Towards a thaw?

The new peace moves in Sri Lanka may not represent another false dawn.

LEOPARDS do not change their spots. Guerillas never lay down their arms willingly. And governments rarely cede control over "sovereign" territory. Going by conventional wisdom, the peace moves in progress in Sri Lanka, which could potentially bring about a negotiated settlement of the ethnic conflict, must be viewed with the utmost scepticism, if not with the darkest forebodings. Going by experience, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) may be playing another wicked diplomatic game by making a un ilateral ceasefire offer - only because it is under severe military pressure, having lost over 2,000 cadres to the Sri Lankan armed forces over the past year. Similarly, it can be argued, Chandrika Kumaratunga's government is promising talks only to ward off international opprobrium; it is not serious about talks, or else it would have reciprocated the Tigers' latest ceasefire offer.

Many plausible arguments can be constructed to cast doubts upon the significance of the Sri Lankan developments since the well-publicised November 1 meeting between Norwegian special envoy Erik Solheim and LTTE chief Vellupillai Prabakaran in the jungles of Wanni in the northern mainland. Similarly, the experiences of 1987 and 1994-95 can be cited to contend that no basic change has come about either in Eelam or Sinhala-chauvinist mindsets or in the ground situation, which warrants much optimism. If a m ilitarily powerful and diplomatically insuperable India could not bend the LTTE to reason in 1987, how can tiny, distant Norway succeed today? Numerous hypotheses can be formulated to forecast a likely breakdown of the unsteady peace process.

And yet, a plausible scenario, although not an open-and-shut case, can also be constructed on a basically optimistic view, one that is based not on ignorant or naive hope, but on some hard realities, admittedly coupled with hope. This column, written aft er discussions in Colombo with numerous sources, including government supporters, Tamils who are not supporters of the LTTE, scholars, peace activists and diplomats, outlines just such a scenario. It does not aim to present cut-and-dried, fully worked ou t, solutions to what has been one of the world's least tractable and bloodiest crises, but to stimulate thinking on alternatives. Consider this:

This is the first time since 1987 that Colombo and the LTTE have come so close to third-party mediation, technically still called "facilitation". Earlier efforts, most importantly the Chandrika government's 1994 moves and the more recent Liam Fox initiat ive, compare poorly with the present case. Not only have the Norwegians received serious assurances from both sides on holding talks. They have even laid down the parameters - in apparent consultation with them. These include the twin propositions that a solution must be found within a united Sri Lanka; and that there must be generous devolution of power and autonomy for the North and the East. There is also clarity this time that the mediation will not extend to the issue of a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities.

Both the government and the LTTE have explicitly or implicitly accepted these parameters, although they differ on some short-term issues. Chandrika Kumara-tunga has repeatedly underscored her commitment to a peaceful solution. She has gone farther than a ny other Sri Lankan high functionary in promising radical devolution for the North and the East. By saying recently that "the real cause of the ethnic crisis" is that the "minority communities have not had a fair or reasonable opportunity to share in the ... power structure", she has acknowledged the need for power-sharing.

The Solheim visit to the Wanni is the first occasion when Prabakaran was photographed in public on his own home terrain with a foreign dignitary and probably the first time that he has held direct talks with a potential mediator since 1987. That this was not a mere public relations exercise should be apparent from his important Heroes' Day speech of November 27, in which he called for "unconditional talks" which could lead to "a negotiated settlement that would be fair, just, and equitable and... satisf y the political aspirations of the Tamil people." He also wants the "creation of a cordial atmosphere and conditions of normalcy conducive for peace negotiations" through "a process of de-escalation of war leading to cessation of... hostilities". But he said that "de-escalation" is not a precondition for talks.

A close reading of his carefully crafted speech (admittedly in English translation, but with some help on nuances in Tamil) reveals a soft tone which is uncharacteristic of the LTTE supremo. Prabakaran directly mentions Tamil Eelam only once, and that to o as a peroration - much like an Indian leader's "Jai Hind!". The only other (oblique) reference to Eelam is rather conditional: "If the Sinhala nation fails to redeem itself from the grip of racism and continues its repression against the Tamils, we hav e no alternative other than to secede and form an independent Tamil state".

This is markedly different from the LTTE's familiar insistence on Eelam as a non-negotiable objective, indeed its own raison d'etre. The speech acknowledges the LTTE's recent military setbacks which forced Prabakaran to "delay" his "advance into J affna", and implicitly pays a compliment to Chandrika Kumaratunga. One must reject his contention that the LTTE's "war is conducted within the norms of international humanitarian law", which it is manifestly not, but one does wonder whether he is using s uch terminology to claim a place for himself in the history of the world's great national liberation struggles.

It is possible, and necessary, to distinguish Prabakaran's professed commitment to the long-term, basic issue of a peaceful "political solution to the ethnic conflict" from his demand for short-term, interim, steps such as de-escalation and cessation of hostilities. On these, the LTTE has adopted a shifting approach calculated to explore what concessions it could extract. Thus, at various times in the last few weeks, it has asked for a ceasefire, its un-banning, or de-escalation and restoring "normalcy as a humanitarian gesture". But it has not once said that there could be no talks unless any or all of these steps are taken. In fact, at a crucial moment, on December 21, it declared a unilateral one-month ceasefire beginning Christmas eve.

