Euphoria and fear

Some nuclear scientists welcome the agreement, while others are concerned about the consent clause on reprocessing spent fuel.

OPINION is divided sharply among informed nuclear scientists and engineers on whether the 123 Agreement will benefit India in the long run. While officials of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL), a public sector unit that undertakes the construction of nuclear power projects, are thrilled that the agreement will provide the company with an opportunity to accelerate the nuclear power programme, retired scientists from the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) criticise it as one-sided prepared only for the benefit of the U.S.

S.K. Jain, Chairman and Managing Director of NPCIL, said the company had been waiting for the past two years and a half for the finalisation of the agreement. In fact, the entire nuclear industry in India was euphoric and upbeat with this particular agreement, he said.

But A.N. Prasad, former Director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai, said the whole deal was one-sided as it was bound by the Hyde Act of December 2006, which makes it clear that the U.S. shall not supply reprocessing, enrichment and heavy water production technologies to India. Even consultations will be one-sided because they will always remind us about the Hyde Act, and we dont have an equivalent law on our side, he said.

Prasad, a pioneer in reprocessing technology in India, said the agreement did not grant India upfront consent for reprocessing into plutonium the spent fuel from the reactors to be imported. He said: The way the reprocessing issue has been resolved does not give any comfort. What has been agreed to in principle is that consent has been given in principle for the arrangements and procedures to be agreed in future [for reprocessing]. Having offered to build a national, dedicated facility for reprocessing the spent fuel, we should have got an unconditional upfront consent for reprocessing to be made effective on the satisfactory conclusion of safeguards.

Placid Rodriguez, former Director of the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR), which designs and develops Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs), rejected the claim that the agreement was a balanced one. It is a euphemism to say that it is an agreement between equals. On [the question of] reprocessing, we have not really concluded the issue. He said no upfront consent was given to India. India is allowed to make a request for reprocessing. Even if the U.S. consented to the request, it [the consent] will go back to Congress for review, he said.

M.R. Srinivasan, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, took a neutral stand by describing it as the best compromise that can be worked out at this point of time and as the best way to move forward. However, we must be alert and make sure that subsequent steps are not taken to lead us to make further concessions or erode our position, Srinivasan, now an AEC member, said.

A.N. Prasad, former

In the susurrus of criticism that the agreement has created among both the nuclear community and politicians, what has not been highlighted is the hard bargain the Indian delegation drove with its U.S. counterparts at the negotiations in New Delhi, Cape Town, London and Washington.

Officials of the DAE called it a fantastic team effort and complimented the crucial, but low-key, role of Ravi B. Grover, Director of the DAEs Strategic Planning Group. According to the DAE, Grover, who is also Director of the Knowledge Management Group of BARC, stood like a rock against the onslaught of American demands. While the core negotiating team comprised officials of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Indias High Commissioner to Singapore S. Jaishankar, Joint Secretary (Americas) Gayatri Kumar and Grover, National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan and Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon stepped into the picture when the negotiations reached a decisive stage. In the final round in Washington in July, AEC Chairman and DAE Secretary Anil Kakodkar was available for consultations, although he did not participate directly in the negotiations.

Jain was confident that the full process of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) relaxing its guidelines to enable India to import reactors would take place smoothly. We will have an opportunity to accelerate our nuclear power programme in a big way both by importing reactors and fuel We are looking at the development as an appropriate opportunity not only for NPCIL but for the entire Indian nuclear industry to become part of the global action, he said.

Explaining how this was possible, he said India needed huge amounts of energy for its burgeoning population. But an important point was how fast its energy requirements were met. China had a similar ambitious nuclear power programme. The Russians were also planning to build two reactors a year.

Already, in the U.S., where there was a stagnation of nuclear power projects for the past two decades, 30 applications have been filed with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for launching these [30 nuclear electricity projects] in the next decade. So more than 100 reactors, as of today, are expected to be ordered in the next 10 to 15 years, he said.

But the number of players in the nuclear market could be counted on ones fingers. They include Rosatom of the Russian Federation, Areva of France and Westinghouse and General Electric of the U.S. Jain said the American nuclear industry, owing to stagnation, did not have the capability to manufacture high-precision and larger equipment. The present industry would not be able to meet the orders that were expected to pour in for reactors. So this opens a big opportunity for the Indian industry to have tie-ups with foreign players and develop indigenous capability, which will go a long way in meeting not only the requirements of India but other countries, he said.

