Conditional crutch

President Bush and Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf in Islamabad in March 2006. The White House told the media that either Musharraf is going to have to be more aggressive in the regions that border Afghanistan or the U.S. will strike on its own.-CHARLES DHARAPAK/AP

Musharraf can count on Washingtons support provided he takes active steps to bring the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region under control.

IF General Pervez Musharraf quits his dual role in Islamabad, he could become an analyst on American television. During his tour of the country last year to promote his new book In the Line of Fire, he charmed almost all the televis ion interviewers (including the comedian Jon Stewart) and earned favourable marks for his candidness and humour. His sharp words about the war on Iraq won him friends among the liberals, and his promise to crack down on al Qaeda drew praise from the conservatives. In his book, Musharraf splits the difference constantly. For instance, he tells the reader that his military has arrested 689 al Qaeda members and handed over 369 of them to the U.S. but that the U.S. government has not provided Pakistans security services with state-of-the-art technology for counter-insurgency. That is, he is doing his best, holding back the hordes, and he expects his allies in Washington to do their part in return.

Musharrafs attempt to retain his dignity in such a vice is commendable, although Washington could not care less. He is still, in the White Houses eyes, a satrap of a distant and dangerous province. On July 19, White House spokesman Tony Snow told the media that Musharraf was going to have to be more aggressive in the regions that border Afghanistan or the U.S. would strike on its own. We never rule out any options, said Snow, including striking actionable targets. The White Houses Homeland Security Adviser, Frances Townsend, made the same point two days earlier: Theres no question, the President [Bush] has made it perfectly clear, if we had actionable targets anywhere in the world, putting aside whether it was Pakistan or any place else, we would pursue the targets. The nature of the pressure on Musharraf was clear when Townsend said, It is no secret there have been a series of very senior-level U.S. government officials to engage with President Musharraf and address this issue. These officials include Vice-President Dick Cheney, Defence Secretary Robert Gates and Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte.

The day before Snows press conference, The New York Times revealed that the White House held a series of high-level meetings on Pakistan. Veteran correspondents David Sanger and Mark Mazzetti wrote: In weighing how to deal with the Qaeda threat in Pakistan, American offi cials have been meeting in recent weeks to discuss what some said was emerging as an aggressive new strategy, one that would include both public and covert elements. They said there was growing concern that pinprick attacks on Qaeda targets were not enough, but also said some new American measures might have to remain secret to avoid embarrassing General Musharraf. On July 21, in his weekly radio address, President George W. Bush reaffirmed his support for Musharraf despite the Generals poor standing in Pakistan. But he offered this support with a caveat, that Musharraf take active steps to take charge of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.

In September 2006, the Pakistan military withdrew their forces from the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands with the proviso from tribal leaders that they would clamp down on cross-border raids by pro-Taliban and other insurgents. Raids have continued just as U.S. use of air power has escalated in the region. (Even Afghan President Hamid Karzai has taken to the use of very strong language in his criticism of the use of overwhelming military force by the U.S., which results, inevitably, in the death of civilians). Townsend dismissed the deal as a failure, saying: It hasnt worked for Pakistan. It hasnt worked for the United States. The U.S. wants the Pakistani Army to re-enter the provinces, to secure the border and to go after the militants. This is a tall order, and it was the very failure of this policy that led to the September 2006 deal. Townsend recognises the costs: Just this month, theyve lost upwards of 80 soldiers in the fight, so there should be no question that Pakistan takes it seriously for their own reasons, and we are working with them to encourage them to deny Pakistan as a safe haven. They dont want Pakistan as a safe haven for themselves.

Who the they is in the last sentence is unclear. If it is the top brass around Musharraf, who feel U.S. pressure on a daily basis, this is perhaps true. The development aid promised to Pakistan, which has bolstered its otherwise fractious economy, is central to whatever last shred of legitimacy Musharraf retains. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher linked the continuation of part of the aid to a military response. I think first and foremost we have to remember that some military action is necessary, and will probably have to be taken before the U.S. will start giving the Pakistan government about $150 million per year to develop the tribal regions, Boucher said.

Within the military too there is a lack of consensus on the closure of the border and of its re-entry into the borderlands. Major General Waheed Arshad, for instance, warned against a forward policy into the region. You cant just start bombing and targeting areas with civilians living around there. It would be playing right into the hands of the militants and extremists, he said.

If there is little political will to enter the region, there is even less strategic clarity. Several hundred Pakistani soldiers have died in trying vainly to seal a border that seems impossible to control. The White House is, as on other things, oblivious to ground reality. All Snow could offer was the firm suggestion that it is clearly of the utmost importance to go in there and deal with the problem in the tribal areas. How one is to deal with the problem was not specified. This is particularly important since the U.S. plans to withhold development aid until there is a military solution. The guns must precede the butter. In his book Musharraf writes: The Pakistan Army has always been held in high esteem as the only powerful stabilising factor in the nation. Whether this has ever been true (as Ayesha Siddiqa contests in her powerful new book, Military Inc.) is questionable; it is certainly no longer true after the way the political elite s have leaned on the military to solve the political problems in Balochistan, in the capital Islamabad (with the Lal Masjid fundamentalists) and now on the border.

A senior U.S. government official who took part in the White House discussion on Pakistan told The New York Times that the U.S. appreciated Musharrafs challenge: Weve seen in the past that he&

#8217;s sent people in and they get wiped out. You can tell from the language today that we take the threat from the tribal areas incredibly seriously. It has to be dealt with. If he can deal with it, amen. But if he cant, hes got to build and borrow the capability. To build and borrow in this context probably refers to U.S. aid for Pakistans military and to the new threat that the U.S. itself would use force in the region.

Lieutenant Hamid Gul said of Musharraf: He is so weak internally that he needs American support. Much the same could be said of Bush. Critics of his foreign policy argue that his war on Iraq robbed the U.S. military and intelligence services of the much-needed resources to quell al Qaeda and to suppress the Taliban. Last year, the already overstretched Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) closed down its unit responsible for finding Osama bin Laden. A recent National Intelligence Estimate from early July provided fodder for this view: We assess [al Qaeda] has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas, operational lieutenants, and its top leadership. Bushs pressure on Musharraf must be seen in the context of the firestorm within the U.S. for his failed policy against al Qaeda.

In the July-August 2007 issue of Foreign Affairs, former State Department official Daniel Markey writes of the False Choice in Pakistan. Acknowledging that there is a strong element around the White House that is eager to put more pressure on Pakistan (including sanctions), he writes: Any attempt to crack down on Pakistan will exacerbate distrust, resulting in increased Pakistan support for jehadists; coercive threats will undermine confidence without producing better results. Markey was part of the Bush administration from 2003 to 2007, so he is no stranger to its inner workings. The Bush administration, he writes, has failed to broaden its partnership with Pakistan much beyond army headquarters; it views the civilian dimension to Pakistani politics as a distraction rather than an integral part of the counter-terrorism effort. Most Pakistanis believe that Washington is all too happy to work with a pliant army puppet. Musharrafs charm has operated as a screen to block off the rest of Pakistan society from American eyes. Washington, in other words, needs to work with the military and also strengthen the civilian leadership (and not fear a Hamas-style victory for extremists).

Neither the Bush team nor establishment critics such as Markey, however, believe that there is a political solution to the borderlands. Even if the army eventually retires from politics, writes Markey, it will remain an essential instrument in Pakistans fight against terrorism. In other words, the borderlands will still need to be subdued, either by Pakistani fingers on the trigger, egged on by the White House, or by American hands on the controls that send off cruise missiles.