What is of crucial importance is that unlike in the past, the LTTE no longer insists on its three well-known preconditions: ceasefire, ending of the economic embargo and removal of the Army from the northeastern area. It has repeatedly clarified that "we (do) not demand the withdrawal of the armed forces." Its December 21 ceasefire declaration came despite the government's reluctance to make "further gestures of goodwill" and Colombo's subsequent statement that a ceasefire would come after "negotiations proceed to the mutual satisfaction of both sides" and its demand that the LTTE must "engage honestly" in this effort; "until then, military operations will continue."

The government of course has every reason to be wary of the LTTE's "goodwill gestures". But it is making a trifle too much of the fact that the LTTE did not communicate the ceasefire offer to it through the Norwegians; and it is also unclear whether the offer extends to the whole island. In reality, government hardliners oppose de-escalation because they think military pressure can decisively weaken the LTTE. It is hard to believe that the Sri Lanka Army can vanquish and wipe out the LTTE. More importan t, a further delay on the government's part in responding to the LTTE's latest diplomatic offensive risks losing an unprecedented opportunity for a dialogue. One can only hope that Chandrika Kumaratunga rises above the narrow framework that some of her o wn functionaries, including Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickramanayake, would like to impose on the fledgling peace process.

AS of now, both sides are jockeying for bargaining power. Neither has undergone a change of heart - not the least the LTTE, which remains one of the most brutal, if not the most brutal, militaristic and fascistic forces anywhere in the world. Nevertheles s, one must recognise a real change in its posture, as well as Colombo's. They are both under enormous pressure, especially external pressure, to appear reasonable and make sincere efforts at negotiations. This is driving them, however tentatively and cautiously, towards the negotiating table. Even if there are only "talks about talks", the process could itself build confidence.

As far as the government goes, the pressure comes from Western donor agencies and international banks. The government desperately needs aid, not the least to prosecute the war to which over a fifth of its current spending is devoted. At the December 18-1 9 meeting of the Sri Lanka Development Forum in Paris - the first since May 1998 - its 24 members read the Riot Act to Chandrika Kumaratunga. They rebuked her for her failure to meet standards of "good governance". They said: "A resolution of the ongoing conflict and the need to build efficient institutions and economic infrastructure are the most critical requirements for reducing poverty and improving the lives of all people." Delegates pointed out the "deep linkages between poverty and conflict". The European Union criticised "shortcomings in government" and asked for peace talks and an improved "human rights record".

Chandrika Kumaratunga had to concede that "escalation in hostilities" has pushed defence expenditure to the "intolerably high level of six per cent of GDP." (According to independent estimates, the figure exceeds 10 per cent and, including opportunity co sts of foregone development, may be as high as 20 per cent). Aid dependence has increased just when Sri Lanka could become ineligible for concessional aid (thanks to its "middle-level" per capita income of $900). If this is "negative" pressure, there is also the "positive" pressure from Chandrika Kumaratunga's own past positions favouring reconciliation and radical devolution.

As for the LTTE, the greatest pressure comes, ironically, from its own military victories earlier in the year - most dramatically, at Elephant Pass. These turned pyrrhic when the Tigers found that world sympathy for a Tamil homeland had ebbed to the poin t of vanishing just as they were knocking on the gates of Jaffna. The international community rallied behind Chandrika. It is hard to say if Prabakaran has concluded that Eelam cannot be pushed as a realistic internationally endorsable goal. But he knows he has to show moderation and appear reasonable. Another source of pressure on him is the British government's threat to ban the LTTE which has its international headquarters in London. This has badly rattled the Tigers.

Sceptics would argue - and they include Tamils who are not LTTE supporters, such as the University Teachers for Human Rights, who have valiantly fought for civil liberties and against fascistic authoritarianism - that the LTTE may use negotiations and an y lull in the fighting only to enter Jaffna and forcibly recruit young students, even children, and then regroup and renew the fighting. They may be right. They are certainly right to highlight the Tigers' blackmail of children and their deep unpopularit y in the North. But the LTTE must be tested on the ground in a peace process that includes all currents of Tamil opinion. The present moment offers a unique chance to do just that. Will Chandrika seize it?

THAT leaves us with one question: is there any role for India in this at all? The answer must be a firm "no". New Delhi is not acceptable as an honest broker or even facilitator, given its past involvement. Nor should it promote or legitimise anything re motely resembling a two-state solution. Any Indian attempt to intervene in Sri Lanka, however indirectly, will be resented by all and will be downright ill-advised. New Delhi's past partisan support for and politicking with different Eelam groups, includ ing the LTTE and the EPRLF (Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front), at different times, has tainted its image.

However, for non-governmental organisations and scholars, Sri Lanka poses a challenge in generating ideas to resolve the ethnic conflict within a radical federal framework. An imaginative devolution paradigm could have applications - and lessons - for us in Kashmir and the Northeast too. But this "ideas agenda" must remain modest.