Missing strategy

The Mumbai bombings expose the deficiencies of the emergency services and the lack of surveillance.

LYLA BAVADAM in MumbaI &PARVATHI MENON in Bangalore

HOW well prepared are State and city administrations in India to deal with the aftermath of acts of terrorism like the serial blasts in Mumbai? Are they geared to respond with speed and efficiency to a terror attack that has the potential to inflict large-scale damage, but in which the time, location, target group and means of assault are almost impossible to predict? Saving human lives is the first priority of any disaster management strategy. The immediate lesson of the Mumbai blasts from a disaster management perspective is the importance of keeping emergency medical services on alert. Had ambulances with doctors and paramedics reached the spot earlier, more lives would have been undoubtedly saved. The ordinary citizens of Mumbai stepped in to fulfil roles that emergency services should have performed. Well-intentioned and timely though this effort was, the entry of large numbers of people into the scene of the crime could have destroyed valuable forensic evidence.

Most disaster response mechanisms that are currently in place are set up to deal with natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes, or disasters such as air and train crashes, or fires and building collapses in which human agency plays a major causative role. Do these mechanisms need to be changed in order to deal with terror attacks or are the chain of responses to any disaster involving the sudden and large-scale loss of life and property the same? Can disaster response mechanisms afford to be "taken by surprise"? In response to the Gujarat earthquake of 2001 and the tsunami of December 2004, the Government of India passed a Disaster Management Act in December 2005, under which a Disaster Management Authority was set up at the Centre and in each State. How effective have these been?

Frontline correspondents in Mumbai, New Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai and Bangalore found that the State governments had increased levels of intelligence gathering and patrolling of sensitive areas after the Mumbai tragedy. However, the different arms of the city administration continue to be ill-equipped to handle the fallout of large-scale terror attacks. Delhi has a better disaster response mechanism in place than other States, a system that was tested after the Sarojini Market terrorist attack in December 2005.

Although Mumbai has a disaster management plan in place, it is geared to deal with natural disasters. Its basic principles, however, could have applied to tackling the July 11 bombings. The Indian Railways was totally unprepared to deal with a crisis of such a magnitude. For instance, the emergency services it was prepared with consisted of just one first-aid box and one stretcher at every station. There were just 450 Railway Protection Force (RPF) personnel and 1,000 Government Railway Police personnel for the Western Railway prior to the blasts, according to Western Railway General Manager Rajkamal Rao. This was increased with the addition of 300 RPF personnel and 1,000 Home Guards subsequently, although far short of the required numbers, according to Anil Sharma, RPF Commandant.

Rajkamal Rao agreed that there was a shortage of police and surveillance equipment but argued that the posting of more security personnel could not have stopped the disaster from taking place. "Eight bomb blasts in the course of 15 minutes is an unusual situation. There are no precautions we can take against this. Each train is packed with 4,000 people. It is tough to look after them all," he told Frontline. Closed-circuit television cameras (CCTVs) were installed after the July 11 events on platforms and at station entrances at Churchgate, Mumbai Central and Dadar, to be later followed by Bandra, Bandra Terminus and Borivili.

The railway services are just one arm of the crisis-response mechanism, and overburdened as they are in normal times, they had their arms full after the blasts. Local trains started running within three and a half hours after the incidents. More than 5,000 workers repaired and cleared the lines and replaced or repaired the damaged overhead electricity cables.

Ravi Krishna, a trustee of a private ambulance service called Ambulance Access For All, has this to say about the July 11 incidents: "Our organisation has seven ambulances with radio-trunking services that ensure that communications are not disrupted during crises. One of our employees saw the flash about the bomb blasts on television and two ambulances were dispatched immediately to the Mahim-Matunga sites." They were the first to reach the spot. They picked up eight victims although the ambulance is designed for one. The first ambulance with the victims reached the government-run Sion Hospital. The second one was directed to go to the KEM Hospital since Sion was operating beyond capacity. "Being told to go to another hospital was not an issue," says Krishna, "but the problem was the time lost in going to KEM. Every minute is precious in trauma care. Someone should have been there to direct us faster to KEM."

Last year, the organisation offered to install three radios - at the Disaster Management Cell, the Police Control Room and Sion Hospital - and pay the monthly operator charges for radio services. There has been no response from the government. Krishna says the government's tendency was to disregard private ambulance services in emergencies. "On that night [July 11] no private ambulance service charged any fees," he pointed out.

Interestingly, some of the trainers who work for Ambulance Access For All were undergoing training in London when that city was bombed last year. When the Western Railway blasts occurred, this team was at the Borivili blast site. They noted the drastic difference in the disaster management response between London and Mumbai: the London teams were organised with each member aware of his particular task. There was a ground team at the site. A secondary team gave support and a third team was in charge of the overall coordination. "Disaster management is more of an academic exercise here," he says.

The crucial difference between a disaster management plan for natural and man-made crises lies in surveillance by the intelligence agencies and the police and inter-agency coordination. This was lacking in the case of the July 11 bombings. If the intelligence agencies had prior knowledge of possible threats to Mumbai, why was this information not communicated to the Railways? "We received absolutely no communication from the intelligence agencies about the possibility of any trouble," Rajkamal Rao told Frontline. To this extent, crisis management was a failure.

