Council that effectively authorised war. But at the time of the Azores summit, the resolution enjoyed the public endorsement of only one other member of the Security Council, Bulgaria.
The summit of the four was among the most curious spectacles in the uneasy countdown to the war. Bush looked a reluctant participant in dialogue when his instinct taught him to put his faith in an awesome display of armed might. He was clearly restive at having to confront any kind of public interrogation and his sneering contempt for any semblance of doubt over war was evident at the post-summit press conference. And even as he went over his well-rehearsed lines, it was evident that his intent was very limited: to merely reduce the political liability that Blair would have to bear on account of his blind loyalty. He was - appropriately enough for one of limited vision, understanding and ability - unmindful of all the specific information that had been delivered by weapons inspectors over the past two months about the hollowing out of Iraq's military capability.
For their part, the Portuguese and Spanish Prime Ministers wore the look of dramatic extras who had wandered on to the world stage by some accident and were too busy apologising for their transgression to say anything beyond the formulaic. Nervous and edgy, Blair seemed clearly aware that his lease on public credulity was near extinction. And he clutched desperately at a lifeline that had been thrown his way just two days prior by the U.S. The token, almost cursory remarks made by Bush, as he unveiled his latest variant of the "road map" to peace between Israel and Palestine, was in Blair's rather implausible judgment, firm assurance of U.S. fair play in West Asia in future.
The pretence was rather thin. Almost as Blair spoke, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was urging certain alterations in the road map, to further skew the plan to his country's advantage. Few could have doubted even as he spoke, that Blair was wilfully engaging in make-believe. Sharon has repeatedly said in the past that the so-called "quartet" of the U.S., Russia, the European Union and the U.N. - that has been nudging along the peace process in recent times - is largely irrelevant, since only the U.S. really matters.
On the day of the summit of the hearing impaired, Rachel Corrie, a peace activist from the U.S. had been killed in the Gaza strip - crushed with what eye-witnesses claim was deliberate intent - by an Israeli military bulldozer as she protested against the demolition of Palestinian homes.
Mustapha Barghouti, a prominent civic leader of West Bank Palestinian society, saw a definite design behind the slaying of Rachel Corrie. The purpose, he said at a press conference in Ramallah, was to frighten away international observers who could possibly convey a picture of the true extent of Israeli atrocities to the outside world. And the purpose of the timing was also clear. Israel clearly was determined to use the international distraction of the war in Iraq to create "facts on the ground" that would further the dispossession of the Palestinians.
War, says the ancient aphorism, is the ultimate instrument of statecraft, one that should only be invoked after much deliberation. There have of course been several instances, when war has been declared on the basis of obvious falsehoods. But by all criteria, the ongoing war against Iraq must count as the most mendacious ever launched. And the mere fact that the U.S. and the U.K. were repeatedly found to be engaging in falsehood to win endorsement for their war plans, points to their grossly diminished credibility in global councils. And the fact that the war has Israel as a third party with perhaps more vital stakes than the explicitly belligerent powers, does little to enhance its legitimacy.
Since September, when it began mobilising forces for the final assault on Iraq, the U.S. had been operating on a rather tight time-table. Putting together appropriate force levels on the ground was estimated to take about six months. And the window for effective military action would begin to close rapidly once the punishing desert heat began by middle or late-April.
This, rather than the rigorous and meticulous schedule of reports filed by U.N. weapons inspectors in Iraq, was to set the context for the U.S.' diplomatic engagements. Unfortunately, following three rather comprehensive reports from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (Unmovic) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Security Council was beginning to appreciate the continuing relevance of peaceful disarmament. The covert pressure that the U.S. had earlier deployed to make Unmovic's predecessor body do its bidding and turn in regular reports of Iraqi recalcitrance, was not working. Rather, with the eyes of the world sharply focussed on it, Unmovic had a special reason to keep its reports as factual and objective as possible.
Early March, the United Kingdom drafted a final ultimatum for Iraq and the U.S. set out to coerce the reluctant membership of the Security Council to adopt it. Even if France remained explicit in its opposition, the U.S. intended to secure the nine votes required for passage of the resolution and then dare the reluctant ally across the Atlantic to do its worst. Russia and China remained unwilling, but these countries were considered less likely to exercise their vetoes. Among the rotating members, Germany and Syria were with good reason, viewed by the U.S. as beyond persuasion. That left the "uncommitted six" - Mexico, Chile, Pakistan, Guinea, Cameroon and Angola - for the U.S. to work its magic on. And humiliatingly for the global policeman, it proved unable to get the requisite endorsement from any of these states, prompting an ignominious withdrawal of its resolution from the Security Council by mid-March.
The campaign of disinformation was by then moving into high gear. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell repeatedly stuck his neck out, claiming that certain aluminium tubes imported by Iraq went far beyond the tolerance levels required for their purported use. But contrary to his assertion that this indicated a covert nuclear weapons programme, experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that the material was in fact being used in permitted short-range rocket applications. Documents showing the clandestine purchase of uranium from Niger were supposedly unearthed. But investigations by the IAEA firmly established that these were forgeries originating in Italy - perhaps as a joint intelligence operation with the U.S.
The last throw of the dice came when Unmovic reported that it had found a pilotless "drone" aircraft at a military facility in Iraq. The U.S. was quick with the inference that the vehicle could be used to disperse lethal chemical and biological material over a wide area. The Iraqi military quickly rolled out the offending item for inspection. Constructed from balsa wood and held together with duct tape, the aircraft had a range of no more than 5 km and could be controlled from the ground only as long as it remained within the line of sight.
With its stratagems collapsing all around, the U.K. finally dreamt up a plan designed to fail. The Security Council, it suggested, could provide Iraq a tight deadline to account for its stocks of anthrax and VX agent. It could also demand that the Iraqi President address his nation over all available broadcast media, admitting in a spectacular show of contrition, that he had personally been responsible for extensive weapons of mass destruction programmes and their concealment from U.N. inspectors.
This crude attempt at humiliating the head of state of a sovereign nation was laughed out of court by virtually the entire membership of the Security Council. And even as the U.S. and the U.K. geared up military forces, Iraq was submitting its final accounts on the anthrax and VX issues. But this final act of compliance did it little good. Having strung the U.N. along for 12 years, the U.S. was soon to embark upon the climactic act of its war of destruction.
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