Whither Al Qaeda?

The Jewish Centre, wrecked by a bomb blast, in Casablanca, Morocco, on May 16. - MEHDI FEDOUACH/AFP

The battle against the Al Qaeda's religion-driven terrorism is one fraught with many challenges; the existence of unpopular and ruthless regimes, especially in West Asia and South-East Asia, makes the task even tougher.

TWO recent incidents - in Riyadh and Casablanca - in quick succession have sent a chill down the spine of policy-makers in the White House. The euphoria that was more than apparent after Saddam Hussein's fall has now given way to concern that all is not well in the fight against terrorism. The attacks in, both Riyadh and Casablanca, are attributed to the Al Qaeda. An orange-level alert issued a few weeks ago in the U.S. was based on intelligence reports that the Al Qaeda was planning major assaults on important targets in the U.S. itself. The official assessment now seems to be that the dreaded outfit cannot yet be written off and that there is a need to be on guard against its machinations. While the U.S. anxiety arises from the Al Qaeda's track record of springing surprises, there is also the other school of thought that views the U.S reaction as something that borders on paranoia. In support of its stand, this section points out that, in the recent past, the Al Qaeda has not succeeded in striking at any major government facility. Only soft targets such as restaurants and private residential complexes have been attacked and it has suffered considerable casualties. In the operations that inflicted 25 casualties in Riyadh and 29 in Casablanca, those who perpetrated the unpardonable violence lost 9 and 10 of their own men respectively.

The question is how to tackle terrorism of the type unleashed by the Al Qaeda. The task confounds the best experts in the field. Here again one encounters a sharp division of opinion. Writing under the title `Al Qaeda's fantasy ideology' for Policy Review (August 2002), Lee Harris lambasts those who argue that terrorism cannot be handled except by striking at the root causes, that is, poverty, illiteracy and totalitarianism. He also discounts the theory that the U.S. has invited upon itself the hatred of various Islamic groups by its unabashed pro-Israeli policies. Harris, instead focusses attention on the staple diet of religion-driven madness which goes by the expression "fantasy".

Osama bin Laden and his followers strongly believe that they are fighting the Satan, and that the Almighty would aid them in finishing off Satan. As Harris says, according to this fantasy, it was the Almighty that brought down the Twin Towers, and the 19 suicides in the attack were not a means but an end. The elation that was evident in Osama bin Laden's taped conversation after September 11, and the absence of even an iota of contrition are evidence of this fantasy.

This aspect makes the Al Qaeda deadly and totally unpredictable. It will act wherever it wants and at a time of its choice. I concede that this assessment does not help those charged with the task of liquidating the outfit. This generic statement could also invite the charge of exaggerating the might of an organisation that is on the run in most of the countries. Nevertheless, the assessment helps to keep policy-makers and law enforcement agencies on their toes.

Many observers are intrigued by the Al Qaeda taking the battle right into the Islamic heartland. There are many theories: By all accounts, the Saudi rulers are not exactly popular with the common man in their country. The chasm between the ruling oligarchy and the ruled is becoming wider by the day. Relations with the Americans are also under greater scrutiny in the context of Iraq. The act of hunting with the hounds and running with the hare has gone far too long to go unnoticed. The Riyadh explosion, while causing Western casualties, is intended to embarrass the Saudi government, a task that has undeniably been achieved.

For all their protestations and threats against terrorists, the Saudi rulers can hardly queer the pitch against Osama bin Laden and his followers, many of whom are Saudis themselves, and are not averse to inciting feelings against the caucus that rules the country. This is especially so when it is widely known that the King and his family have shown little sympathy for the majority of the populace who are weighed down by economic problems. A broadcast in February (by a voice claiming to be that of Osama bin Laden) called upon "honest Muslims" to "liberate themselves from those unjust and renegade regimes that are enslaved by the U.S."

While Saudi Arabia and Morocco possibly qualified themselves eminently for the attack, it is hard to speculate as to which other countries are in the line. The point that deserves attention here is that assaults like those in Riyadh and Casablanca are not difficult to stage. Only a few "sleepers" are enough to strike when the vigil is relaxed slightly. As is well known, the greatest advantage of a terrorist is the element of surprise that he packs in his armoury.