Delhi's Disaster Management Authority is in its third year of operation and its effectiveness was tested during the Sarojini Market blasts. Contingency plans have been drawn up, and representatives of various government agencies and groups have been trained to respond to emergencies. On being informed of the Sarojini Market bombings by the police control room, the authority coordinated medical help, established trauma centres and set up emergency help lines for the relatives of the victims.

The risk perception from any large terrorist attacks is not high in West Bengal, even within State intelligence circles. The only terrorist strike the State has witnessed is the January 22, 2002, attack on the American Centre in Kolkata. The State's geographical position as a gateway to the northeast and to Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh makes it a conduit for terrorist infiltration. "If we go by regular risk analysis, West Bengal, particularly Kolkata, is not among the top in the danger list vis-a-vis cities such as Mumbai and New Delhi, but the risk is always there," a senior intelligence source in the State government told Frontline. If the threats to West Bengal were to be prioritised, it is the Maoists and the Kamtapuri Liberation Organisation (KLO) that would top the list, "higher than Islamist extremism", the source said. By the government's own admission, however, Islamist fundamentalists backed by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) are operating in Kolkata and the rest of West Bengal. The location of West Bengal itself, ironically, is its safeguard from militant attacks. It is a well-known fact that Kolkata is used as a transit point for extremists in their movement to and from Bangladesh. "It would not be in their interest to organise attacks here," a senior Army source told Frontline.

Thus, while there is no formal crisis management plan in place in the eventuality of a terror strike, the police and the administration have been on extra alert since the Mumbai bombings. Tamil Nadu, which faced a major terrorist attack by Islamist fundamentalists in Coimbatore in February 1998 in which 60 people were killed, has stepped up security. Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi and Director-General of Police D. Mukerjee have instructed District Superintendents of Police to increase security at railway stations and the suburban railway network, with the police even frisking passengers. About 1,400 personnel of the Government Railway Police, 1,200 of the RPF, and 1,200 Tamil Nadu Police have been posted at railway stations and on trains.

Bangalore is seen as a possible location for a major terrorist attack because of its status as an international centre of the software industry and the many defence and scientific research establishments that are located in the city. The terrorist attack on an international conference held on the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) campus in December 2005 brought alive the threats from terrorist groups, and the vulnerability of institutes that function in relatively unrestricted and open academic environments.

Like other major cities, Bangalore too was put on a two-week high alert, with intensified patrolling in sensitive locations. "In the event of a major crisis the three elements of management would be access control, rescue operations, and rehabilitation," the Director-General of Police, B.S. Sial, told Frontline. At a high-level meeting, the Chief Minister reviewed security measures and took stock of the various services that would have to be pressed into service in the eventuality of any organised large-scale attack, but the lack of coordination among different sections of the official machinery in devising a crisis management plan is evident. The State Disaster Management Authority, of which the Chief Minister is the Chairperson, does not have a key player on board, namely the DGP, Fire and Emergency Services and Home Guards. This arm of the police force is trained to handle large-scale emergency situations. It has 35 fire tenders managed by 150 officers: for the next two weeks it will be ready to mobilise an additional 400 fire tenders through tie-ups with public sector organisations and the Indian Air Force. It also has one advanced and two mini rescue vans that can cut through concrete and lift roofs. "We are trained in crisis management," says Ajay Kumar Singh, DGP, Fire Services and Home Guards. Bangalore's crowded malls have been identified as possible targets. According to Ajay Kumar Singh, several large buildings, in particular a popular mall that has recently been constructed, have violated fire safety requirements. "I think that there is room for improving coordination amongst the civic authorities, the health authorities, the police and the fire force," he said.

The medical services department has kept its ambulances on stand-by. "We have instructed our ambulance services in Victoria and Bowring Hospitals, and in the Malleswaram and Jayanagar general hospitals to conduct repairs and be on standby," Usha Ganesh, Karnataka Health Secretary, said. "We have also contacted voluntary agencies to be ready in case of any large-scale emergency," she said.

The State government has held meetings with representatives of the Information Technology and Biotechnology sector on increasing security for employees. Defence establishments and organisations have their own security systems in place. Educational and research campuses remain relatively vulnerable. Throwing a security blanket around them would stifle their functioning, yet some measure of vigilance is necessary. "We have certainly enhanced security since the December incident, but I believe that open academic campuses cannot be fully secured... only intelligence can help," P. Balaram, Director, IISc, told Frontline. "We are more alive to the risks and are in touch with the police when we hold major conferences."

It takes an actual crisis to test the viability and effectiveness of a crisis response strategy to terror strikes. For the present, the elaborate objectives of the Disaster Management Act appear to be only on paper, at least in respect of addressing the new and deadly threats posed by terrorist strikes.

With inputs from Aman Sethi in New Delhi, Suhrid Sankar Chattopadhyay in Kolkata and T.S. Subramanian in Chennai.