Taliban threat

Published : Mar 13, 2009 00:00 IST

RECENT reports of large-scale violence in Afghanistan and the bordering areas of Pakistan, attributed to the Taliban and a few other groups owing allegiance to it, are of great concern to India. The many incidents that have been reported confirm the views of Afghan-watchers that the Taliban has definitely registered a resurgence that does not augur well for the United States-backed Hamid Karzai government.

On February 11, the Taliban struck at three government buildings, including that of the Ministry of Justice, in the heart of Kabul, killing 20 persons. More than 50 were injured in the attacks, in which explosives and Kalashnikov rifles were used; eight gunmen were killed by the Afghan security forces. The Taliban claimed that it had sent 16 of its cadre to the Afghan capital for the whole operation and that the others were still there looking for opportunities to strike.

Knowing the ferocity of this outfit, one cannot take this as a bogus claim intended only to intimidate the administration and the hapless public. U.S. officials believe that this attack was sponsored by the Pakistan-based Jalaluddin Haqqani group, which is suspected to have been behind the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008, in which more than 40 persons, including two Indian diplomats, were killed.

The February 11 attacks, hoodwinking all the security deployment in most of Kabul, cannot be viewed in isolation. There have been indiscriminate kidnapping adventures by the Taliban and its associates in the neighbouring regions of Pakistan, especially in the Swat valley of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), which is virtually under militant control despite a huge Pakistani Army presence.

A Polish geologist was abducted in September 2008 and held hostage until he was killed on February 7. A United Nations diplomat (a U.S. national), abducted from Quetta (Baluchistan) a few weeks ago, is being held hostage. A Chinese hostage has been released after being held for several months, with the Taliban describing it as a goodwill gesture during peace talks with the administration. A 10-day ceasefire announced by the Taliban on February 15 does not convince many about its bona fides. The move is looked upon as a ruse to gain time and gather more resources or to redeploy existing ones for a fresh offensive.

India needs to sit up and ask several questions after the February 11 attacks, which have come within a year of the suicide bombing of the Indian embassy. In the latter incident, too, there was heavy security on the road leading to the embassy where the vehicle carrying the two high-ranking Indian diplomats was intercepted before they were fired upon. Two other Indian victims of the Taliban were M.R. Kutty of the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), in November 2005, and Suryanarayana, a telecom engineer deputed to Afghanistan by a Bahrain firm, in April 2006.

These would point to continuing Taliban hostility to India and the need to secure Indian nationals working in Afghanistan. More than that, how does India guard itself against Taliban action by proxy on its territory? There are many outfits in Pakistan and Kashmir having ties with the Taliban directly or through intermediaries harboured by Pakistan, and they are more than willing to receive aid to execute the Talibans diabolic plans.

Interestingly, in the early years of its existence, the Taliban did not display any rancour against India. There is reason to believe that it was actually indifferent to the happenings in this country as it had other preoccupations, including the fight against communism, a follow-up to the ouster of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.

The first signs of unhappiness towards India came in 1998 when the Taliban suspected Indian support to what it considered a puppet communist regime. Next came the Taliban administrations dubious role in Kandahar in December 1999 when the hijacked Indian Airlines flight IC-814 landed there. The suspicion of Taliban complicity in the hijacking is bolstered by the report that airport officials handling the situation were in close touch with Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) operatives in Pakistan. There was also a report a few years ago that the Taliban was willing to support the demand for a free Kashmir and assist the movement openly. But it expressed its inability do so until it gained full control of the region adjoining Kashmir. This stand alone would establish that given a chance it would destabilise India and its environs.

