Nuclear deal at what price?

The Manmohan-Bush `understanding' on implementing the July nuclear deal leaves many questions unanswered about the `hidden' costs.

PRESIDENT George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have pulled off a broad-contour agreement on implementing the civilian nuclear deal initialled last July. This took several rounds of tough negotiations, the last after Bush's arrival in India. The final decision was taken at the highest political level - a token of the keenness on both sides to clinch the deal.

As I write this on March 2, after participating in a spirited anti-Bush rally in Delhi, details of the "understanding" remain unavailable. By all accounts, Bush accepted India's "finalised" identification of "civilian" facilities, some 14 of the 22 thermal nuclear power reactors in operation/under construction.

The list excludes fast-breeders - in keeping with the Department of Atomic Energy's (DAE) insistence - and facilities producing fissile material for military use. This would be a significant concession, but fraught with risk. It underscores Washington's eagerness to reach agreement before positions possibly harden through public debate.

India, in return, seems to have dropped the condition, explicit in the July text, that the civilian-military separation will be "voluntary". The "civilian" list will reportedly be placed under safeguards in perpetuity and cannot be amended in future. It is likely, but not clear, that the U.S. has promised to supply fuel for these reactors in perpetuity either itself or through the Nuclear Suppliers' Groups (NSG). Acceptance of "perpetual" safeguards is a major concession by India. The meaning of "India-specific IAEA safeguards" is also unclear. If it means a special regime only for India, this might not be easy to negotiate without further U.S. help.

Can Manmohan Singh "sell" the "understanding" to Parliament? More important, can Bush "sell" it to his Congress? The first answer depends largely on how the Left and Centrist parties react. If they see the "understanding" not mainly as a narrow issue of "sovereignty", but as an integral component of a new political-strategic arrangement with the U.S. and a setback to the cause of nuclear disarmament, Manmohan Singh cannot claim a broad consensus for the nuclear deal.

The deal must be seen in the context of the Manmohan Singh-Bush "Joint Statement", which commits India to a range of policies and actions, including the Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture which would be driven by U.S. corporations like Monsanto; completing the Doha Round by the end of 2006; implementation of "Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate"; promoting "democracy" jointly with the U.S.; and developing "a bilateral business climate supportive of trade and investment."

Equally important among the "hidden costs" are "expanded defence cooperation and information sharing" and a commitment to a "vibrant" (read, tight) "intellectual property rights regime". The U.S. has managed to push through a long, comprehensive agenda as a quid pro quo. Only a couple of paragraphs of the 35-page "Joint Statement" refer to the deal.

Securing ratification from the U.S. Congress and the NSG seems even more problematic. Opposition is likely to be significant because the statement excludes from safeguards fast-breeders and 35 per cent of other reactors which also can generate large amounts of plutonium - probably enough to make 25 to 40 fission bombs annually (in addition to the current 6 to 10). [Their capacity is about 2,600 MW. Each MW produces roughly 0.5 kg of plutonium. And 3 to 5 kg is enough to make a bomb.]

Ratification of the deal is premised upon the assurance that India is committed to nuclear restraint and ready to work for an early Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. With his abysmally low acceptance rating (now just 34 per cent), Bush will find it hard to push the controversial deal through Congress. He is already mired in domestic political trouble and the Iraq quagmire.

It will be even tougher to persuade the 45-member NSG to make a special exception for India. Countries like Japan, Germany, Sweden, Norway, South Africa and Brazil - which renounced nuclear weapons to join the global nuclear order on the assumption that it will not be loosened - might object. China could stall the process. Whether or not the deal goes through, we must ask: Will it limit diversion of civilian nuclear material to military uses? How will it influence India's already-close "strategic partnership" with the U.S.? And how will it impact the global nuclear order?

India's pro-deal eagerness is attributable to two motives: get its nuclear weapons legitimised/sanctified, and secure access to nuclear fuel and plants in the world market. The first motive is unworthy.

The second is related to the DAE's inability to anticipate a uranium shortage. Under the separation plan, the DAE can dedicate its domestic uranium entirely to weapons while using imported material for power reactors - hardly a sign of nuclear-weapons restraint.

The deal is part of a larger political arrangement, premised on Washington's offer to "help India become a great power" (read, its subordinate ally, which acts as a countervailing force against China, and loyally supports the U.S.' reshaping of the world). The deal will strengthen this unequal "partnership", entailing erosion of India's sovereignty and its ability to play an independent global role in keeping with the worthy objective of promoting multipolarity, multilateralism, balance and peace. India will find its options narrowing further as it becomes complicit in Washington's plans to establish an Empire.

Also, India would abandon the whole agenda of fighting for global nuclear disarmament and the nuclear weapons-free world so loftily promised in the National Common Minimum Programme.

The nuclear deal will also lead to an import-dependent energy path on which there is no consensus. Nuclear power has not proven safe, economical or sustainable. By joining the Global Nuclear Energy Project, India risks getting drawn into a spiralling technology trajectory where it lacks control. The deal's global implications are even worse.

It will be widely seen as rewarding hypocrisy and double standards. India can keep its nuclear weapons because it is Washington's friend, but Iran cannot have enrichment even for power generation. Strict inspections must apply to 180-odd states, but India is exempted. The hypocrisy will create resentment and weaken the political thrust towards nuclear restraint.

The nuclear deal is a bad bargain for India and the world. Its central political impetus reflects the Indian elite's desperate desire for a subservient alliance with Washington, itself related to the intensely pro-U.S. sentiment in our urban middle class. A June 2005 opinion poll by the Pew Research Centre of the U.S. in 16 different countries bears this out.

Fully 71 per cent of urban Indians have a "favourable opinion of the U.S.", up from 54 per cent in 2002. This is the highest proportion among the 16 countries. The rating is 43 per cent in France, 41 per cent in Germany, 52 per cent in Russia, 42 per cent in China, 23 per cent in Turkey, an ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and 23 per cent in "major non-NATO ally" Pakistan!

"Solid majorities in India view Americans as `inventive' [86 per cent], `hard-working' [81 per cent] and `honest' [58 per cent]." Fewer than half associate traits like `greedy' (43 per cent), `violent' (39 per cent), `immoral' (36 per cent), and `rude' (27 per cent) with Americans.

To a question on where a young person should go "to lead a good life", the answer of 38 per cent of Indians is America! "India is one of only three countries surveyed in which a majority [63 per cent] says the U.S. pays a great deal or a fair amount of attention to their country's interests when making international policy decisions." This is news indeed! Recent urban-based polls in our media turn up similar results. An Outlook poll says 66 per cent believe that Bush is a "friend of India". Yet, 50 per cent believe Washington is "closer to Pakistan". Seventy two per cent think the U.S. is a "bully". And yet, 46 per cent "love" it!

The Hindustan Times (March 2) finds that 45 per cent think Bush is "a friend of India" - despite the fact that 56 per cent says Manmohan Singh is "moving India too close to the U.S." and 51 per cent believe India cannot trust the U.S. "in the long run". Forty five per cent would invite Bush "home for dinner". (Only 43 per cent would not.)

An elite with such lack of moral clarity and schizophrenic admiration for Bush cannot formulate a rational, principled and credible foreign policy. Proof? The Bush visit.