THE situations in Iraq and Afghanistan are a cause for worry. There have been reports of skirmishes between the local people and the U.S. soldiers in Iraq. These are inevitable whenever there is foreign occupation. But, in the light of a generally disturbed situation in the whole region, and the U.S. charge that Iran is harbouring elements loyal to Osama bin Laden, the hostility against the U.S. troops in Iraq cannot be ignored. The once talked about uneasy relationship between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden notwithstanding, emergence of an axis between disgruntled elements in Iraq, pro-Saddam Hussein and others, and the Al Qaeda, which has shown itself pragmatic in its recruitment, cannot be ruled out. The rise of the Shiites in the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq may not portend immediate problems. But in a scenario marked by Islamic solidarity against a U.S. presence and its attendant tensions, one cannot safely assert that the Al Qaeda will not fish in troubled waters. Any repression against the latter is bound to invite spectacular actions against the establishment and its cronies. This is an opportunity that Osama bin Laden will hardly miss.

Afghanistan does not excite positive feelings either. There is a strong impression that the government's writ does not run beyond Kabul. Basic services are still unsatisfactory. A recent television documentary was galling, with children complaining that there were hardly any schools to go to. With the Taliban gone, these children hoped that its anti-education campaign regime will yield place to a resurgence of learning. Sadly, this optimism has proved ill-founded. The scene, therefore, beckons the Taliban and the Al Qaeda to indoctrinate people and promote violence. One, therefore, should not be surprised if the clock is turned back by a few years. It has been established that the Al Qaeda does not need large amounts of money or weaponry. It needs pliable minds, and Afghanistan will offer many if the present conditions remain.

The U.S., rightly or wrongly, is convinced that it has won the battle in West Asia and within its territory as well. No doubt many key associates of Osama bin Laden have been arrested. The U.S has also built a solid anti-Al Qaeda consensus and effective international cooperation, especially in Europe and in West Asia, which has ensured the free flow of actionable intelligence. As a result many terrorist attacks have been pre-empted. All this is impressive. But the worrying development is the worsening of the situation in South-East Asia. Bali offered strong evidence of the nexus between the Al Qaeda and militant Islamic groups, some with criminal records in the area. Both Indonesia, with a Muslim-majority population, and the Philippines, which has a substantial number of Muslims, offer fertile grounds for militancy. The periodic arrests of people with suspected links with the Al Qaeda are a constant reminder that the region could become another theatre of action against the U.S and its allies. Thanks to the enormous pressure exerted by the U.S., governments in the region have responded to the demand for stepping up the anti-terrorist offensive. There are, however, different perceptions on the issue of what the U.S. should do to prevent the growth of the Al Qaeda in the region.

Last August, John Gershman writing in Foreign Affairs was critical of the myopic vision of U.S. policy-makers. In his view, any solely militaristic strategy that is based on pouring in U.S. forces to buttress the anti-insurgency operations of local governments will not keep the terrorists at bay. He wants the U.S. to understand that the problem lies with the political and administrative corruption that has contributed to weak governance, the abysmal poverty that afflicts major segments of society and the authoritarian style of the regimes in the region. This situation is compounded by the free rein enjoyed by criminal elements masquerading as paramilitary groups who support the government's battle against insurgents. Gershman would, therefore, commend U.S. initiatives to strengthen the local government machinery and offer economic aid focussed on poverty reduction. Gershman sounds utterly pragmatic. He is not saying anything new. The traditional prescription against crime and violence has been to increase the stakes, for those violating the law, in civilised living and obedience to constitutional government. Massive programmes aimed at spreading literacy and creating meaningful employment opportunities are one sure way of creating such stakes. Whether the U.S. is willing to do so is an entirely different question. With a trouble-prone Iraq on its hands, how far is the U.S in a position to take on an additional burden to shepherd South-East Asia is a matter for debate.

In sum, the Al Qaeda has tremendous potential for mischief. This is especially in the context of reports that Osama bin Laden is still alive. The organisation does not need enormous resources to strike. It requires only a handful of people who believe that they can attain martyrdom through violence against Americans. They do not ask questions because they are convinced that the Almighty has brought them on earth for this specific mission. Confronted with this insanity, one often wonders whether we can do enough to protect ourselves.