India could become an exporter of nuclear reactors and nuclear technology. Many countries in the Asia-Pacific region, where the grid size is small, are looking for small and medium-sized nuclear power reactors. The Indian nuclear industry is the most vibrant industry in the manufacture of reactors ranging from 220 MWe to 700 MWe. We are well placed in servicing this sector of the market, Jain said. Representatives from power utilities in Thailand and Cambodia have met NPCIL officials. Other countries have also expressed interest in buying reactors from India.

They are aware that India could neither import nor export nuclear technology because of the NSG restrictions. (The NSG Guidelines mandate that its 45 members shall not sell reactors or buy reactors from India since India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). Although India is not a member of the NPT, it has implemented the treaty in letter and spirit.

Once India signs an India-specific safeguards treaty with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the NSG relaxes its guidelines, the country can sign agreements either to import reactors or to export its Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs). India had held exploratory and preparatory talks with countries that wanted to assess the Indian nuclear industrys capability to supply safe, economic and reliable reactors, the NPCIL Chairman said.

Just as India is looking for uninterrupted supply of fuel for the life-time of its reactors, countries in the Asia-Pacific region want to import reactors with guaranteed life-time supply of fuel. Once international civil nuclear cooperation opened up to India, NPCIL and the DAE would like to have stakes in the global uranium business, Jain said. India could have stakes in natural uranium mines in other countries either as the owner or as a partner in joint ventures. For reactors fuelled by natural uranium [that is, PHWRs), we have got the entire technology of fabricating quality fuel, which we can supply at competitive prices, he added.

Placid Rodriguez, former

The Hyde Act denies the technology of reprocessing, enrichment and heavy water production to India. Under the Act, the U.S. can terminate the 123 Agreement not only if India conducted a nuclear explosion but took a stand on Iran and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) that went against the U.S. interests.

What intrigued Prasad was U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns repeated claim that India would build a dedicated, state-of-the-art facility for reprocessing the spent fuel. How can we convince him that the facility is state-of-the-art? Burns has got something up his sleeve when he keeps repeating that it should be state-of-the-art. They will find some fault with it, keep dragging [their feet] and we will lose time, in reprocessing, Prasad said.

He alleged that the U.S. game was to hit at Indias indigenous three-stage nuclear power programme because reprocessing formed the backbone of the three stages. The U.S. intention was to block us from reaching the second and third stages. The spent fuel from the PHWRs, which used natural uranium as fuel, was reprocessed into plutonium. This plutonium mixed with uranium as oxide would be the fuel for the FBRs, which would form the second stage. Naturally available thorium formed a blanket around the fuel bundles made of plutonium-uranium oxide. In the FBRs, this thorium was converted into uranium-233, a fissile material. In the third stage, a string of breeder reactors would use Indias vastly available thorium and uranium-233 as fuel.

In both the stages, reprocessing is the central point. They are trying to hit that, Prasad said. It hurts because we have worked so hard in reprocessing. We mastered the reprocessing technology more than 40 years ago. [A plutonium separation plant started functioning at BARC in January 1965.] We were respected. But they deny us reprocessing technology, Prasad said.

Ravi B. Grover,

He feared that India would face another danger once the 123 Agreement was in place. Uranium suppliers will form a cartel, increase the price of natural uranium and will fleece us. So the cost of generating electricity will go up, Prasad said. It is better to suffer for some more time than to succumb, he added.

Rodriguez alleged that the full civilian nuclear cooperation promised to India in the July 18, 2005 joint statement by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President George W. Bush did not materialise in the 123 Agreement. There was no upfront consent given to India for reprocessing the spent fuel.

Technologies relating to reprocessing, enrichment of uranium and heavy water production could be transferred to India only after an amendment is made to the agreement. Besides, the agreement makes it clear that transfers of dual-use items that can be used in reprocessing, enrichment and heavy water production are subject to the parties applicable laws, regulations and licence policies. This was not the full civilian nuclear operation promised to India, Rodriguez said.

Although the Prime Minister went on record saying that there is no question of allowing American inspectors to roam around our nuclear facilities, the agreement has a provision that if the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and the recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures. This would enable American inspection of Indias nuclear facilities, Rodriguez said.