Why Kanishka happened

THE government needs to take responsibility to avoid further failure and to prevent a return to a culture of complacency. So concluded the former Canadian Supreme Court Judge John Major, who probed how Air India's Kanishka aircraft was brought down over the Atlantic on June 23, 1985, killing 329 passengers and members of the crew. The reputed judge could not have been more forthright and blunt.

Appointed in 2006 to go into all aspects of the disaster, the judge, in his 3,000-odd-page report released on June 17, was emphatic that a cascading series of errors by Canadian security agencies led to the disaster. It is true that the findings are of no solace to the victims' families.

The recommendation for further compensation also lacks meaning and has been assailed as nothing more than a bitter sweet. John Major's report is, however, relevant to those of us not directly affected by the tragedy. The gravamen of the judge's charge was that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) were guilty of utter lack of coordination.

This shortcoming of the country's most vital establishments is not peculiar to Canada. It is the same story in most democracies. One recent supreme example was 9/11, which exposed the ongoing turf war between the principal intelligence organisations in the United States, especially the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which resulted in an abysmal failure to construct the whole conspiracy. Ironically, between them, they had all the vital facts that could have helped to bust the group, which executed the diabolical plan. The Kanishka tragedy has been described in vivid detail many times in the past. Although 25 years have elapsed, the facts are so relevant to civil aviation security of the present times that its details bear repetition.

The conspiracy to sabotage an Air India flight was taken by Sikh extremists in Canada owing allegiance to the dreaded Babbar Khalsa, who were provoked by Operation Blue Star (1984) against Sikh separatists operating from the Golden Temple in Amritsar.

The Canadian authorities had been alerted by Indian intelligence which was concerned that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi could be targeted by Sikh extremists during his visit to the United Nations in June 1985. India had, in fact, told Canada of what Sikh groups were doing both at home and in Canada to whip up anti-India feelings.

Justice Major's report is graphic about what Indian and Canadian intelligence and the RCMP knew about the threat to Air India flights. Air India in Montreal, too, had alerted the RCMP of the danger to its flights. What takes the cake is that the RCMP had kept a tab on Talwinder Singh Parmar, the well-known Babbar Khalsa International leader. He had been kept under surveillance for quite some time.

To this day one does not know why this watch was withdrawn, that too after some CSIS officers chanced to be present close to the spot where Talwar and two other Sikhs conducted an explosives test prior to the sabotage of Kanishka. The rest is history.

The Babbar Khalsa group managed to smuggle a box containing explosives and a timer device onto flight AI 182 from Montreal to New Delhi. Simultaneously, a Canadian Airlines flight, was also targeted. Explosives sent in a bag on that flight went off at the Narita airport in Japan when luggage was being transferred to an Air India flight. Two handlers were killed.

What ultimately happened after the gang responsible for the two incidents was traced and put on trial was even more galling than the gruesome attack on Kanishka. The two principal accused, Ripudaman Singh Malik and Ajaib Singh Bagri, were let off by the trial judge on the grounds that the evidence against them was not convincing. This was a commentary on the quality of investigation, even if one were to concede that complicity in terrorist acts is far too difficult to prove in a court of law trying someone for murder.

A third accused, Inderjit Singh Reyat, directly involved in the Narita explosion, was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison and served this out in a British prison. On being returned to Canada thereafter, he was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison in the Kanishka case.

Some recommendations of Justice Major focus on the gaps in the structure of the Canadian security establishment. Foremost among the shortcomings is the lack of rapport, if not downright hostility, between the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. This is why the judge suggests the creation of a czar who will iron out differences between them. He goes on to say that this functionary, possibly the National Security Adviser, will have direct access to the Prime Minister.

More significant is the suggestion that prosecution of terrorists should be in the hands of the Federal government in the form of a Director of Prosecutions within the Attorney-General's office. (This is analogous to the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in India.

Of course, the NIA is only an investigating agency and has to depend on prosecutors appointed by the Central government. Nevertheless, its situation within the Central government gives it access to enormous resources and international experts on terrorist investigation and prosecution.) Justice Major also recommends the setting up of an institute (a Kanishka centre) that would undertake a systematic study of terrorism in the present context.

All these are definitely steps in the right direction. The point, however, is that people working at the grass roots are the weakest link in the chain. There is always a question mark over the level of their sensitivity and dedication to tasks, both of which call for hard work and perseverance. We have come a long way since Kanishka. The most crucial slip-up by the airline authorities in Vancouver and Montreal was to allow the aircraft to depart with baggage that was unaccompanied by the passengers who had checked them in. This rule with regard to such baggage is implemented strictly these days.

But then the hidden human element here can contribute to a breach, wittingly or unwittingly. There is, therefore, something to be learnt from each such incident. The shoe-bomber who concealed explosives in his footwear and the more recent incident in which a terrorist fastened to his thigh ingredients required to assemble a bomb on board are perhaps the ultimate in innovation.

Internationally, all airlines have taken precautions against such ludicrous acts. But then there is no end to ingenuity on the part of a terrorist. This is why aviation security does not permit any complacency. Whatever the airlines do, it is ultimately passenger alertness that bolsters a well-designed drill.