There are several grounds for the Talibans bitterness towards India. The prominent ones would include Indian support to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, whom it considers a puppet in U.S. hands. Anybody who toes the U.S. line becomes an instant foe of the Taliban. More recently, Indian help in development projects in Afghanistan has annoyed the Taliban. The Indian presence has been expanding by the day, with its technical personnel going as far as the Herat region bordering Iran. The Kutty-Suryanarayana murders were an echo of the growing distrust of Indias intentions. In a way, the Indian presence cuts into Taliban activities outside Kabul. Pakistans perception of the Indian presence is not wholly different from the Talibans. It is equally jealous of Indias positive image and increasing influence in Afghanistan.

It is a tribute to Indias foreign policy that it has refused to be cowed down by the Taliban threat. Nor has India paid attention to Pakistans dislike of its assistance to the development of Afghanistan. The costs in terms of human lives of Indians working in Afghanistan and the danger of a more aggressive Taliban directly supporting militants in Pakistan, especially those in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, could, however, be heavy. The investigation into the Mumbai carnage of November has not yet brought evidence of a direct Al Qaeda/Taliban role. It is doubtful whether Pakistan will share with India any supporting material it may come across during its investigation.

India should be concerned about reports that the opium trade in Afghanistan is flourishing. This is despite claims to the contrary until very recently when the government crowed about its war against druglords. Some of the latter have actually joined the administration at the provincial level and hold elective offices. Corruption in law enforcement agencies is rampant. It is a matter of distress that even President Karzais brother is mentioned in dispatches as being involved in the racket, and it is known that Karzai cannot distance himself from the former, particularly when elections are round the corner.

The Taliban itself has a lot at stake to defeat any policy that aims at liquidating poppy cultivation. Taliban prosperity is attributed mainly to revenue from this source. India is a definite transit point for the drug trade originating in Afghanistan. In every way, India has a stake in whatever is happening in that country. This assessment derives strength from the view of General David Petraeus (who now oversees U.S. operations in Afghanistan after a tenure in Iraq) that no strategy against terrorism in the region can leave out India.

Few can deny that the situation in Afghanistan is fast going out of control. The number of terror incidents has gone up. These are no longer confined to areas far away from Kabul, from where the Taliban was once described as having eased out civil administration. These are now happening right in the heart of Kabul, close to the presidential palace. Karzais ineptitude and the strong feeling that he has not done much to check corruption in all spheres of life have caused disillusionment among U.S. policymakers. This explains the Barack Obama administrations reported favour of a surge that will pump in several thousand more troops into the country. General Petraeus is not so sure that what worked in Iraq will work in Afghanistan, whose problems are manifold.

The overall trends are ominous. Reports of a marshalling of resources and a sinking of differences by an assortment of terrorist groups cannot be ignored. According to one source, Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union, also from Uzbekistan, are all now prepared for a direct role in taking charge of the situation.

Earlier, they were content with training cadre and making them available for action in the field. Enthused by the arrival of experienced fighters from Iraq and fresh recruits from the Central Asian republics, Chechnya and Turkey, Al Qaeda and the other two groups from Uzbekistan now seem willing to take a direct part in operations. Irrespective of whether this report is accurate or fanciful, there is need for a state of extreme preparedness.

Satellite-based military technology has shrunk distances. Such technology is not available only to lawful armies. There is reason to believe that terrorist formations have easy access to them. This is why the surge that the U.S. talks about has its limitations. What India needs is hard intelligence on terrorist preparations. It did not have this in the case of the Mumbai terror attacks, which resulted in the loss of nearly 200 innocent lives.

Can we afford one more Mumbai? Predictions by many (including the reputed Rand Corporation) are that India is likely to be attacked again in the near future. Despite all the rhetoric in the days immediately after the Mumbai attack, infrastructure to meet the terrorist challenge has improved only marginally.

Sign in to Unlock member-only benefits!
  • Bookmark stories to read later.
  • Comment on stories to start conversations.
  • Subscribe to our newsletters.
  • Get notified about discounts and offers to our products.
Sign in

Comments

Comments have to be in English, and in full sentences. They cannot be abusive or personal. Please abide to our community guidelines for posting your comment